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ABSTRACT
This thesis takes as its focus R. v. Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 and seeks to
assess its possibilities as the source of a legal principle to guide the constitutional
review of the aboriginal and treaty rights protected by s . 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982.
In Chapter 1, the decision and the commentary to which it gave rise is
discussed . Chapter 2 reviews the history of the law of aboriginal rights with a
particular focus on the Indian law of the United States. Chapter 3 reviews Canadian
Native law with a particular stress on the trust obligation . In Chapter 4 the language
of trusts is reviewed and the influence of International law is canvassed . After a
brief discussion of fiduciary law, the chapter closes with a suggested basis for a
constitutional fiduciary principle . Chapter 5 opens with a discussion of s. 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 . The theory is then proposed .
The theory would find its origin in the common law recognition of the pre-
contact sovereignty of the aboriginal peoples and its denial by the colonizing nation
at the time of colonization. The assumption of legislative power by the Crown came
with an obligation, acknowledged by the Crown, that it must use its legislative power
so as to protect and promote the interests of the aboriginal peoples in order to assist
them through the process of colonization . It is suggested that s. 35 of the
Constitution Act. 1982 may have made that obligation justiciable and may require
the courts to check the exercise of its legislative power to make certain that any
negative effect on the aboriginal peoples is justified . The standard, being a fiduciary
one, would be high .
The thesis closes with an application of the theory to some past and present
issues in Native law .
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many people have contributed to this thesis. First I must thank the College
of Graduate Studies and Research for the scholarships without which this work
would not have been possible .
I would like to thank also my supervisor, Professor Norman K. Zlotkin, for
his assistance and support. It is greatly appreciated. I must thank also the members
of the thesis committee, Professors Richard Bartlett and Howard McConnell, for the
invaluable assistance they have given me . Thanks also to my external examiner, Don
Purich, who helped to make the final stage of the process an enjoyable one .
I must thank also the many students from the Gabriel Dumont Institute and
NORTEP who I had the pleasure to meet through teaching my course on Native
law. Their contribution to the understanding which informs the thesis has been
greatly appreciated.
I thank also Associate Chief Justice Hamilton of the Manitoba Court of
Queen's Bench and Associate Chief Judge Murray Sinclair of the Manitoba
Provincial Court, for their support and understanding during the final phases of the
preparation of the work.
Particular thanks must go to my friend Brian Anderson with whom I spent
many hours discussing the ideas which led me to the results found herein and for the
many diversions we found together . Thanks also to Tim Quigley, once a fellow
resident in the windowless basement room where the first pages of this were written,
who made the process more enjoyable by seeking my assistance with the empirical
research for his thesis .
Finally, I must thank also those other friends who are too numerous to be
named here who also assisted me in the writing of this work . They made the days
brighter.
iii
A FIDUCIARY THEORY FOR THE REVIEW OF ABORIGINAL RIGHTS
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION	
1
NOTES	
11
CHAPTER 1
ANTICIPATING THE CONSTITUTION : R. v. GUERIN	13
a The Guerin Decision	
14
i The Opinion of Mr. Justice Estey	 20
ii The Opinion of Madame Justice Wilson 24
iii The Opinion of Mr . Justice Dickson 27
b The Decision Discussed	 37
c The Fiduciary Obligation : A Theory for Constitutional Review?	
45
NOTES	
49
CHAPTER 2
AMERICAN INFLUENCES	 56
a Early Influences 57
i
	
The Beginnings of Colonization	 57
ii The Royal Proclamation of 1763 65
b Native Law in the United States
68
i The Marshall Cases	
72
ii Development
87
c The Trust Obligation Today 95
i The Moral Obligation
96
ii The Rules Of Treaty Interpretation	
98
ill As a Restriction on the Powers of Congress
	100
iv As a Check on the Powers of the Administration
105
v Analysis	
118
iv
d Conclusion	
132
NOTES
135
CHAPTER 3
ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN CANADA	
155
a Indian Rights	 157
b Federal Power 167
c Trust Obligation 171
i
	
The Unenforceable Trust:
The Guardian/Ward
Relationship	 175
ii The Enforceable Trust: The Wardship Codified	184
a Codification in the Pre-Confederation Period 185
b Codification after Confederation	195
c Codification in the Indian Acts 198
i The Definition of Reserves 201
ii Control over Band Moneys 203
iii The Powers of Management of Indian Lands and
Property	 204
d Codification : The Views of the Courts	207
i The Crown as Trustee 208
ii The Native Law Trust 211
iii The Enforceable Trust: The True Trust 218
d Summary	 222
NOTES 224
CHAPTER 4
A SEARCH FOR COHERENCE	 241
a A Problem of Terminology 243
i. Trusts in the Generic Sense 247
ii Trusts in the Legal Sense : The True Trust	250
iii Trust in the Political Sense	 257
a Government as Trust 258
b Fiduciary Duties Implied into Statutes 261
iv Summary	 270
v
b The Native Law Trust	
273
i The Guardian/Ward Relationship	 274
ii The International Law Trusteeship 277
iii The Native Law Trust : A Wardship
282
c Guerin: The Basis of a Theory?	
283
i The Triggering Event: The Assumption of Sovereignty	
285
ii Fiduciary Law: The Background
290
iii The Connecting Principle : The Transfer of an Encumbered
Power	 295
d Summary
302
NOTES	
303
CHAPTER 5
A FIDUCIARY THEORY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW	
316
a The Aboriginal and Treaty Rights Provisions of the new Constitution . . . 317
i Section 35: A Purposive Analysis	
319
ii The Purpose of Entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights . . .
321
a The General Objectives 322
b The Relation of s. 25 and s. 35
324
•
	
The Purpose of s. 35	 327
d Summary	 335
iii A Closer Look at s. 35
337
a The Content of s . 35 338
b Recent Judicial Discussion of the Fiduciary Obligation	343
iv Summary	 350
b A Fiduciary Theory for Constitutional Review	
351
i The Constitutional Fiduciary Theory
352
a The Origin	
353
b The Triggering Event	 353
• The Legislative Scheme which invites the Supervision of the
Courts
354
d The Purpose of the Duty 355
•
The Connecting Principle	 356
f Summary	 356
ii A Measured Separateness 357
iv The Wardship
361
v The Theory
364
vi
c Some Applications of the Theory	
367
i Child Welfare	 367
ii The Treaty Right to Post-Secondary Education	369
iii The Sechelt Band Self-Government Act 373
d Conclusion 377
NOTES	 380
BIBLIOGRAPHY	 391
vu
INTRODUCTION
In December 1984 the Supreme Court of Canada delivered its long awaited
decision in Guerin v. The Oueen . l The Court held that the Crown owed the
Musqueam Indian Band a fiduciary duty in relation to surrenders of reserve lands!
The language of the case indicates strongly that the case was intended to operate as
a general rule covering all Indian Act surrenders. The duty, which could be varied
in any particular case, was one which required the Crown, when leasing the
surrendered lands, to act in the best interests of the Band . The three opinions
handed down all gave extensive justification for the particular duty which they held
the Crown owed the Indians.
In March of 1985, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the federal
government owed a fiduciary obligation to the Penticton Indian Band which was not
breached when they acted against the interests of the Band in expropriating reserve
lands for use as an airfield in wartime .' The expropriation was held not to be a
breach of duty because the government was merely balancing the "competing
considerations"' pertinent to Departments with different mandates . The government
was permitted balance its duty to the Indians against the requirements of the
Department of National Defence. In reaching this opinion for the majority,
Urie
J. gave no reasoned analysis on how the courts, and more importantly the Bands,
might judge the balancing process . He offered only proof that the different interests
1
had been considered. The provisions of the Constitution Act . 1982,
it should be
noted, were relevant to neither of these cases .
In August of 1988, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that although the Treaty
right to fish of the Batchawana Indian Band had not been extinguished and was,
consequently, constitutionally protected, it could nevertheless be derogated from by
regulation validly aimed at the conservation of the fish stocks! The argument of
Blair J.A. for the Court, is comparable to that of Urie J . in the Federal Court of
Appeal three years earlier . He states :
Indian treaty rights are like all other rights recognized by our legal system .
The exercise of rights by an individual or group is limited by the rights of
others. Rights do not exist in a vacuum and the exercise of any right involves
a balancing with the interests and values involved in the rights of others . This
is recognized in s . 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which
provides that the limitation of Charter rights must be justified as reasonable
in a free and democratic society. In the United States the rights proclaimed
by the Bill of Rights are not qualified by a provision similar to s
. 1 of the
Charter, yet they have been subjected nevertheless, to reasonable limitation
by judicial decisions .
The test of reasonableness has been applied to Indian treaty and
aboriginal rights .'
Finding the impugned licensing provisions to be reasonably aimed at conservation,
Blair dismissed the appeal . In doing so, like Urie before him, he offered no
principled theory for balancing the competing interests : the rights of the Indians,
the need for conservation, and the rights of the commercial fisherman and of the
general public .
What these cases amount to, and there are others which follow a similar
pattern, is an acceptance by the courts of the opinion of the relevant department of
the Crown regarding the weight to be given to the now constitutionally protected
2
rights of the First Nations . That, it is suggested, is not acceptable . I do not suggest
here that aboriginal and treaty rights should be allowed to override all competing
interests . I suggest that the courts should take a more principled and active role in
the protection of those rights . Without that, the constitutional entrenchment of
aboriginal and treaty rights will have been an empty exercise . It is not enough
simply to check that the Crown took the aboriginal interest into account . The
courts, it is suggested, must make certain also that the balancing was properly carried
out and must do so in a principled way. I suggest here that the opinion in
Guerin
of Mr. Justice Dickson,7 as he then was, might provide the basis for principled review
of that balancing .
The Guerin decision was one of the first Native law cases considered by the
Supreme Court of Canada after the constitutional entrenchment of aboriginal and
treaty rights. And although it concerned only the protection of
Indian Act reserve
lands, Dickson, with three of the eight 'udges deciding, handed down an opinion
which dealt with the issue in a very broad manner! The opinion of Madame Justice
Wilson, with two other members of the Court, seemed to support the general tenor
of Dickson's opinion.' It is suggested here that the Court was offering an indication
of how it was predisposed to interpret the constitutionally protected Indian rights .
The analysis of Dickson's opinion offered here suggests that the fiduciary
obligation recognized in Guerin contains five elements
. The duty originates in the
Band's interest in their reserve land coupled with the fact that the Band can
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surrender its interest only to the Crown . The third element is a legislative scheme
which invites the scrutiny of the courts. That is provided by the Indian Act and its
delegation, to the Governor in Council, of a discretion in relation to land surrenders .
The purpose of the duty, the fourth element, is found in the protective role of the
Crown, recognized throughout Indian/European and Indian/Canadian relations, and
which is codified in the provisions of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 10 and the
Indian Act." Finally, the law of fiduciaries provides a principle to connect the above
elements, one which can guide the courts in their checking of the actions of the
government. The obligation, of course, is intended to protect the Indian land rights .
The theory suggested here would go further than protecting land rights . It
would provide a minimum standard for the interpretation of s .35 rights . I would
suggest that the interests recognized in the Guerin case are inevitably limited by the
facts of the case itself. So, consequently, is the law . Guerin is limited to land issues .
But the recognition of land rights is only one element in the field of aboriginal
rights. The special status of the aboriginal peoples as peoples, as the First Nations
in today's parlance, is, it is suggested, the essential aboriginal and treaty right . A
general theory, if it is to be useful, must be relevant to the implications of this
special status. Dickson's opinion, I suggest, might contain the germ of such a general
theory.
The protection of rights in land, I suggest, is merely the result of the
recognition of special status . They seem to be the premier aboriginal right only
because they are the first to come to court . Recognition of the land right implies
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special status. The Constitution Act . 1982, s. 35, it is suggested, entrenches the
special status. A similar development can be discerned in the Indian law of the
United States." It is suggested that the recognition of the land right in Johnson v.
McIntosh led inevitably to the recognition of a limited right to self-government in
Worcester v. Georgia.' I make no argument here about the right to self-government
in Canadian Native law. I note it only because it represents the extreme recognition
of special status.
The theory supporting a broader fiduciary obligation proposed here looks to
the base of the elements recognized by Dickson in Guerin. The interest in land is
only one aspect of the pre-contact relationship of the Indian Nations to their lands .
It originates in, and is an element of, the pre-contact sovereignty of the Indian
nations. The surrender requirement originates in the Doctrine of Discovery, the
same principle which is at the root of United States Indian law . Integral to the
Doctrine of Discovery is the special duty owed By the Crown to the Indian peoples .
A general fiduciary duty would originate in these two elements .
Section 35 of the Constitution Act. 1982 invites the scrutiny by the courts of
Crown action in relation to Indian matters . The fourth element, the purpose of the
duty, since this is a constitutional theory, is provided by aboriginal rights sections of
the new Constitution . A purposive analysis of s. 35 suggests that the purpose of the
section is to provide the aboriginal peoples with a special status within Canada: a
special status I have called a "measured separateness" ." The protective role of the
Crown, I argue, is only one aspect of the duty of the Crown to Canada's aboriginal
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peoples .
Alongside and inextricably bound up with that duty is one to assist the First
Nations to adjust to colonisation . Together these constitute a broader duty, called
the trust obligation, which is at the heart of native law . I call it here the wardship
to emphasize the duties it contains.
It is a role that the government has actively
assumed, albeit on occasion in a somewhat equivocal fashion . The connecting
principle is, as it is in Guerin,
provided by the law of fiduciaries.
The synthesis of these elements reveals, I argue, a theory which is well
equipped to assist the courts in the determination of the content of s . 35 and in the
balancing of those rights with the rights of others . It might serve also to suggest
standards by which to judge the legislative and administrative actions of the Crown
.
A major problem for the aboriginal and treaty rights provisions of the Constitution
is that the beneficiaries of those rights do not have sufficient political power to
control their implementation . The aboriginal peoples make up between 2% and 5%
of the Canadian electorate ."
Constitutional protection of their rights might
counteract that imbalance .
In Chapter One, after a brief review of the Guerin
decision, I note that the
commentators have uniformly opined that the
decision shows potential for
developing Canadian Native law
. However, none go on to develop a theory how that
development might be sustained . Chapter Two opens with a discussion of the trust
obligation from the earliest days of Spanish colonization to its entrenchment in the
law of the United States
. I make the argument here that the trust obligation is the
central aspect of Native law and that it results from the denial of Indian sovereignty
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by the colonizing European nations . The centrality of the trust obligation, I suggest,
can be seen in both the Spanish colonial law and in the decisions of Chief Justice
Marshall.
The chapter closes with a discussion of the trust obligation as it is found in
the United States law today . I note that the trust obligation is in part only a moral
obligation, and in part a set of enforceable legal duties . While the law is United
States' law is well defined, it does not include any restriction on the legislative power
of Congress. I note that some commentators favour such a restriction and that some
intimate that such a limitation has been considered by the Supreme Court of the
United States .
Chapter Three is devoted to a discussion of Canadian Native law . I note that
the Canadian law mirrors that of the United States . In particular, it is shown that
the trust obligation in Canada, a discussion of which occupies the majority of the
chapter, is also part moral, and part legal . I argue that the legally enforceable trust
obligation originates in the more general moral one, and that in fact, the legally
enforceable form is a codification of certain aspects of the broader, unenforceable
duty. I suggest that the broader duty is at the heart of Canadian Native law
.
Chapter Four opens with a review of the law and language of trusts . I show
that there is some precedent for holding the Crown to a trust obligation to its
citizens, and that properly controlled, it might perform a valuable function in
domestic law . I show, however, that it has been used to justify some very political
decision-making on the part of the bench . This susceptibility represents a serious
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danger. A review of the Native law trust and the International law trusteeship
suggests that properly controlled, it can be a very useful concept.
It is suggested that a properly articulated purpose can control the public law
fiduciary obligation . I then argue that the purpose of the trust obligation in
Canadian law, like that of Spanish and United States law, is to compensate for the
denial of sovereignty at the time of colonization. The Doctrine of Discovery and its
denial of Indian sovereignty and of the right to have input into, or power over, the
new governing regime, charged the colonial regimes with a duty to protect the
Indian. The practice of the government, through both legislative and administrative
arms, has been to protect the First Nations from the excesses of the colonists . It has
also been, albeit rather half-heartedly much of the time, to assist their adjustment
to the arrival of the European . This role, to both protect and promote, has informed
and guided the Crown/Indian relationship and forms the backdrop against which
s. 35 must be read. I have called it a wardship rather than a trust obligation in order
to emphasize the positive duties it includes .
I close the chapter by suggesting that fiduciary law can support a concept
which is designed, like the wardship, to both protect and promote a broad set of
Indian interests. Such a theory need not be property-centred but can be centered
upon power. A power-centered fiduciary rule can serve to protect less tangible
interests such as Indianness and economic well-being .
Chapter Five opens with a discussion of the aboriginal rights provisions of the
Constitution Act, 1982 . A purposive analysis suggests that s
. 35 entrenches the right
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of the aboriginal peoples to a measure of separateness within Canada . The
legislative power of the Crown vis a vis the First Nations while not ousted, has been
limited so as to protect that measured separateness . The Crown, I argue, has a
positive duty to protect the special status of the aboriginal peoples . Even so, the
rights of the aboriginal peoples may have to be balanced against other rights .
Furthermore, the obligations of the Crown to the First Nations may also have to be
balanced against the Crown's other obligations. I argue that fiduciary law can
channel that balancing .
I do not suggest any substantive content of s . 35. Substantive rights can only
be dealt with in relation to specific groups of aboriginal peoples ." The theory
offered here allows a central role to the trust obligation and would require the
Crown to preserve and support the special status of the aboriginal persons . I suggest
that only such rights as are essential to the "measured separateness", essential that
is to aboriginality, have been entrenched . The theory offered here would allow only
such derogation from aboriginal rights as can be justified by the Crown . Finally, in
order to illustrate the possible application of the theory, I apply the theory to three
aboriginal rights issues. With that the thesis comes to a close .
The theory presented here, it is suggested, might provide for a principled
review of governmental actions such as those in the two cases mentioned at the
beginning of this introduction . At the very least, it might provide a principled
equivalent to section 1 of the Charter for the aboriginal and treaty rights provisions
of the new Constitution: An equivalent which would require the courts to check the
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adequacy of the balancing of interests undertaken by the Crown in its governance
of Canada. Finally, it might provide a standard, or a method of determining the
standard, by which the actions of government might be judged : A standard which,
to address the nightmare of equity, will not vary with the Chancellor's foot .
10
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CHAPTER 1
ANTICIPATING THE CONSTITUTION: R. v. GUERIN
R. v . Guerin' was the first case considered by the Supreme Court of Canada
after the coming into force of the Constitution Act . 1982 .2 The aboriginal rights
provisions of the Constitution are vague . The major provision can be found in s . 35 .
It reads :
35(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed .
35(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes Indian, Inuit and
Metis peoples of Canada .
Section 52 protects these rights . It reads :
52(1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law
that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of
the inconsistency, of no force and effect .
Case law since the decision in Guerin has to some extent fleshed out the force and
content of these provisions, but there is still not any really consistent theory
informing aboriginal rights in Canada .
Guerin itself predated the enactment and did not, consequently, raise any
issues regarding the interpretation of the new Constitution . Nevertheless, I suggest
here that the case, and in particular the opinion of Mr . Justice Dickson, as he then
was, might provide the basis for a theory for the constitutional protection of
13
aboriginal rights in Canada. It seems very likely that the interpretation of the new
provisions of the Constitution would have been very much in the minds of the
Justices as they grappled with the Guerin case. I am encouraged in this opinion by
the broadness of the decision of Mr. Justice Dickson, as he then was
. Further
support for such a proposition might be found in some of the decisions and opinions
handed down by the now Chief Justice during his years on the bench .
Dickson could be characterized as a systematizer in law . He has, of course,
been a major force in the interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms?
He was instrumental in developing the doctrine of fairness in
administrative law
.` He was also at the court when the modern constructive trust
was created in the Murdoch and Rathwell cases
.' In the area of Native law he
attempted, in Jack v. The Oueen,
to create some order and fairness in the
interpretation of Indian fishing rights in British Columbia by suggesting constitutional
protection of a priority for the Indian food fishery over concerns other than
conservation.' More importantly, in the Simon and Nowegijick
cases,' he has set the
standard for the interpretation of the Canadian treaties with the Indian Nations . I
suggest here that with his opinion in Guerin,
it is possible to begin a reassessment
of the underlying basis of aboriginal rights in Canada.
Clearly, with their
constitutional protection, such a reassessment is not out of order
.
a The Guerin Decision
The decision in Guerin, in particular that of Mr
. Justice, now Chief Justice,
14
Dickson, is much broader than the case seems to have required. A decision could
have been reached considering only the provisions and effect of the Indian Act' and
the particular facts in the case itself. Instead, both Dickson and Madam Justice
Wilson, speaking between them for seven of the eight justices then active in the
court, discussed the nature of the relationship of the Indians to both the land and
the government.
The case itself concerns the surrender and subsequent leasing of a part of the
Musqueam band reserve in Vancouver . The band leaders and the representative of
the Federal government reached an oral agreement as to the terms for leasing 162
acres of the reserve to the Shaughnessy Heights Golf Club . The band then
surrendered the land pursuant to the terms of the Indian Act'
leaving the
government to complete the lease as arranged. The government later leased the
land to the Golf Club on terms materially different from, and deficient to, those
agreed to with the band .'° The written terms of the surrender made no reference
to the oral agreement with the band but stated only, in relation to the government's
obligation to the band, that the land was to be held by the Crown,
[I]n trust, to lease the same to such person or persons, and upon such terms
as the Government of Canada may deem most conducive to our welfare and
that of our people."
The revenues to be received under the lease were dealt with in the same document .
They were to be "credited to our revenue trust account at Ottawa ."" The
Indian Act,
s.18(1) provided :
Subject to the provisions of this Act, reserves shall be held by Her Majesty
for the use and benefit of the respective bands for which they were set apart
;
and subject to this Act and the terms of any treaty or surrender, the Governor
15
in Council may determine whether any purpose for which the lands in a
reserve are used or are to be used is for the use and benefit of the band . 13
Neither the terms of surrender nor the legislation seemed to greatly restrict the
Crown's discretionary powers .
Upon learning that the terms of the lease made were not those to which the
band had agreed, and after lengthy negotiations, Guerin, the Chief of the band, and
other members of the band sued the Crown for breach of trust . In 1980, five years
after the action was started, the action came to trial .
Mr. Justice Collier found for the Band on the basis of a trust created by oral
conditions agreed to by the Band and the representatives of the Department of
Indian Affairs in the negotiations leading up to the surrender ."' Apart from one
meeting immediately prior to the surrender meeting, at no point during the two
years of negotiations did the Indian Affairs representatives bring the two parties
together. The surrender went ahead, Collier held, with the Band having made very
clear the lease they expected to obtain . The Crown officials assured the Band that
such a lease was to be signed . Collier held that a trust arose between the Band and
the Crown at the surrender meeting, notwithstanding the written terms of the
surrender and the provisions of the Indian Act. The trust was breached when the
Crown officials signed a much less favourable lease with the Golf Club . The Band
was awarded substantial damages ."
At the Federal Court of Appeal the decision was reversed on the grounds
that, while a breach of trust had in fact occurred, there had been no breach in law."
Mr. Justice LeDain considered three separate grounds of liability . First, he held that
16
the terms of the Indian Act precluded consideration of the oral terms of surrender.
Secondly, he held that any trust created under section 18 of the Indian Act would
be a trust enforceable through the political process and not through the courts of
law. Thirdly, he noted that the creation of the reserve itself under the various acts
and orders in council also did not create trust obligations .
The case was argued somewhat differently at the Court of Appeal than it had
been at trial. At trial- the allegation had been that the surrender had created the
trust. At appeal the argument was that there were two trusts : one created by the
surrender and one pre-existing the surrender, created by the Indian Act . The Crown
argued that the since it was the surrender document which had been approved by
the Band in the vote required by the Indian Act," then only it, and not any oral
representations made during negotiations, could form the basis of any obligation
owed by the Crown . LeDain concludes :
The oral terms found by the judge were not voted on and approved by a
majority of the band . They were deduced by the Trial Judge from the
testimony of three members of the Band and a former official of the Indian
Affairs Branch as to what was said at the meetings, and in some cases as to
what was not said . The oral terms of the surrender as found by the Trial
Judge were not accepted by the Governor in Council as required by the Act .
What was accepted by Order in Council P .C. 1957-1606 of December 6, 1957
was the "attached surrender dated the sixth day of October, 1957" . It was an
unqualified acceptance of the written surrender, with no reference, written or
implied, to other terms or conditions ."
The oral terms, since they had not been approved, could not form the terms of any
trust .
LeDain then turned his attention to liability under the statutory trust arising
through the Indian Act and the written terms of surrender . The Band argued that
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the use of the language of trust in both the Act and the terms of surrender,
demonstrated an intention by both parties to create a trust relationship .
Consequently, they argued, the discretionary powers granted in the lease and the Act
were constrained by the best interests of the Band . The Crown argued that the
broad discretionary powers given to the Crown by both the terms of surrender and
the Act, refute such an intention .
LeDain, after an examination of the Act, concluded that the obligations it
contains are political rather than legal. He described the relationship as "a trust in
the higher sense"," following the reasoning in a number of cases which hold that the
Crown can only be held to a trust obligation where there is "clear evidence of an
intention to make the Crown a trustee" .' He comments:
In my opinion the discretionary authority conferred by section 18 on the
Governor in Council or Government, to determine whether a particular
purpose for which land in a reserve is to be used is one for the use and
benefit of the Band indicates, . .. that it is for the Government, not the courts
to determine what is for the use and benefit of the Band . That provision is
incompatible, in my opinion, with an intention to impose an equitable
obligation, enforceable in the courts to deal with the land in the reserve in
a certain manner, and particularly, an obligation to develop or exploit the
reserve so as to realize its potential as a source of revenue for the Band,
which is in essence the obligation that is invoked in the present case ."
Then, having noted that the Indian Act confers many discretionary powers on the
Minister, the Governor in Council, and the band council he reasons :
All of this, it seems to me, clearly excludes an intention to make the Crown
a trustee in the private law sense of the land in a reserve . How the
Government chooses to discharge its political responsibility for the welfare
of the Indians is, of course, another thing .
The extent to which the
Government assumes an administrative or management responsibility for the
reserves of some positive scope is a matter of governmental discretion, not
legal or equitable obligation. I am, therefore, of the opinion that section 18
of the Indian Act does not afford a basis for an action for breach of trust in
18
the management or disposition of reserve lands
So while it might be possible for the Crown to make itself a trustee, there is in the
Indian Act and the surrender at hand, no true trust because the intent on the part
of the government was to shoulder certain responsibilities as government and not
to create rights in relation to reserve land for the Indian peoples .
LeDain finally refers to the nature of the discretion itself . For LeDain the
parameters of the discretion can be found in the various legislative acts that delimit
the relationship between the Indians and the Government . Of these, the Indian Act
is decisive . Section 41 provides :
A surrender shall deemed to confer all rights that are necessary to enable Her
Majesty to carry out the terms of the surrender .
Subsection 53(1) provides :
The Minister or a person appointed by him for the purpose may manage, sell,
lease or otherwise dispose of surrendered lands in accordance with this Act
and the terms of the surrender .
This leads LeDain to the conclusion that :
[A] conditional surrender for the purpose of leasing land in a reserve is
intended to confer an authority to lease and not to impose a duty to do so
The discretion is a blanket authority and not a circumscribed power to act within
certain bounds . The opinion offers a bleak picture of the responsibilities of the
Crown.
At the Supreme Court of Canada the trial result was reinstated, but on
different grounds . Three very different opinions were handed down.
Dickson, with
Beetz, Chouinard and Lamer JJ . concurring, based his decision on a breach of
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fiduciary obligations .' Wilson, with McIntyre and Ritchie JJ
. concurring, held that
a breach of trust gave rise to liability on the part of the government .' Mr Justice
Estey decided on the grounds of a breach of an agency relationship. The then
Chief Justice Laskin took no part in the decision .
i The Opinion of Mr. Justice Estey
The least complicated decision is Estey's .
For Estey the "primary
constitutional issue" of the nature of aboriginal title does not arise in the case .'
For
him, the Indian Act covers the issue
. He characterizes its effects in the following
manner:
[The surrender is] a retention of interest and the exploitation of that interest
in the manner and to the extent permitted by statute law . The Crown
becomes the appointed agent of the Indians to develop and exploit, under the
direction of the Indians and for their benefit, the usufructuary
interest
described in St. Catherine's.
In failing to follow the agreement, clearly the government has placed itself in breach
of the terms of the agency relationship. If one were to agree that the relationship
is one of agency, this is good agency law .
Much could be said in support of this analysis
. It is not essential to concern
oneself with the nature of aboriginal title in order to resolve this case
. It is the
opinion of all the deciding judges in the case that the government officers breached
a duty owed to the Band
. Disagreement arises only as to the legal character of the
relationship breached . After the trial decision, the facts were never in issue
. It is
enough for Estey that the breach caused loss to the Musqueam band
. What was
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given up in the process of surrender and in the treaty process is for him irrelevant .
In agreeing to act in a certain manner to further the Indian's interests under the
Indian Act, the government restricted the scope of its discretion. Going beyond the
mandate to which it had agreed, led to liability for the deficiency between the actual
proceeds and those which might otherwise have been obtainable .
While this analysis has the merit of great simplicity, it is not without dangers
and complexities . It seems, for example, difficult in the extreme to describe as an
agent one who places himself in the position of intermediary between one group and
another without having been appointed . A principal would normally appoint his
agent. This, at least in part, allows the law to fix the principal with
legal
responsibility for the acts made under his name by his agent. This, I would suggest,
is one of the crucial aspects of the agency relationship . Such a relationship, based
upon appointment made and accepted by independent parties, rightly can be dealt
with by the common law . And there is no injustice in fixing the principal with
liability for the acts of his agent . Such is not the case between the government and
the Indians .
Estey, quoting from Halsbury's Laws of England, notes that the "essence of
the agent's position is that he is only an intermediary between the two other
parties."' It is clear that in the case of the Indians the "agent" is more than a mere
intermediary . The responsibilities of the "agent" under the terms of the
Indian Act
and the lease itself require the Government of Canada and the Governor in Council
to determine whether any purpose is for the benefit of the Indians or not 3 0 Under
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the Indian Act,
at least, the relationship is not one of mere agency .
In that situation, the government has, apparently without invitation, placed
itself in the position of intermediary between the Indians and other inhabitants of
this land . In 1763, the imperial government issued the
Royal Proclamation,"
restricting the Indians' rights of alienation over their land . By that instrument, the
government became the only entity to which Indian land might be alienated .
The
Indian Act continues that policy. In the ordinary law of agency it is not the agent
who creates the relationship. Consequently, it seems, to this writer at least, to be
somewhat overreaching to describe this relationship as one of agency .
There are further reasons to hold this position. In an agency relationship the
principal has control of the relationship. Between the Indians and the government
it is the government which has been the stronger party . The essence of the
relationship between the government and the Indians is the subordinate position of
the Indians. From the Royal Proclamation through the treaty process to today's
Indian Act, the Crown has taken up the role of guardian over the native people .
By
the power of this guardianship the Indians have been prevented from exercising or
participating in many of the normal incidents of citizenship . They have at various
times in history been protected from alienating their land, from drinking alcohol and
have been unable to vote
.' An agent would not normally have the power to prevent
his principal from enjoying full citizenship .
Finally, a government is not usually thought of as being the agent of its
subjects . A special law of agency would have to be developed for such a
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relationship . The lack of that law suggests that the relationship is in fact not that of
agency. Control of the acts of private ordering by individuals of their affairs is the
normal subject matter of the law of agency and of the common law in general . The
law, however, is less able to deal with situations where a stronger party imposes itself
upon weaker one, particularly where it is done for the protection of the weaker
party. This is even more the case where the stronger party is the government which
has, of course, many immunities and other protections from legal liability . Such a
relationship is one which can in fact be better policed by equity . The law has little
experience with determining the obligations of the Crown : equity was born to it .
Overall then, it would appear that the law of agency is not the most
appropriate for dealing with this situation . The government has passed numerous
pieces of legislation which proclaim its intent to act in the best interests of the
Indian peoples . The limits of that guardianship, however, remain obscure .
The
relationship, like the nature of the aboriginal title to the land, has never been fully
delineated. Whether through racism, ethnocentrism, misunderstanding or misplaced
.
concern, or even a combination of all these, the parameters of the relationship
remain uncertain: what is certain is the unequal power of the Indians and the
government which acts for them. Agency has little or no experience with such
relationships. By contrast, such an unequal relationship provides a natural role for
equity
. However appropriate the law of agency might at first glance seem, it cannot
describe or control a situation where the agent appoints himself and where the
principal is at the mercy of his agent without having had any voice in the
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appointment. Equity can.
Estey's decision then, while having the merit of great simplicity, in the end
attempts too much . A new law of agency where the government is by its own action
agent would have to be created. Equity provides a better model for any new law
which might have to be created since the essential elements of the relationship at
issue are elements that are the normal elements of the law of equity . The law of
guardianship is a branch of equity . The law of trusts, which normally governs the
relationships where property is held by one for the benefit of another, is another
branch. The law of fiduciaries, a more general law than the previous two, is a third
branch of equity. These, it is suggested, offer a more adequate doctrine for
describing the relationship between the Crown and the Indian Nations .
It is to equity that both Dickson and Wilson turn in Guerin . Both find that
there is a "fiduciary obligation" owed by the federal government to the Indian
nations. Wilson holds that this obligation crystallizes into a full blown trust upon
surrender. Dickson suggests that there can be no trust since, following the Smith
case,33 the Indians have no proprietary interest in the land . There being no trust
corpus, there can be no trust . He bases liability fully upon the fiduciary obligation
.
Let us deal with Wilson's opinion first .
ii he Opinion of Madame Justice Wilson
Wilson says very little about the nature and origins of the fiduciary obligation
owed by the government. She confines her discussion to the effects of the surrender
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provision of the Indian Act, s. 18(1). She comments in passing
:
While I am agreement that s .18 does not per se create a fiduciary obligation
in the Crown in respect to Indian reserves, I believe that it recognizes the
existence of such an obligation . The obligation has its roots in the aboriginal
title of Canada's Indians as discussed in Calder v. A.G.B.C., [1973] S.C.R. 313,
[1973] 4 W.W.R. 1, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 1453'
Wilson does not discuss the nature or scope of this general pre-Indian Act fiduciary
obligation, preferring to restrict herself to the obligation as it has been affirmed
under s.18 of the Indian Act .
On the nature of the s. 18 obligation she has this to say :
I think that when s .18 mandates that reserves be held by the Crown for the
use and benefit of the bands for which they are set apart, this is more than
just an administrative direction to the Crown . I think it is the
acknowledgement of a historical reality, namely that the Indian bands have
a beneficial interest in their reserves and that the Crown has a responsibility
to protect that interest and make sure that any purpose to which reserve land
is put will not interfere with it . This is not to say that the Crown either
historically or by s .18 holds the land in trust for the bands
. The bands do not
have fee in the lands ; their interest in the lands is a limited one . But it is an
interest which cannot be derogated from or interfered with by the Crown's
utilization of the land for purposes incompatible with Indian title unless, of
course, the Indians agree . I believe that in this sense the Crown has a
fiduciary obligation to the Indian bands with respect to the uses to which
reserve land may be put and that section 18 is a statutory acknowledgement
of that obligation.'
When surrender occurred, for Wilson, the terms of this surrender created a
"full-blown" trust.' She states:
The subject of the trust, the trust res, was not the band's beneficial interest
in the land but land itself. The Crown prior to surrender had title to the land
subject to the Indian title. When the band surrendered the land to the
Crown, the band's interest merged in the fee.'
And concludes :
[T]he fiduciary duty which existed at large under the section (s .18) to hold the
land in the reserve for the use and benefit of the band crystallized upon
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surrender into an express trust of specific land for a specific purpose
So although the Crown's duty originates in the fiduciary obligation, Wilson avoids
the necessity of defining that relationship by finding that ultimately a true trust is
created .
Wilson, while she does suggest a general fiduciary duty which predates the
Indian Act and which continues under the Act, concentrates on the facts at hand and
does not develop any general theory of Crown duties towards the Indian Nations .
She prefers to protect the Indian interest in reserve land .
In this her opinion is well
within traditional Indian law . This is not to deny its power
. Wilson's opinion has
the merit of avoiding statute of limitations problems by taking advantage of the
various statutory protections available for trusts actions' Also, one might assume,
the true trust might allow the Band to follow the land or other property rather than
only being able to pursue monetary damages
. And, of course, the possibility of some
development of the legal obligation of the federal government is mooted but left for
a later time .
Nevertheless, she offers very little direction as to the nature of the general
fiduciary obligation .' For this reason, I would suggest that Dickson's opinion is
more interesting. He seems to go much further in describing the fiduciary obligation
than would appear to be necessary for the holding in Guerin
. He discusses the
nature of the Indian interest in land generally rather than restricting himself to the
facts at hand . It is the broadness of his opinion which gives plausibility to the
argument that the decision may be intended to cover more than the facts in this
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particular case .
iii The Opinion of Mr. Justice Dickson
It is the opinion of Mr. Justice Dickson, as he then was, which forms the focus
of this thesis. His discussion of the fiduciary obligation owed by the government to
the Indians, presents a careful and elaborate description of its origin and scope, one
which, I suggest, might be in part to indicate how it is intended to interpret the new
constitutional provisions. Dickson recognizes that the law of fiduciaries is a very
volatile field and that, consequently, there is a need for caution lest too much be
ascribed to the duty. Because of their volatility, it is necessary that fiduciary
relationships be anchored very carefully to particular law and facts. In his opinion
in Guerin Dickson has done just that
. His duty, I suggest, has five elements . First,
one needs a recognized legal interest . Second, one needs a triggering event which
gives rise to a duty. It is in these first two elements in which one finds the origin of
the duty . The third element consists of a legislative scheme which invites the
supervision of the courts . The fourth requirement is an object or purpose for the
duty, and fifth, one needs a connecting principle which ties the first four together .
Mr. Justice Dickson also recognizes a general fiduciary obligation owed by the
federal Crown to the Indians . Along with Wilson, he finds the roots of this
obligation in aboriginal title, coupled with the surrender requirement . Dickson,
unlike Wilson, discusses its nature at some length . He states :
The fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the Indians has its roots
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in the concept of aboriginal, native or Indian title . The fact that Indian bands
have a certain interest in lands does not . . . in itself give rise to a fiduciary
relationship between the Indians and the Crown . The conclusion that the
Crown is a fiduciary depends upon the further proposition that the Indian
interest in the land is inalienable except upon surrender to the Crown ."'
Facts are always important in determining the scope and the actual source of any
particular fiduciary obligation ." Dickson delves quite deeply into the facts he
considers relevant. In doing so he defines, quite carefully, the relationship between
the Indians, their interest in their lands, and the Crown .
The land at issue in Guerin is surrendered reserve land. Title to the land
before surrender was in the federal Crown.' Referring to the Indian interest in
reserve lands, Dickson states :
Indians have a legal right to occupy and possess certain lands, the ultimate
title to which is in the Crown. While their interest does not, strictly speaking,
amount to beneficial ownership, neither is its nature completely exhausted by
the concept of a personal right . It is true that the sui generis interest which
the Indians have in the land is personal in the sense that it cannot be
transferred to a grantee, but it is also true, . . . that the interest gives rise upon
surrender to a distinctive fiduciary obligation on the part of the Crown to deal
with the land for the benefit of the surrendering Indians."
The Indian interest in the land, in conformity with existing Canadian law, 45 is
characterized by Dickson as consisting of only occupancy and possession : It is not
a proprietary right .
It is on the basis of this proposition that Dickson holds against the
relationship being one of trust . Since the Indians have no proprietary interest in
their land, he reasons, there is no res capable of forming the trust corpus ." This is
a crucial point. It is the point of disagreement between Wilson and Dickson . For
Wilson the surrender provisions of the Indian Act create a true trust out of the
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pre-existing interest that the Indians have in their lands when joined with the title
already held by the Crown.
This identifies the first element of the fiduciary principle : a recognizable
legal interest .
Here typically for the fiduciary relationship it is an interest in
property. Dickson notes that the interest of the Indians in reserve lands is the same
as that in "unrecognized aboriginal title in traditional tribal lands" . "' It would appear,
therefore, that the fiduciary obligation might be traced back beyond the passing of
the Indian Act.
The second requirement for the creation of a fiduciary relationship is the
surrender requirement. For the Guerin case, that requirement is found in s
. 39(1)
of the Indian Act. Both Dickson and Wilson see the
Indian Act as the expression
of a long standing governmental policy . Dickson comments :
An Indian band is prohibited from directly transferring its interest to a third
party. Any sale or lease of land can only be carried out after a surrender has
taken place, with the Crown then acting on the band's behalf . The Crown
first took this responsibility upon itself in the Royal Proclamation of 1763[see
R.S.C. 1970, App.II,No.1]
. It is still recognized in the surrender provisions of
the Indian Act . The surrender requirement, and the responsibility it entails
are the source of a distinct fiduciary obligation owed by the Crown to the
Indians."
	
(my emphasis)
Since all that is required for the fiduciary obligation to arise is present as soon as
the surrender requirement is government policy, it seems logical to assume that at
least by the 7th October 1763, the date of the
Royal Proclamation, the government
stood in some sort of fiduciary relationship with the Indian nations .
And since the
Royal Proclamation predates the Indian Act,
it follows that the "distinct fiduciary
obligation" owed under the Indian Act
would not necessarily be that owed under any
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pre-existing general fiduciary relationship. Since this policy pre-dates even the Royal
Proclamation, it is possible that a fiduciary relationship might have arisen even
before 1763 .
The third element, one necessary for an enforceable duty, is a legislative
scheme which invites the supervision of the courts . The particular fiduciary
obligation in Guerin finds expression in the Indian Act, s
. 18(1) of which grants to
the Governor in Council, the Crown, a discretion in relation to surrenders .
The
existence of this discretion, which appears absolute but is not since it must be carried
out in a fashion consistent with the purposes of the Act, gives the courts a
supervisory role. Dickson explains :
Through the confirmation in the Indian Act of the historic responsibility which
the Crown has undertaken, to act on behalf of the Indians so as to protect
their interests in transactions with third parties, Parliament has conferred
upon the Crown a discretion to decide for itself where the Indian's best
interests lie . This is the effect of s . 18(1) of the Act.' (my emphasis)
It is the existence of the fiduciary relationship together with this discretion that
opens the door for the courts . He concludes :
This discretion on the part of the Crown, far from ousting, as the Crown
contends, the jurisdiction of the courts to regulate the relationship between
the Crown and the Indians, has the effect of transforming the Crown's
obligation into a fiduciary one .'
And of course, this fiduciary obligation is a legal,
not merely a moral or
governmental, one . That means that the power to decide and to act is not absolute :
it is charged with a duty.
We shall see below that the fiduciary principle can be somewhat wayward .
It needs to be channelled in order that the court supervision not become a
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substitution of the court's opinion for that of the Crown ." That role is performed
by the fourth element: the purpose or object of the duty . That purpose Dickson
finds in the protective role of the Crown . He comments :
The purpose of the surrender requirement is clearly to interpose the Crown
between the Indians and prospective purchasers or lessees of their land, so
as to prevent the Indians from being exploited . This is made clear in the
Royal Proclamation itself, which prefaces the provision making the Crown an
intermediary with a declaration that [at p . 128] "great Frauds and Abuses
have been committed in purchasing the Lands of the Indians, to the great
Prejudice of our Interests, and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said
Indians . .
."'
It is worth noting once again that Dickson refers to both the Royal Proclamation and
the Indian Act as embodying this protective duty. The object or purpose is to assist
the court in determining what facts and law should be considered in relation to a
particular fiduciary relationship. This permits the determination of the scope of the
duty.
Finally, one needs a connecting principle and it is the fiduciary relationship
to which Dickson turns to tie the elements together . Blandly put, a fiduciary
relationship requires the fiduciary to act so as to further the interests of another .
That duty, of course, can be narrowed in various ways . That is the case here . In
fact Dickson seems to allow that any general fiduciary obligation might be broader :
The discretion which is the hallmark of any fiduciary relationship is capable
of being considerably narrowed in a particular case . This is as true of the
Crown's discretion vis-a-vis the Indians as it is of the discretion of trustees,
agents, and other traditional categories of fiduciaries . The Indian Act makes
specific provision for such narrowing in ss . 18(1) and 38(2) . A fiduciary
obligation will not, of course, be eliminated by the imposition of conditions
that have the effect of restricting the fiduciary's discretion.
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There is an implication here that any general fiduciary obligation may be broader
than that under the Indian Act provisions and the even narrower one under the
terms of the surrender in Guerin . Let us look more closely at the "narrowing"
.
Section 18(1) of the Indian Act provides:
Subject to this Act, reserves are held by Her Majesty for the use and benefit
of the respective bands for which they were set apart; and subject to this Act
and to the terms of any treaty or surrender, the Governor in Council may
determine whether any purpose for which the lands in a reserve are used or
are to be used is for the use and benefit of the band .
Section 38(2) allows :
A surrender may be absolute or qualified, conditional or unconditional .
By contrast, the Royal Proclamation provides only for outright sale :
[I]f at any Time any of the said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the
said Lands, the same shall be purchased for Us, in our Name, at some public
Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that Purpose by the
Governor or Commander in Chief of our Colony respectively in which they
shall lie .
So if there is a fiduciary obligation existing under the Royal Proclamation its scope
would be judged by the intent of that instrument . Its function was to protect the
Indians and guarantee them justice'
There would appear to be two distinct forms of narrowing provided for in the
Indian Act . First, the Indian Act itself narrows the discretion by requiring it to be
exercised in accord with the provisions and philosophy of the Indian Act.
The
philosophy of the Indian Act, of course, is often said to be assimilationist
.' Since
1969, that may have changed. Second, the Indians may provide for narrowing
through a treaty or through the terms of a surrender
. A general fiduciary obligation
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arising before the Indian Act would presumably reflect the dominant policy pursued
at the particular time, whether it be that of the Royal Proclamation or other
instruments.
Dickson, presumably by way of clarification, discusses the obligation further .
He quotes an article by Professor Ernest J . Weinrib :
[Where there is a fiduciary obligation] there is a relationship in which the
principal's interests can be affected by, and are therefore dependent on, the
manner in which the fiduciary uses the discretion which has been delegated
to him. The fiduciary obligation is the law's blunt tool for the control of this
discretion
Dickson then continues :
I make no comment upon whether [Weinrib's] description is broad enough
to embrace all fiduciary obligations . I do agree, however, that where by
statute, agreement, or perhaps by unilateral undertaking, one party has an
obligation to act for the benefit of another, and that obligation carries with
it a discretionary power, the party thus empowered becomes a fiduciary .
Equity will then supervise the relationship by holding him to the fiduciary's
strict standard of conduct'
The obligation might be raised where the power has been taken unilaterally .
Perhaps then, even in the absence of a statutorily entrenched policy or of some form
of written guidelines, the courts might have the duty to check and supervise the
exercise of the delegated power.
Let us look more closely at the origin of Dickson's fiduciary obligation . For
Dickson, it is the surrender process which defines the scope of the particular
fiduciary obligation. In Guerin, oral undertakings were given by the Crown which
were not written into the surrender document. The Crown argued that they did not
form part of the surrender since the wording of the Indian Act
along with the
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surrender document specifically ousted them . Dickson seems to agree with this
contention. He comments:
[T]he surrender document did not make reference to the "oral" terms . I
would not wish to say that those terms had nonetheless somehow been
incorporated into the surrender.
But that is not the end of it . He continues :
Nonetheless, the Crown, in my view, was not empowered by the surrender
document to ignore the oral terms which the band understood would be
embodied in the lease . The oral representations form the backdrop against
which the Crown's conduct in discharging its fiduciary obligation must be
measured. They inform and confine the field of discretion within which the
Crown was free t(n tnphasis)
The fiduciary obligation stands above the actual terms of the surrender and can, as
it clearly does here, restrict them. This is important and radical. Dickson is
suggesting that what the Crown says will be the standard by which to judge what it
does. And while for Dickson it is the surrender requirement which creates the
fiduciary obligation, it would appear to be the surrender process which defines the
scope of the duty. This distinction might have particular relevance for a treaty
related fiduciary obligation, should one be held to exist .
In Guerin the discretion of the government was narrowed perhaps to the
point of extinction, not by the legislation or the surrender document, but by the
negotiations leading up to the surrender . The Band surrendered its interest in the
land on the strength of a particular lease . The breach occurred when the
government signed a lease which was deficient in relation to that agreed to with the
Band. The lease, while deficient, did not fall nor was it corrected .' The terms of
the legislation and surrender documents allowed the government to do what it did .
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The oral assurances were not part of the lease .' The surrender and lease stand
.
However, the oral representations were not empty . Dickson states :
The oral representations form the backdrop against which the Crown"s
conduct in discharging its fiduciary obligation must be measured . They inform
and confine the field of discretion within which the Crown was free to act .'
Having promised a certain lease, the Crown could not, without permission, agree to
another:
When the promised lease proved impossible to obtain, the Crown, instead of
proceeding to lease the land on different, less favourable terms, should have
returned to the band to explain what had occurred and seek the band's
counsel on how to proceed .'
The remedy, for this particular duty, for Dickson, was to be found in the principle
of equitable estoppel .
The remedy for breach of any broader duty may be different . Dickson
comments:
In my view, the nature of Indian title and the framework of the statutory
scheme established for disposing of Indian land places upon the Crown an
equitable obligation, enforceable by the courts, to deal with the land for the
benefit of the Indians . This obligation does not amount to a trust in the
private law sense . It is rather a fiduciary duty . If, however, the Crown
breaches this fiduciary duty it will be liable to the Indians in the same way
and to the same extent as if such a trust were in effect .'
So while the relationship is not one of trust, the remedy is identical . And it is the
"statutory scheme" which defines the fiduciary duty .'
It is worth noting two things in passing . While Dickson is discussing a remedy
for breaches of the Indian Act duty, he does nothing to negate the possibility of a
breach of any pre-Indian Act fiduciary obligations
. On a more negative note, his
remedy may be susceptible to limitations problems . Generally, limitations do not
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run where a trust is fraudulently breached . Wilson, utilising the true trust, avoids
some limitations problems . Dickson's opinion would seem to limit the remedy to
damages rather than any tracing remedy that might be available through a trust .
Those, however, are not problems to be addressed here . After all, should the
fiduciary obligation form the basis for a theory of constitutional review, such
problems are unlikely to arise . It should not be possible, after all, to lose
constitutional rights through the operation of rules such as limitations and laches .
What Dickson has done is not radical . He has read into a statute an
implication that any discretion found therein must be exercised in a manner
consistent with the Act as a whole . The Indian Act, in Dickson's view, invites the
courts to check the exercise, by the Crown, here exercised through the Department
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, of a delegated discretion . What
Dickson has described here is a theory of judicial review of administrative action
designed to address the special obligations which the federal government owes the
Indians .
A governmental power possessed by the federal Parliament has been
delegated to the Governor in Council . In the hands of the one to whom it has been
delegated, it takes on the policy of the legislation within which it has been delegated .
The fiduciary obligation arising out of the historical relationship between the Indians
and their land together with the historical and legislative relationship between the
Indians and the federal government, invites the courts to check the exercise of that
delegated power. The exercise will be judged against a fiduciary standard .
The
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government will be forced to live up to any promises made, both to the Indians and
to the third parties, such as the lessee here . However, as I hope I have
demonstrated here, Dickson has lays out an elaborate theory which, while it covers
the case at hand, might also be developed to cover obligations well beyond those
in Guerin itself.
The theory proposed in Guerin by the now Chief Justice Dickson was
probably not absolutely necessary for the facts in the case itself, but it is a well
considered one . As has been noted above, it is not the first time that Dickson has
attempted to clear up some of the confusion which permeates the area of native law
in Canada. Before considering the broader implications of Dickson's opinion, it is
useful first to look at some of the commentary that the Guerin decision has
precipitated .
b The Decision Discussed
If confined to the facts and the particular obligation at issue, the decision
does not greatly alter the law . In fact, perhaps the major change which can be noted
is the placing out of reach of proprietary remedies in relation to the loss of Indian
lands .
Such is, it is suggested, the effect of substituting a fiduciary for a trust
relationship . This is undoubtedly a change to be regretted
. But it is not my purpose
here to dwell on such issues . My interest is in the ramifications of the fiduciary
analysis for constitutional review of aboriginal rights .
The majority of the commentary on the case concerns itself with issues, such
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the protection of reserve lands, directly raised by the case . It deals with such issues
as the nature of the interest of the Indian Nations in their land, both reserve and
unsurrendered lands . Also covered is the legal nature of the obligation of the
government vis-s-vis the land before and after surrender
. Such issues are only
indirectly of concern in this thesis . I am more interested in the possibilities of the
case for producing a more general theory for the interpretation of the constitutional
protections of the rights of aboriginal peoples . Consequently the literature can be
dealt with fairly quickly .
The literature on Guerin shows a remarkable consistency. Almost all
commentators criticize the decision in that it unnecessarily limits the interest of the
Indians in reserve lands . All see at least a glimmer of hope within the gloom . Two
views emerge although no one commentator fits into either category . There is the
pessimist's view which stresses the limits of the decision in relation to the interest
in land . And there is an optimist's view. These focus more on the broader
ramifications of the decision.
Bartlett's main concern appears to be the protection of reserve lands and he
criticizes the inappropriateness of equating the Indian interest in reserves with that
in unsurrendered traditional lands .' The denial of a trust in the statutory scheme,
not only appears to contradict the policy behind the establishment of reserves, it
makes limitations legislation significant . Since most of the contested surrenders took
place outside the limitations periods the denial of a trust relationship in the Indian
Act effectively prevents litigation even of surrenders which took place under the
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"most corrupt circumstances"
.' This important point is not the focus of this thesis .
For Bartlett the glimmer of hope is twofold . First he recognizes that implicit
within the decision is that the obligation would appear to attach to surrenders of
traditional lands and thus make breaches of treaty justiciable . Furthermore, the
cause of action can be pursued against the Crown in both its provincial and federal
manifestations ." This, it is suggested, is a reasonable conclusion
.
The most complete discussion of the case is Hurley's, although he is at times
unduly critical .' Hurley's paper really centres upon the nature of the interest of the
Indian Nations in their land. That being the case, much is not relevant here, though
the criticism is well put .
His argument is that the Indian interest is in fact a
proprietary one and that cases from St. Catherines through
Star Chrome to Guerin
itself are wrongly decided in that they do not recognize that .
I have a great deal of
sympathy with this view but it is not relevant to this thesis . Indeed, it might be said
that such an analysis is not so much one of Guerin but rather of the earlier cases .
It is, therefore, in some ways not a very useful commentary .
Hurley does make some interesting comments on the fiduciary duty and on
its possibilities for broadening the scope of the legal obligations of the government .
He notes early in the paper :
[This article] attempts to relate the Court's treatment of [the Crown's
fiduciary] duty to the guardianship doctrine developed by the United States
Supreme Court, and it speculates as to the future applications of the doctrine
of Crown fiduciary duty in Canada.'
The fiduciary duty, for Hurley, is part of this guardianship .
Later he relates the fiduciary duty and the guardianship in this way :
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For Dickson J., the surrender requirement
reflects the Crown's
acknowledgement of the duty incumbent upon it, by virtue of its historical
role as guardian of the Indians, to protect their title in land. But if this is
so, the surrender requirement is not, contrary to Dickson J
.'s earlier assertion,
itself a source of fiduciary duty . Rather, it is a specific manifestation of a
general fiduciary duty, and this duty in turn derives from the guardian
relationship existing between the Crown and the Indians ."
This would have many ramifications . Hurley comments :
[T]he Crown's fiduciary duty would appear to extend to all groups which are
considered as Indians or aboriginal peoples for the purposes of the
Constitution. . . . It has been argued above that, since the Crown's fiduciary
duty stems from its general guardianship of the Indians, it applies to the
Crown's relations in general with Indians. For example, the Crown's fiduciary
duty would require it, at a minimum, to give full effect to its undertakings
under existing land claim agreements such as the James Bay and Northern
Quebec Agreement . . . . It would also seem to require the federal government
not to remain passive but to act positively on behalf of native peoples to
settle their aboriginal and treaty claims vis-a-vis recalcitrant provincial
governments.'
Hurley prefers to found a general fiduciary obligation in the historical relationship
between the Indian Nations and the Crown . He sees potential for the protection of
less tangible aboriginal rights should the guardianship become the basis for the
fiduciary obligation.' He notes that the United States guardianship has given rise
to certain specific duties, and comments :
This inference of specific duties from a general guardian relationship seems
to recommend itself more than Dickson J .'s deduction of the Crown's
fiduciary duty from incidents like the surrender requirement . In any event,
having now affirmed the principle of the Crown's fiduciary duty towards the
Indians, the Supreme Court of Canada has given Canadian courts the
opportunity to profit from American judicial experience with the practical
consequences of that duty."
One might quibble with Hurley's impatience with Dickson on this point . It does
seem to be something of a chicken and egg problem .'
That aside, Hurley has hit
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upon what is, I would suggest, the interesting aspect of the decision . It does have
exciting possibilities for a more general Crown obligation to the Native peoples of
Canada. And this, as Bartlett comments, could include both the federal and
provincial governments . Unfortunately, Hurley does not develop these assertions
into theory or principle.
On the most important point, that of a standard for judging when a breach
has occurred, Hurley suggests only a "good faith test" .' This he borrows from the
United States law. I suggest below that the American law has limited value in
delineating the fiduciary obligation and its breach in Canada. I suggest that the duty,
because of the constitutional protection offered by s . 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982, would be a very different and much stronger duty in Canada than in the
United States .
Johnston picks up the point regarding the relevance of the United States
Indian fiduciary cases.' Johnston criticizes Dickson's opinion for much the same
reasons as Bartlett and Hurley . While she recognizes that the obligation might arise
before surrender, she reads the opinion as denying that possibility. She comments :
Hence, the scope of the fiduciary duty which Mr . Justice Dickson outlines is
not coextensive with the powers unilaterally assumed by the Crown ."
I have suggested that such is not the case. The confusion derives from the fact that
the obligation being litigated in Guerin is a particular "narrowed" duty rather than
the general duty which exists as a result of previous surrenders or takings .
I point
this .out only because Johnston also makes the point that the fiduciary obligation
held to exist in Guerin allows the Crown to "exercise its powers of management [of
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Indian lands] with impunity .""2 This, I agree, is the crucial point
. I would suggest,
however, that this absolute power comes not from a lack of duty . Rather, it comes
from the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy which has made the general duty non-
justiciable. The Constitution Act . 1982 will, it is hoped, have changed that
.
Johnston would prefer a much broader duty attaching to all the discretionary
powers granted under the Indian Act.
She laments that Dickson turned away from
the law of trusts, "which could provide concrete standards and remedies" to an
uncertain sui generis fiduciary duty
.' Johnston suggests, however, and this is her
glimmer of hope, that the fiduciary obligation of the United States government to
the Indian Nations could be used to flesh out the Canadian situation . This would,
she suggests, provide those broader standards and remedies. She comments :
Through its legislation dealing with Indians, the Canadian government has
unilaterally undertaken to regulate almost every aspect of Indian existence .
Under this comprehensive statutory scheme, the Minister of Indian Affairs is
accorded sweeping discretionary powers. The application of the [fiduciary
principle to these powers] would lead to a recognition of a fiduciary duty
coextensive with the government's pervasive pattern of control . . . . However
wide the discretion granted by statute, the court would be able to ensure that
it is exercised correctly .`
I would agree that the decision does just that . I would add that it might go further
and serve as a check even on the legislative powers of the government
. The United
States law, in that it recognizes the absolute power of the federal government, is too
weak for that. Nevertheless, it remains instructive .
The analysis of Pratt and McMurtry is much more complimentary of the
opinion of Mr Justice Dickson .' These I would place amongst the optimists
.
However, while they see much more of the possibilities of the opinion, they also do
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not develop a sound theoretical basis for their assertions . They do, nevertheless, go
a long way towards drawing some of the theoretical possibilities out of Dickson's
opinion. They also recognize the desirability of sound and principled theory :
The common law cannot work well unless it is strongly founded in principle .
We predict that Guerin will stand for generations as the touchstone of the
legal and political relationship between the Crown and the Indians and that
from this new beginning a new body of law will evolve on its secure
underpinnings.'
They also suggest that Dickson's purpose in re-examining the whole framework of
Canadian Native law is precisely because he wishes to construct the beginnings of
a new theoretical basis'
In a long passage worth quoting because they explain this assertion, they
declare:
Mr. Justice Dickson, by reverting to the first principles of the creation of
fiduciary obligations, suggests the possible existence of fiduciary obligations
of a very different nature than those involved in the surrender of the
Musqueam reserve . . . . In effect, in our submission, his judgment establishes
that the Royal Proclamation, a unilateral undertaking by the Crown, created
an inchoate fiduciary relationship with respect to the lands of all Indian
nations covered by the Royal Proclamation. This "unilateral undertaking" was
combined with a discretionary power that is in part the political dominance
of the Crown and its agents and in part the establishment of a legal system
of land tenure which both protected and narrowed the property interest of the
Indians. . . . [A]ny surrender gives rise to a specific set of fiduciary obligations,
but it is in fact the crystallization, realization or particularization of the
previous generalized inchoate relationship .
We submit that all dealings between Indian people and the Crown are
clothed with a fiduciary aspect, as the result of the Royal Proclamation .'
McMurtry and Pratt state the core of a possible theory in this passage .
I shall return
to this below . They do not, however, themselves develop one .
They feel that, because the history of the many Indian Nations of Canada are
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so varied, it would not be possible to develop one single theory . They add that the
agency theory of Mr Justice Estey might be appropriate for situations where a band
has reached a sufficient stage of development that they should be allowed input into
decision making which concerns them . Consequently, they make this suggestion
:
There can however be a general theory of shifting emphasis along a
continuum between the extremes of agency and trust, with presumptions to
guide courts or negotiators as to the appropriate model in any given set of
facts.'
This seems rather to deflate the grand claims they make earlier, and to do so
unnecessarily.
If the theory will vary from band to band and from year to year, then we will
be back into the sort of chaos from which Pratt and McMurtry recognize that Guerin
might have rescued us. Like Pratt and McMurtry, I believe that the law works best
when guided by sound theory, and not theory which can vary with the Chancellor's
foot. The theory must work for all situations
. Certainly the scope of the duty might
vary in accord with any particular situation, as might the standard by which the
conduct of the fiduciary will be judged . This is normal . But it seems to defeat the
purpose for the creation of theory if one allows the basis of the theory to vary from
agency through trust to non-trust fiduciary law. I hope to show, in the pages which
follow, that a sound and coherent theory of the legal and political obligations of the
government to the Indian Nations might be developed from Guerin
.
c The Fiduciary Obligation : A Theory for Constitutional Review?
The new Constitution contains two major provisions covering aboriginal rights .
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Section 35 protects "existing aboriginal and treaty rights" and section 25 protects
those rights are from abrogation and derogation by the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms!' The s. 35 rights are not defined in the Constitution and nor have
they been defined by the courts. Some aspects of them have been recognized and
defined and others might be easily predicted." For example, sections 37 and 37 .1
provide for a series of First Ministers Conferences which were intended to address
the content of section 35 . The last of these was held in April 1987 and ended
without agreement being reached . It would appear, however, that the right to some
form of self-government might now be considered an aboriginal right . There was
general agreement amongst the First Ministers that self-government was properly
considered within the scope of the section 37 conferences . On its precise definition
there was no agreement." Section 35 rights, then, might be very broad.
It would appear also that any rights recognized by the Royal Proclamation are
protected by section 35 . While the section does not refer to the Royal Proclamation,
section 25 includes Royal Proclamation rights amongst the "aboriginal, treaty or
other rights which pertain to the aboriginal peoples" which are not to be adversely
affected by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms .
Since section 25 uses the word
"including" rather than a phrase such as "as well as" it seems logical to assume that
Royal Proclamation rights are also included in section 35 and that they are
mentioned in section 25 only for greater certainty .
The Royal Proclamation clearly meets all the requirements for the creation
of a fiduciary obligation . The fiduciary relationship arises through the surrender
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requirement and the aboriginal interest in lands . Both are present. It can be no
coincidence that both Dickson and Wilson refer to the Proclamation in their
opinions as being the origin of the distinct obligations owed by the federal
government to the Indians . Certainly it was not necessary for the decision. And
given that the Royal Proclamation is now of constitutional status, and since, logically,
it will inform the scope of the constitutionally guaranteed aboriginal rights, it would
not be absurd to view Guerin as a guide for future constitutional interpretation of
those rights .
Before the enactment of the Constitution Act . 1982, Canadian governments
possessed what were probably unlimited legislative powers within their respective
spheres. The new constitution has placed restrictions upon those powers
. Sections
25 and 35 protect the peculiar interests that the Indian nations possess . I suggest
that the Court, aware that the day will soon arrive when they would be called upon
to interpret those restrictions, has taken the opportunity provided by the Guerin
case, to indicate to the Indian nations and to the governments of Canada something
of how they are predisposed to interpret them .
I argue here that the wording of particularly Dickson's opinion almost
requires us to consider any proposed interpretation of the aboriginal rights provisions
of the new constitution in the light of the Guerin decision. If as most commentators
suggest, the fiduciary obligation extends back beyond the provisions of the Indian
Act, then any attempt by the federal government to deal with Indian lands, indeed
with any aboriginal right, may be susceptible to review by the courts . And any
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interference with those rights must be justified and proved in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution and the fiduciary nature of the relationship.
I suggest here that it is possible that Dickson's opinion contains the germ of
such a theory, centered, not upon the interest in land, but upon the "trust obligation" :
the guardian/ward relationship . The general fiduciary obligation referred to above
is, I suggest, that trust obligation . I suggest that the government from the earliest
days, took upon itself an obligation to govern with due regard to the interests of the
Indian nations while they made the adjustment to the changed circumstances brought
about by colonisation. While the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy rendered that
obligation unenforceable except through the political process, the entrenchment of
aboriginal and treaty rights has changed that . And I suggest that the most
compelling logical basis for the existence of a general fiduciary obligation is the
taking of power from the Indian Nations, rather than the taking of their lands . That
taking of power, the denial of sovereignty, resulted in the creation of the
guardian/ward relationship, and I suggest, that relationship may be entrenched in s .
35 .
The interest in lands, consequently, is not of central importance to this thesis .
The focus is the reasoning in the opinion of Chief Justice Dickson . A secondary
focus is what has been termed the "trust obligation" and which I, so as to emphasize
the duty it carries, refer to at times as a wardship . The wardship is found from the
very beginnings of the colonisation of the Americas . It guided the Spanish
colonisation and it forms the centre of the Marshall decisions in the law of the
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United States. With the development of the fiduciary remedy in Canada, I suggest,
it now forms the centre of Canadian native law .
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CHAPTER 2
AMERICAN INFLUENCES
The trust obligation has been central to Native law since the very earliest days
of the colonisation of North America . It is there in the first major colonial
legislation affecting North America, and it persists today in such legislation such as
the present Indian Act' and the Sechelt Band Self-Government Ace .
Its influence
can be seen in the Trusteeship in International law . It is also fundamental to the
Marshall decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which established the
ground rules for Native law in that nation and in Canada .
The trust obligation required the colonizing nation to protect the aboriginal
inhabitants of the new world from the excesses of the colonizers . It was intended
to protect not only the land rights of the indigenous peoples, but also human and
some limited civil rights . It became a necessary element of the act of colonisation
in part because the colonizing nations of Europe denied the aboriginal peoples of
the Americas any political involvement in the establishment of the new regimes
which were then being imposed . It was, in a sense, a limitation on the governmental
powers of the new governments . It was a limitation, however, which the aboriginal
peoples could not enforce against the colonizers . The limitation was self-imposed
and often more honoured in the breach, than in practice .
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Over the years since 1492, the trust obligation
has received increasing
recognition by the colonial regimes, and it has become, to a degree, enforceable
against the successor regimes to the colonial governments . The degree of the
recognition varies from nation to nation . Some separateness is recognized in many
nations in both North and South America. In the United States, the trust obligation
has resulted in a limited, and precarious, right to self-government. In Canada, the
situation is uncertain although some land rights and separate status have been
recognized.
The Guerin case represents the most recent statement of the Supreme Court
of Canada on the scope of the trust obligation' In his opinion, Mr Justice Dickson,
as he then was, explicitly recognizes the influence of this background . In particular
he notes the importance of the United States law regarding the trust obligation . He
also, it is suggested here, implicitly recognizes the central and fundamental
importance of the trust obligation in defining and protecting aboriginal and treaty
rights in Canada . The trust obligation is the key to understanding the
Guerin
decision.
And the key to understanding the trust obligation is to observe its
historical significance in the colonization of the Americas . Of the greatest relevance
is the trust obligation as it exists in the United States .
a Early Influences
1
	
The Beginnings of Colonization
The trust relationship dates back to the very earliest contact between the two
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cultures, European and Indian . Its origin can be traced to the paternalism that the
colonial invaders felt towards the inhabitants of the new land, a paternalism that
continues even today." It can be seen, in embryo, even in the system of land-holding
utilised by the Spanish in their earliest colonies in Hispaniola . One writer describes
the development of the Spanish/American landholding system in this way:
The first colonists reduced the Indians to slavery . Generous Queen Isabella,
who accepted responsibility for the souls of her primitive subjects, sent
Ovando as governor to Hispaniola in 1502, with strict orders against
despoiling and enslaving the Indians . Ovando faithfully obeyed Isabella's
instructions, whereupon the Indians fled to the mountains, dug no gold,
cultivated no corn, did not answer when the church bells summoned them for
religious instruction. Such idleness and disdain for the gospel provoked
Isabella to action. In 1503 she ordered the introduction of the
encomienda
as the royal solution for regulating land and labour in America.
The encomienda(from encomendar, to entrust), a word for which there
is no adequate English equivalent, was the legal device under which the
Crown "entrusted" specified numbers of Indians to deserving Spaniards, the
encomenderos, who thereby won definite rights over their Indians and
incurred specific obligations to them . The encomendero was entitled to
definite days of labor from his charges and was duty bound faithfully to serve
their physical and spiritual well-being .'
The encomenderos received their power over the Indians together with an obligation
to protect and care for them
. The nature of the obligation mirrored the obligations
of the Spanish Crown. The encomienda is clearly more than merely a trust
relationship vis a vis land
.' It is the first example of the wardship of the European
nations over the Indian nations of the New World .
The encomienda system was much abused and in 1512 the Laws of Burgos
were promulgated. These laws codified the encomienda system and attempted to
alleviate its worst excesses . They spell out in clear language the paternalism
of the
colonizers. The laws were justified on the grounds of the laziness of the Indians and
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their inclination towards vice .' These laws create a complete regime for managing
the lives of the Indians, from waking to sleeping and from the cradle to the grave .
Amongst other things the laws established the amount of work to be required of the
Indian and the amount of holidays to be allowed! They required religious
instruction for the Indians' and also laid down other more trivial rules such as those
preventing the Indians from sleeping on the ground" and setting the time at which
the Indians could be required to get up in the morning ." Although the Laws of
Burgos are more extreme, the comparison with today's Indian Act is both striking
and depressing .
The abuses continued . The Dominicans of Hispaniola, in 1519, speaking of
the colonizers as "rabid dogs" reported that "as far as could be said, one hundred
thousand persons, had been destroyed and lost ."" In 1532 deVictoria, a Spanish
philosopher, argued that the Indians should be respected as equals and as owners
of the land they occupied." He stated :
[T]he aborigines . . . were true owners, before the Spanish came among them,
both from the public and the private point of view ."'
In 1537 Pope Paul III issued the Bull, Sublimus Deus, which recognized the Indians
as human beings." It stated, inter alia :
[T]he said Indians and all other people who may later be discovered by
Christians, are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the possession
of their property; nor should they be in any way enslaved ."
In 1542 the New Laws revoked the encomienda
system but within a year the New
Laws were themselves revised to favour the colonists ."' h
1550 & 1551 the dispute between the colonizers and the humanitarians was publicly
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mooted in the debates at Valladolid between Bartolome de Las Casas and Juan
Gines de Sepulveda .' 8 This debate has been called "one of the decisive events in the
history of Spain and of Mankind.' The two participants argued the justice, or lack
of it, of the war against the Indians in the Americas . Sepulveda took the position
that the war was justified in that the Indians were subhuman . De Las Casas, on the
other hand, argued that they were at least of equal humanity . Sepulveda argued,
inter alia, that the Indians were so barbarous that it was justified to wage war against
them to gain domination over them in order to liberate them . De Las Casas
responded, that in the large part, they were barbarous only because they lacked
education."
Neither debater thought for a minute that the Indians themselves should have
any input into the debate. Also, neither entertained the possibility that the native
religion itself might be redeemable if its worst excesses, such as the use of human
sacrifices, could have been ended . They might be redeemed, for de Las Casas, if
they were to give up their own way of life and submit to the dominion of Spain .
Hanke quotes de Las Casas as stating at Vallodolid :
[The Indians] are of such gentleness and decency that they are . . . supremely
fitted and prepared to abandon the worship of idols and to accept . . . the word
of God and the preaching of truth .'
Clearly both de Las Casas and Sepulveda felt that the fate of the Indians was
properly in the hands of the Spanish nation . This is the attitude in which the trust
relationship originates .
The Spanish experience is worthy of note because it forms the background to
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the events which were to take place later in North America . In the later North
American experience the debate was never joined at such a high level . In fact, the
debate at Vallodolid itself was, in the end, inconclusive . No clear decision was
rendered.' The two sides are, however, very clearly demonstrated .
And . what is
important is that neither side in the debate felt that the Indians had a right to their
own culture, or to their own land or to any input into the colonial government .
The
encomienda system was to last until the eighteenth century . It has been blamed for
the fact that today the once proud members of the great civilizations of South and
central America are landless and, often, poor .'
In this short account of the early Spanish activities in the Americas we can
see the origin of two of the themes that are the focus of this thesis . In the attitude
of the Spanish imperialist masters to their Indian "charges", particularly as evidenced
in the Laws of Burgos and the debates at Vallodolid, we see the trust relationship
in embryonic form. In the encomienda
system and the subsequent legislation we see
the first examples of the relationship between the native population and the
colonizers being defined in terms of a legal trust or a wardship
. These two "trusts"
were utilised by the Spanish to strip the indigenous peoples of their land and of
their culture. Very similar devices were to be used in North America by the French
and the British when they came colonize that continent in the following century .
In North America the exploitation was rarely of such intensity and brutality
as it had been further south
. This is probably not due to the greater humanity of
the North American colonists
. The North American colonists were largely either
6 1
farmers or fur traders
. Many of the farmers were Puritans to some extent at odds
with the governments in England . The fur traders relied on the native population
to obtain both food and the raw material of their trade . The Spanish had been from
the aristocracy whose interests were in gold and, where they did cultivate the land,
only in the wealth to be so realised and not in the work itself . Others were expected
to do the work.' These facts alone would render the relations between the two
cultures different in North and South America. But this is not the place to speculate
as to what the reasons might have been . Enough to say that things were different .
The Spanish had colonized through war : the North American colonizers came more
or less peacefully .
Like the Spanish, the French do not seem to have recognized any right in the
Indians to their land. Mr. Justice Taschereau in the Supreme Court of Canada
referred to this fact in the St. Catherine's case.' He stated:
Neither in the commission or the letters patent to the Marquis de la Roche
in 1578 and 1598, nor in the charter to the Cent Associes in 1627, nor in the
retrocession of the same in 1663, nor in the charter to the West Indies
Company in 1664, nor in the retrocession of the same in 1674, by which
proprietary Government in Canada came to an end, nor in the six hundred
concessions of seigniories extending from the Atlantic to Lake Superior,
made by these companies, or by the Kings themselves, nor in any grant of
land whatever during the 225 years of the French domination, can be found
even an illusion to, or a mention of, Indian title .'
The French first arrived in the New World in 1534 with Jacques Cartier's first
voyage. The first French grant dates from 1540
. This and other early grants came
to nought. The first successful grant was that to La Roche in 1598
. In 1603 Pierre
Du Gua, Sieur de Monts, obtained a Royal Commission to establish a colony in New
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France. Slattery says of this commission
:
[De Monts was empowered as the Deputy of the King] to extend the King's
authority as far as possible within the stated limits (delineated in the grant)
and to subdue the inhabitants, thereby bringing them to the true knowledge
of God.'
The actual language in the grant is stronger. It requires de Monts to "assujettir,
submettre & faire obeir tous les peuples de [la] terre."31 The purpose of the colonies
in French America was, according to Slattery, "to facilitate the fur trade.""
Slattery concludes that the French did recognize that the Indians had
proprietary rights in their land . This seems hard to sustain . He comments:
The relative absence of French-Indian treaties involving cessions of territory
or land rights has often been remarked . . . . From this, some conclude that
France did not acknowledge any sort of Indian interest in the soil . The true
explanation seems somewhat different . France was primarily concerned with
extending its dominions in America by incorporating Indian nations under
French rule, rather than acquiring lands for settlements . . . . [T]he aim was
to attach the Indian nations to the French crown as subjects and vassals, and
thereby obtain dominion over their territories'
This seems like a rather back-handed recognition of property rights in land . In truth,
it is astounding to find recognition of a right in the very act of its usurpation .
However the French gained their dominion over the Indian lands, the lack of
executive or legislative recognition of the Indian's right to their land suggests to me
at least that, ultimately, the French ignored it .
The paternalism which we have noted above as a precursor of the trust
relationship, can also be seen in the dealings of the French with the native
population which they displaced. Marc Lescarbot, the first historian of New France,"
in 1618, said of the Indians :
I have at times seen some who doubted if one could justly occupy the lands
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of New France, and deprive the inhabitants ; to whom my reply has been in
few words, that these people are like the man of whom it is spoken in the
Gospel, who had wrapped up in a napkin the talent which had been given
unto him, instead of turning it to account, and therefore it was taken away
from him. And, therefore, as God the creator has given the earth to man
to possess it, it is very certain that the first title of possession should appertain
to the children who obey their father and recognize him, . . . rather than to the
disobedient children . . . . The earth pertaining, then, by divine right to the
children of God, there is here no question of applying the law and polity of
Nations, by which it would not be permissible to claim the territory of
another . This being so we must possess it and preserve its natural
inhabitants, and plant therein with determination the name of Jesus Christ
and France.'
	
(my emphasis)
The indigenous population were seen as wards, not as equals just as they had been
in the Spanish colonies further south. Their native land they only lived on, they did
not own it .
There is some evidence that the French colonists, while they did not give legal
recognition to Indian ownership, may have given de facto, recognition through a
practice of purchasing land from the Indians . Taschereau, in St. Catherine's,
commented on this :
The King granted lands, seigniories, territories, with the understanding that
if any of the lands, seigniories, or territories proved to be occupied by
aborigines, on the grantees rested the onus to get rid of them, either by
chasing them away by force, or by a more conciliatory policy as they would
think proper. In many instances, no doubt, the grantees, or the King himself,
deemed it cheaper or wiser to buy them than to fight them, but that was
never construed as a recognition of their right to any legal title whatsoever .
The fee and the legal possession were in the King or his grantees ."
The practice never gained the status of official policy . With the British colonists in
North America, we shall see, the practice of buying land was eventually accorded
that status. It is worth commenting, however, that while the French may not have
recognized any Indian rights to land, they would appear, at least according to
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Lescarbot, to have recognized a
broader obligation to "preserve its natural
inhabitants" .
g
	
The Royal Proclamation of 1763
The British colonies developed the practice of purchasing land from the
aboriginal inhabitants in their early days. Gould and Semple describe the practice
in one of the original colonies in this way :
In 1629 the Company of the Massachusetts Bay Colony issued instructions for
the colonists to make "reasonable composition" with the native landowners in
order to be free of any "scruple of intention ." The right of the Crown was not
questioned, yet the Indians were clearly acknowledged as having some right
in the soil.'
In 1633 the colony of Massachusetts passed a law requiring a licence from the colony
before purchasing land from the Indians.' This policy was followed by many of the
colonies
In 1763 the policy was codified by the Imperial government with the
promulgation of the Royal Proclamation . Mr. Justice Dickson comments in Guerin,
that this is the first recognition of the "independent legal right" possessed by the
Indians in relation to their land.' Certainly it is the first legislated recognition, but
is in fact only the codification of a long established governmental practice . For the
common law, the Royal Proclamation is perhaps the fundamental document in
Indian/Crown relations . It is also an important document in the history of both the
United States and Canada. It was issued following the end of the Seven Years War
and established the new regime under which Great Britain intended to exploit the
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wealth of North America, and sets the context in which all subsequent dealings
between the Indian Nations and the Crown must be examined.
It is not possible here, nor is it necessary, to make the detailed critical
analysis of the Royal Proclamation that Slattery and Lester have made ." Since my
focus is neither the nature of aboriginal title nor the question of its possible
recognition, I am able to limit my analysis . It is enough to establish that the
wardship is a fundamental aspect of the policy which informed the relations of the
government of Great Britain with the Indians .
The prime purpose of the Royal Proclamation was to create a new governing
structure for the British possessions in North America . The intent is to enable "all
Our loving Subjects, . . .[to] avail themselves with all convenient speed, of the great
Benefits and Advantages which must accrue [from the] "extensive and valuable
Acquisitions in America"4 2 To facilitate this it established three new governments
and provided for the application of English laws in English style courts. It further
provided for land settlements for soldiers who had fought in the then recent wars .
The final provisions lay out the policy to be followed in relation to the
Indians. The preamble to this part delineates the stance taken towards the Indians
:
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the
Security of our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with
whom We are connected, and who live under our Protection, should not be
molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of our Dominions and
Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved to
them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds.'
Two things are of note here . First, the guardianship role is already evident in the
phrase "who live under our Protection" . Secondly, the origins of the trust obligation
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in relation to the land can be seen in the reserve of land to the Indians for their
benefit. Title to the land is assumed by the Crown .'
This can be seen in the
preamble to the whole, noted above, which refers to "recent Acquisitions, secured
to our Crown". This denial of any right to regulate or dispose of the land as they
might see fit is, I suggest, an essential aspect of the wardship by the Crown of the
Indians.
The Royal Proclamation also denies to the colonists power to purchase the
Indian interest without Crown approval and establishes the method to be followed
in purchasing that interest's From the promulgation of Royal Proclamation to
today, the Indians have been prevented from alienating their land except to the
Crown. This requirement, it will be remembered, Dickson saw as the origin of the
"distinct fiduciary obligation" owed by the Crown to the Indians'" Again, I suggest
that this "distinct" obligation is only one facet of a general duty, the trust obligation
or wardship in its broad sense, which colours the dealings of the Crown with the
Indians. The general duty is not laid out with any clarity by the Royal Proclamation
however and its scope must be sought in all the dealings of the Crown with the
Indian nations .
The general duty is consistent with the practice of other European nations
which were reviewed briefly above . The absolute power assumed by the colonial
governments came with a duty to act to some degree or another, as the protector of
the Indians from the worst excesses of the colonists themselves . The general duty
is uncertain and can only be discovered by viewing the practice of the government
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in context. The governments of Europe viewed their powers and their duties
differently .
After the defeat of the French and the promulgation of the Royal
Proclamation, a single policy governed Indian/Crown relations in North America
.
With the American Revolution, which began in 1776 and lasted some seven years,
and the subsequent creation of the United States of America, the history once again
diverges. With the divergence in the United States comes the creation of a
distinctive body of Native law.
b Native Law in the United States .
Native Law quickly became a coherent body of law in the United States .
Felix Cohen, who first recognized the fact that Indian law deserved to be dealt with
as a whole and as a distinct body of law, wrote :
Indian law is an extraordinarily rich and diverse field
. The cases, both old
and new, weave a fabric with threads drawn from constitutional
law,
international law, federal jurisdiction, conflict of laws, real property, contracts,
corporations, torts, domestic relations, procedure, trust law, intergovernmental
relations, sovereign immunity and taxation . Typically, as those fields meld
into Indian law, the blend produces a new variation that could not have been
predicted by analysis of the applicable law from those other fields."
Cohen recognized that Indian law had become a body of law in its own right, rather
than a series of sub-species of other bodies . The Indian law of contract, for
example, was more a part of Indian law and not so much a sub-category of the
general contract law .
The Indian law recognized by Cohen can be said to contain three elements :
First, absolute legislative power in the Congress
; second, Indian rights ; and third, the
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trust relationship . Although it might appear that the land rights, including hunting
and fishing rights, are the central fact of Native law, I suggest here that it is the trust
relationship which is the most important aspect . To view land rights as central is to
mistake the symptom for the cause . Land rights appear to be of paramount
importance only because they have been central to litigation . United States' Native
law begins with land litigation and rapidly progresses to much broader issues such
as the constitutional position of the Indian nations in the United States . This, I
suggest, is inevitable because it is the trust obligation which is central and because
the trust relationship is intimately connected with the acquisition of sovereignty in
North America. Indeed, the progression from land issues to the broader issues can
be seen in the founding cases of Native law for both Canada and the United States :
the Marshall cases .
After the Revolution, the Federal government of the fledgling United States
quickly succeeded to the role from which the government in London had been
ousted. The new government concluded its first post-revolutionary treaty in October
of 1784 . 4' It was with the Six Nations . This treaty provides,
inter alia, :
A line shall be drawn, beginning at the mouth of a creek about four miles
east of Niagara . . . upon the lake named . . . Ontario; from thence . . . to the
mouth of Buffaloe Creek on Lake Erie ; thence south to the north boundary
of the state of Pennsylvania ; thence west to the end of the said north
boundary; thence south along the west boundary of the said state, to the river
Ohio; the said line . . . shall be the western boundary of the lands of the Six
Nations, so that the Six Nations shall and do yield to the United States, all
claims to the west of the said boundary, and they shall be secured in the
peaceful possession of the lands they inhabit to the east and north of the
same.49
	
(my emphasis)
The preamble of the treaty reads :
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The United States of America give peace to the (Six Nations), and receive
them into their protection .'
The parallels with the wording of the Royal Proclamation, as well as the
acknowledgement of the trust obligation, are clear .
Later treaties, starting with the 1785 treaty with the Cherokee, contain similar
language." The 1785 treaty, for example, provides :
For the benefit and comfort of the Indians, and for the prevention of injuries
and oppressions on the part of the citizens or Indians, the United States in
Congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the
trade with Indians, and managing all their affairs in such manner as they think
proper.'
In 1787, the policy enshrined in the Royal Proclamation became the official
policy of the new republic.' In 1790 the first Trade and Intercourse Acts` prohibited
"any person or persons . . . [and] any state" from securing title or claim to any Indian
lands except "by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution ."-"
The authority for these Acts is found in the Commerce Clause and the Treaty
Clause of the Constitution. The Commerce Clause states that "Congress shall have
the power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the Several states,
and with the Indian Tribes."' The Treaty Clause allows the President the "Power,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur ."' P
1790, then, the situation of the Indians under the dominion of the United States is
comparable to that which it had been under the British in 1763 . There is one
important difference : there are no restrictions on the powers of Congress and the
President, at least when acting in concert, over Indian land . The states are in no
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better position in this matter than they had been before as colonies .
In its early years the United States followed the Imperial policy in its dealings
with the Indians . The early treaties were quite favourable to the Indians . As the
situation of the United States became more secure, the policies followed became less
favourable to the Indians . Treaty-making continued for the next one hundred
years and clauses, such as those mentioned above, promising protection continued
to appear in treaties throughout the period. The idea of the United States as
protector was fundamental to the language of the treaties .
The treaty phase of United States/Indian relations came to an end in 1871
when Congress passed the Indian Appropriations Act which provided, inter alia :
[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or
power with whom the United States may contract by treaty : Provided,
further, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or
impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with
any such Indian nation or tribe .'
During this period, which Cohen has called the formative years, the foundations of
native law in the United States were laid . By its close, the trust obligation was
firmly entrenched at the centre of the relationship between the Indian Nations and
the United States government.
In the early years of the 19th century the United States Supreme Court gave
its imprimatur to the interpretation of this relationship as a guardianship
. Chief
Justice Marshall, in Fletcher v. Peck b0 Johnson
v. McIntosh," Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia,
established native law as a distinct field and
made guardianship the core of that field . These cases are the seminal influences of
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not only United States, but also of Canadian Native law . With the last of these
cases in 1832, the place of trust relationship in native law was secured .
1
	
The Marshall Cases
Marshall developed his ideas of the obligations of the government to the
Indians and as to the nature of the Indian interest in the land through four cases
spaced over 22 years. The first two concerned land rights : the last two had
constitutional implications. His interpretation of the treaties, legislation and of
constitutional and historical practice, led him to conclude that, while the Indian
peoples did not relate to their land in a way that the courts could recognise as
ownership, they did have some rights to it which were legal in nature . The Indian
nations, he held, had rather fragile rights of possession, along with such other legal
rights as treaty might guarantee to individual tribes . There existed also an obligation
on the United States to protect the Indian nations . The extent of the obligation was
left vague .
The first of the cases dates from 1810 . In Fletcher v . Peck, a case which was
more concerned with contracts than with Indians, the power of the state of Georgia
to grant land subject to Indian title was questioned. The Royal Proclamation,
which included the lands at issue within those reserved for the Indians, was cited in
support of the argument. Referring to subsequent commissions in 1763 and 1764
including that land within the borders of the colony of Georgia, Marshall responded :
[The Royal Proclamation] contained a clause reserving,
. . . for the use of the
Indians, all the lands on the western waters . . . . The lands conveyed to the
plaintiff lie on the western waters . . . . The reservation [in the
R	
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Proclamation] for the use of the Indians appears to be a temporary
arrangement, suspending, for a time, the settlement of the country reserved,
and the powers of the royal governor within the territory reserved, but is not
conceived to amount to an alteration of the boundaries of the colony. If the
language of the proclamation be, in itself, doubtful, the commissions
subsequent thereto, . . . entirely remove the doubt.'
The argument had been made that the Royal Proclamation placed the land out of
the reach of the government of the colony, now the state . This argument was
rejected .
He continued :
It is the opinion of this court, that the particular land stated in the declaration
appears, . . . to lie within the state of Georgia, and that the state of Georgia
has power to grant it . . . . It was doubted, whether a state could be seized in
fee of lands, subject to the Indian title . . . . The majority of the court is of the
opinion, that the nature of the Indian title, which is certainly to be respected
by all courts, until it be legitimately extinguished, is not such as to be
absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the state
The state government could grant unsurrendered Indian land even though it could
not affect Indian possession . I suggest that the trust obligation, in somewhat
embryonic form, can be seen in the separation of the Indian and state interests, and
in the granting of the power of control over title to the government . Its broader
ramifications, however, remained hidden .
Thirteen years later in Johnson v. McIntosh, Marshall got to refine this
judgment somewhat
. This case concerned land in what is now the state of Illinois
also reserved for the use of the Indians under the terms of the Royal Proclamation.
The plaintiffs claimed the land under two grants made before the revolutionary war .
The grants had been made by the chiefs of the tribes to private individuals . The
defendant claimed though a grant made by the United States . The United States
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had signed treaty with the tribes in 1795 .' This case addressed much more squarely
the question of the nature of Indian title .
Marshall, in his decision, analyzed the history of the European colonization
of North America. The view he laid down has become the foundation of the
relationship between the native people and their new governments for the whole
continent. He discerned a fundamental principle underlying all the dealings between
the two races. The principle has become known as
the Doctrine of Discovery. He
states :
This principle was that discovery gave title to the government by whose
subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European
governments, which title might be consummated by possession.
Indian ownership was not even in question for Marshall .
They did, however, have some legal rights . He continues :
In the establishment of [the relations between the discoverer and the natives],
the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded ;
but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired . They were admitted
to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to
retain possession of it, . .. but their rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose
of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the
original fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who
made it. While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the
natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate
dominion to be in
themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate
dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in the possession of the natives .
These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.
The right he likened to a lease in that it does not prevent the owner from dealing
with the fee as he wishes."
Marshall then went on to establish that the United States had taken over all
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the powers which originally were the Europeans . He comments :
By the treaty which concluded the war of our revolution, Great Britain
relinquished all claim, not only to the government, but to the "propriety and
territorial rights of the United States ." .. . By this treaty, the powers of
government, and the right to soil, . . . passed definitively to these states . . . . It
has never been doubted that either the United States, or the several states,
had a clear title to all the lands within the . . . treaty, subject only to the Indian
right of occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish that right was
vested in that government which might exclusively exercise .it' i
And for Marshall it is the United States government in which the power to
extinguish vested. He continues:
The power now possessed by the government of the United States to grant
lands resided, while we were colonies, in the crown, or its grantees. The
validity of either has never been, questioned in our courts. It has been
exercised uniformly over territory in possession of the Indians . The existence
of this power must negative, the existence of any right which might conflict
with, and control it. ... All our institutions recognize the absolute title of the
crown subject only to the Indian right of occupancy ; and recognize the
absolute title of the crown to extinguish that right72
The powers which the United States government inherited from Great Britain over
the Indians were broad indeed . They were not, for Marshall at least, unencumbered .
Certain responsibilities came with them. The peculiar history of European claims
to North America gave rise to these responsibilities .
Marshall notes that Britain first claimed the continent as a vacant land . Due
to the impossibility, for whatever reasons, of assimilating the Indians, the British
found it necessary to convert the title through discovery into one gained by conquest .
These problems arise due to the nature of British colonial law . For the purposes of
this thesis, it is enough to assert two points, both taken from Blackstone .' First,
where the land colonized is vacant, that is to say, uninhabited, . the Crown has full
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title and power to dispose of it as it might .
Second, that where the land is not
vacant, and in particular in conquered territory, the property rights of the conquered
nation survive the conquest' And this was so whether they were assimilated or
chose to remain a distinct people .
This law was not to be adequate for application in North America . Marshall
states :
[T)he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest .
To leave them in possession of their country was to leave the country a
wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people was impossible, because they
were as brave and as high-spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to
repel by arms every attempt on their independence .
What was the inevitable consequence of this state of things? The
Europeans were under the necessity of either abandoning the country, and
relinquishing their pompous claims to it or of enforcing those claims by the
sword,
and by the adoption of principles adapted to the condition of a people
with whom it was impossible to mix, and who could not be governed as a
distinct society, or of remaining in their neighbourhood and exposing
themselves and their families to the perpetual hazard of being massacred .'
(my emphasis)
I am not concerned here with the accuracy of Marshall's analysis . Others have
suggested at least a "cultural chauvinism ." 76 I am interested in the case as lega_i
history, not as actual history .
Whatever the truth, Marshall used this representation of history to create a
new principle of law for justifying colonial tenure in North America. He states :
That law which regulates, and ought to regulate in general, the relations
between the conqueror and the conquered, was incapable of application to
a people under such circumstances . The resort to some new and different
rule, better adapted to the actual state of things, was unavoidable . Every rule
which can be suggested will be found to be attended with great difficulty .
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an
inhabited country into conquest may appear, if the principle has been asserted
. ., and . . . sustained, it becomes the law of the land and cannot be questioned
.
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So. too, with respect to the concomitant principle, that the Indian inhabitants
are to be considered merely asoccupants. to be protected
. indeed, while in
peace. in the possession of their lands
. but to be incapable of transferring the
absolute title to others'
	
(my emphasis)
Marshall, it seems, has performed an interesting trick here. He has mixed two
principles of the common law to create a new principle which reflects the existing
practice of the British colonial governments. On the one hand, British law required
that the conquering nation respect the antecedent rights of the conquered race, and
on the other, discovery of vacant land allowed the sovereign a free hand in dealing
with that land. North America had been treated originally as vacant land
. Later it
had turned out that conquest was necessary . Nothing in the law covered this
situation . To the judicial mind, Marshall's at least, this required the fashioning of
a new rule of the common law
. Actual conquest in British law gave absolute power .
The fictional conquest of the Indian Nations, by contrast, gave a limited power, a
power which was to be charged with certain responsibilities .
The sovereign, in order to maintain peace in his colonies, issued the Royal
Proclamation establishing a new regime for granting land to colonists . By its terms
the Indian nations were denied rights which were properly theirs under the British
colonial law. This denial required that the Crown step in to protect the Indian
nations from exploitation made possible by that denial of input into
the new
governing regime. Thus, it is suggested, the trust obligation was born
.
For the imperial Crown this may have been merely a temporary regime
designed to provide for the peaceful expansion of empire
. For Marshall, that regime
matured into a principle of the common law . He continues from the quote
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immediately above :
However this restriction [on transfer] may be opposed to natural right, and
to the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system
under which the country has been settled, and to be adapted to the actual
condition of the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and
certainly cannot be rejected by the courts of justice .'
It has, in other words, become a fundamental principle of the law of the United
States presumably equal in status to the principles of Blackstone noted above .
And what exactly is that fundamental principle? It is not a recognition of the
Indian nations as equals . Far from it .
It, rather, is an entrenchment of their
subordinate position. It must have been clear to Marshall, as it is clear to us today,
that the European and colonist governments did not in fact respect the rights of the
Indian peoples .' Certainly while the Indians were strong enough to challenge the
might of the colonists they were feared. But once they were unable to resist the
colonist's advance, the Indians rights were ignored . And, for Marshall at least, that
ignoring could be justified under the principles of land tenure that had evolved .
He
comments:
Frequent and bloody wars, in which the whites were not always the aggressors,
unavoidably ensued. European policy, numbers and skill prevailed
. . As the
white population advanced, that of the Indians necessarily receded
. . . . The
game fled into thicker and more unbroken forests, and the Indians followed
.
The soil, to which the crown originally claimed title, being no longer occupied
by its ancient inhabitants, was parcelled out accordingly to the will of the
sovereign power, and taken possession of by persons who claimed immediately
from the crown, or mediately, through its grantees or deputies ."
This could be described as a process of peaceful conquest .
The obligation to respect property rights of a conquered nation has been
converted into a limited respect only for actual possession
. In other words, as
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regards Indian ownership and title to the land, the colonists treated the land as
vacant. However, as regards the Indian's possession, it was necessary only to end the
Indian occupation of the land . This could be done by conquest or by purchase
. And
if the Indians abandoned their land, for whatever reason, the Indian title was to be
deemed to abandoned also . Until the Indian's possession was terminated, it was to
be "protected ." The protection, it would appear, is a very weak obligation in that it
appears to consist only of the surrender requirement . Marshall, with an adept
sleight of hand, has converted the respect due to the rights of conquered nations into
protection of the right of a weaker race to possession of such land as they could hold
onto.
What is even more remarkable on Marshall's part is that he has taken the
policy enunciated by the Royal Proclamation and attempted to render it into a
principle of the common law of the United States . On the practice of the British
under the Royal Proclamation Marshall comments :
According to the theory of the British constitution, the royal prerogative is
very extensive so far as respects the political relations between Great Britain
and foreign nations . The peculiar situation of the Indians, necessarily
considered in some respects, as a dependent, and in some respects as a
distinct people, occupying a country claimed by Great Britain, and yet too
powerful and brave not to be dreaded as formidable enemies, required that
means should be adopted for the preservation of peace, and that their
friendship should be secured by quieting their alarms for their property .
This was to be effected by constraining the encroachments of the whites ; and
the power to do this was never, we believe, denied by the colonies to the
crown.
This course was pursued not because of the force of the common law : it was
a policy decision by the government of Great Britain . By contrast, in the fledgling
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United States the same course was followed but, according to Chief Justice Marshall,
for a different reason
. There it was followed because it had matured into a rule of
the common law. Great Britain's policy had become the United
States's
fundamental law. It was a "new and different rule" necessitated by the "actual state
of things."' And since the case was concerned with land rights, Marshall explores
only that aspect . Clearly however, logic suggests a broader protective role, and
Marshall soon recognized this fact .
It is to be noted that in neither of these cases did the Indians themselves
appear. Finally, in the third case of the series, Cherokee Nation v.
The State of
Georgia,' they actually appeared to argue their own case .
In this action the
Cherokee nation attempted to prevent Georgia from executing certain acts within
territory reserved to them under various treaties made with the United States
government between 1785 and 1819.' Marshall spoke of the case in this way :
If the courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better
calculated to excite them can hardly be imagined. A people once numerous,
powerful, and truly independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and
uncontrolled possession of an ample domain, gradually sinking beneath our
superior policy, our arts and our arms, have yielded their lands by successive
treaties, each of which contains a solemn guarantee of the residue, until they
retain no more of their formerly extensive territory than is deemed necessary
for their comfortable subsistence . To preserve this remnant the present
application is made
The case turned on whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction under the
Constitution to hear the case
. To have their case heard it was necessary for the
Cherokee nation to bring themselves within the ambit of Article III of the
Constitution. Article III reads :
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
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this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority ; . . . between a State and Citizens of
another State ; . . . between a State . . . and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects .'
The Cherokee were not citizens . They, therefore, had to demonstrate that they were
a foreign state. This they were unable to do .
Marshall did agree that they were a state . He allowed:
So much of the argument as was intended to prove the character of the
Cherokees as a State, as a distinct political society separated from others,
capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself, has, in the opinion
of the majority of the judges, been completely successful . They have been
uniformly treated as a State from the settlement of our country . The
numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them as
a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being
responsible in their political character for any violation of their engagements,
or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by any
individual of their community . Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these
treaties. The acts of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee Nation
as a State, and the courts are bound by those acts .
They were not, however, a foreign state. Consequently, the action failed :
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and,
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy until that right shall
be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government, yet it may well be
doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged
boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated
foreign states. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic
dependent nations . They occupy a territory to which we assert a title
independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when
their right of possession ceases . Meanwhile, they are in a state of pupilage .
Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian .
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and
its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants
; and address the President as
their great father
Here we see stated unequivocally, albeit in obiter, for the first time, the guardianship
role
. The Doctrine of Discovery_ with its separation of title and possession of land,
8 1
has led Marshall inexorably to the conclusion that a similar rule must apply to all
Indian governmental powers
. They were nations before contact, and nations they
remain. However, as nations within the United States nation, they are nations under
pupilage. In the last of his four cases, Marshall presents the fully worked out theory
and the trust obligation clearly occupies a central role .
In Worcester v. Georgia one of the laws which the Cherokee objected in the
previous case was directly challenged .
Worcester was a white missionary from
Vermont imprisoned for violating a Georgia law requiring a licence from the state
to live upon the Cherokee reserve. He applied for a writ of error to the Supreme
Court
. Since Worcester clearly came within Article III of the Constitution,
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the
problem in the previous case was finessed.
It is my contention that in this case Marshall brings together the three
previous cases and makes as clear a statement as he could on the nature of
relationship between the Indians and the government . 9' He reiterates much of what
he has said before. He expands on other issues . And retracts nothing
. That title
was in the Europeans still bothers him and, once again, he justifies the point . He
comments:
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct
people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the
rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves
by their own laws. It is difficult to comprehend the proposition that the
inhabitants of either quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims
of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they
occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give
the
discoverer rights in the country discovered which annulled the pre-existing
rights of its ancient possessors 9 2
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At a later point he asks, and then answers his own question :
Did these adventurers, by sailing along the coast and occasionally landing on
it, acquire for the several governments to whom they belonged, or by whom
they were commissioned, a rightful property in the soil from the Atlantic to
the Pacific; or rightful dominion over the numerous people who occupied it?
. . . [P]ower, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded
by the world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they
descend."
The claim was one thing: it took power and actual domination to perfect it
. And,
as he had noted before' it was the reality of colonization which created the
superiority of the European land tenure over that of the Indians . Power the
Europeans certainly had.
The claim, while absurd on its face, was, when coupled with termination of
possession on the part of the Indians, however effected, was sufficient to perfect title,
without cession, to all that land from sea to sea. He continues, speaking of the
colonial charters, :
The extravagant and absurd idea that the feeble settlements made on the
sea-coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate
power by them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea to sea, did
not enter the mind of any man . They were well understood to convey the
title which, according to the common law of European sovereigns respecting
America, they might rightfully convey, and no more . This was the exclusive
right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell .'
Nothing here is new: Marshall has said all of this before
. The claims gave title
subject to the native right of possession
. That possession might be purchased or
taken by conquest, as he comments here, or, as he had noted in
Johnson v.
McIntosh,' it might be abandoned. The Cherokee were not in the mood to give up
their territory .
They had come to court the previous year precisely to protect
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possession of the land that they had earlier made treaty to retain
.
What is new is Marshall's discussion of the relationship between the Cherokee
and the United States
. He discusses at some length the meaning of the "protection"
owed under the law, through both treaties and legislation, to the Indians
. Speaking
of the first treaty with the Cherokee, he comments :
The third article acknowledges the Cherokee to be under the protection of
the United States of America, and no other power .
This stipulation is found in Indian treaties generally . . . .
The general
law of European sovereigns, respecting their claims in America, limited the
intercourse of Indians, in a great degree, to the particular potentate whose
ultimate right of domain was acknowledged by the others
. This was the
general state of things in times of peace . It was sometimes changed in war
.
The consequence was that their supplies were derived chiefly from that
nation, and their trade confined to it
. Goods, indispensable to their comfort,
in the shape of presents, were received from the same hand
. What was of
still more importance, the strong hand of government was interposed to
restrain the disorderly and licentious from intrusions into their country, from
encroachments on their lands, and from those acts of violence which were
often attended by reciprocal murder
. The Indians perceived in this protection
only what was beneficial to themselves -
an engagement to punish aggressions
in them
. It involved, practically, no claim to their lands, no dominion over
their persons
. It merely bound the nation to the British crown as a dependent
ally, claiming the protection of a powerful friend and neighbour, and receiving
the advantages of that protection, without surrender of their national
character .
This is the true meaning of the stipulation, and is undoubtedly the
sense in which it was made . Neither the British government nor the
Cherokees understood it otherwise .
The same stipulation entered into with
the United States is
undoubtedly to be construed in the same manner .
The Cherokee
acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of the United States, and
of no other power.
Protection does not imply the destruction of the
protected.'
The sentiment contained in this last sentence is instructive .
Of the same provision in a later treaty Marshall states :
[The relation of the Indians to the United States] was that of a nation
claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not that of
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individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to
the laws of a master 98
Discussing the legislation respecting Indians then in place, Marshall notes :
The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory
as completely separated from that of the States ; and provide that all
intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the
Union."
He concludes :
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original rights, as the undisputed
possessors of the soil from time immemorial, with the single exception of that
imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any
other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the
particular region claimed . . . . The term "nation so generally applied to them,
means "a people distinct from others ." The Constitution, by declaring treaties
already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the
land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian
nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are
capable of making treaties."'
The Cherokee, by their treaties and by the general law, had retained a limited right
to self-government. Consequently, the State of Georgia could not pass valid laws for
them. Worcester, therefore, must go free.
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Marshall's decision to recognize the Indian nations as "domestic dependent
nations" is driven by his earlier recognition of the land right . The principles which
lead to recognition are the same. The British colonial law required the recognition
of the pre-existing laws of the indigenous societies . The Doctrine of Discovery
contraverts that law and allows the Crown to assume full legislative power over the
Indians. The language of protection in the Instructions to the governors, the Royal
Proclamation, and in the treaties results in the power assumed by the government
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being accompanied by a duty to exercise the power with due regard to the interests
of the Indians. The trust obligation, which is what the duty has been called, is the
duty which accompanies the assumption of power over the Indian nations .
The exact nature of the duty is not clear from the cases . Clearly, the Indians
are dependent on the superior power of the United States ." This being so they
have a legal right to protection by that power ." The protection resembles that of
a guardian and ward ." Just what is to be protected is also somewhat enigmatic .
Certainly, the Indian's possession of the land is to be protected as long as it
peaceable
." It is possible to conclude that, for Marshall at least, the only protection
required was the protection afforded by the surrender process .
Further obligations
may flow from treaties 107 and legislation." They may also be fundamental law
. The
Indians might be entitled to relief' or supplies ."' They are entitled to protection
from encroachments on their lands and prevention of entry by "disorderly"
elements."' Perhaps most controversially, they are entitled to self-government"' and
protection of their national character ."' Marshall states this strongly in Worcester
v. Georgia when he says, "Protection does not imply destruction of the protected
."
11'
The legal obligations which are entailed by the relationship, whatever its
nature, are unclear . The Cherokee treaties, along with most of the American
treaties, have the force of law .
Possibly then, all the obligations mentioned by
Marshall should be legally enforceable . That did not come to pass and, whatever
Marshall had in mind, he did not make it clear . It was necessary for the parameters
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of the obligations, and as well as the content, to be clarified through the following
years.
u
	
Development
The authorities suggest that Indian law in the United States has three major
phases."' The first phase lasted from the revolution until approximately 1871 . It is
the period when all the major treaties between the Indians and the government were
made. It is the phase in which Indian rights received some recognition . The second
phase for the most part saw the government attempt, by various measures, to destroy
Indian peoples as a separate and distinct fact of North American life . During this
phase many different policies were developed and implemented . It was a time of
assimilation, allotment and termination and it lasted until the present phase, that of
self-determination, began between 1958 and 1961 . This most recent phase begins
with the recognition, by the authorities, that the Indians themselves should have
some say as to the direction of their future, and that they should be able, if they
wish, to retain their Indian identity . Within the second period, from 1934 to 1953,
there had been a glimmer of these things to come .
Cohen called the first phase the formative years, 1' and it was during this
period that the foundations of native law in the United States were laid . It was a
time of immense upheaval for the Indians of North America . The treaties dealt
with two billion acres of their land ."' At the beginning, during the revolutionary war,
the Indians were much sought after as allies . By 1871 they were outcasts in their
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own land as the American nation took more and more of the land for its own use
and herded the remaining Indians into smaller and smaller areas of poorer and
poorer land. Beginning with the 1817 treaty with the Cherokee
118 a program was
initiated of removing the Indians west of the Mississippi . This became settled policy
in 1830 with the passing of the Indian Removal Act ."'
The treaties vary greatly
. Some, such as the first with the Delaware and the
Cherokee,"' dealt with the Indians as equals promising fair dealing
. Others, such as
the 1817 Cherokee treaty,12' altered an earlier treaty
. Still others terminated Indian
status completely ." Many guaranteed some measure of independent control to the
bands." Cohen comments :
From 1776 to 1849, all treaty limitations on the powers of tribal
self-government were related in some way to intercourse with non-Indians .
Treaties concluded in the last two decades of the treaty making period,
however, increasingly encroached upon the autonomy of tribes ."
(authorities omitted)
As the United States gained strength and had less to fear from the Indian peoples,
so it felt less constrained from interfering in their internal affairs .
After the Civil War, settlement in the far west increased dramatically
. Since
Indian land could no longer be obtained by the executive through treaty, the task fell
to Congress. Cohen comments :
Rapid settlement and development of the West . . .
demanded legislation
providing for the acquisition of Indian lands and resources. The theory of
assimilation was used to justify the legislation as beneficial to the Indians .
Proponents of assimilation policies maintained that if Indians adopted the
habits of civilized life they would need less land, and the surplus would be
available for white settlers . The taking of these lands was justified as
necessary for the progress of civilization as a whole .' (authorities omitted)
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Needless to say, the Indians were not asked their opinion of this development . This
marks the beginning of the second phase .
Although some attempts at assimilation had been made throughout the earlier
history of the United States, the General Allotment Act' which was passed in 1887
signified that the national policy towards the Indians had changed from one of
co-existence to one of domination . This act, like so many others, was partly born out
of philanthropy and was intended to advance the Indians through assimilation . This
does not excuse its excesses .
The Act attacked Indian sovereignty and culture on a number of fronts .
Primarily, it allowed the President to break up the reserves and to "allot the lands
. . . in severalty to any of the Indians located thereon
."" This was to impose upon the
Indians the European form of tenure . Cohen cites two reports of the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs as asserting :
It is doubtful whether any high degree of civilization is possible without
individual ownership of land .
Common property and civilization cannot coexist .'
The land was to be granted subject to a 25 year trust period to guard against
alienation.' This is, I believe, the first actual reference to land as being held in
trust for the Indians . The Act states :
[The Secretary of the Interior shall issue patents in] the name of the allottees,
which patents shall be of legal effect, and declare that the United States does
and will hold the land allotted, for the period of twenty five years, in trust for
the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have
been made."'
A further provision allowed the government to purchase any unallotted land for
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settlement . The money thus realized was to be held "in the Treasury of the United
States for the sole use of the tribe or tribes of Indians .""' The marginal note speaks
of this as a trust .
The Act made a further attack upon Indian lifestyle in that it granted
citizenship to allottees and to any Indian taking up the habits of civilized life ."' In
1924, citizenship was conferred upon all Indians .'
The General Allotment Act had a devastating effect on the Indians
. Canby
puts it most succinctly:
The primary effect of the Allotment Act was a precipitous decline in the
amount of Indian-held land, from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million in
1934. Of the 48 million acres that remained, some 20 million were desert
or semi-desert . Much of the land was lost by sale as tribal surplus
; the
remainder passed out of the hands of allottees . Allottees who received
patents after 25 years found themselves subject to state property taxation, and
many forced sales resulted from non-payment . In addition, the Indians's new
power to sell land provided many opportunities for non-Indians to negotiate
purchases . . . on terms quite disadvantageous to the Indians
. The allottees
were frequently left with neither their land nor with any benefits that might
have resulted from its disposition."
As President Roosevelt was to describe it in 1906, it was "a mighty pulverizing
engine to break up the tribal mass.""
Many other methods were utilised in aid of assimilation . Education was
fundamental. Cohen comments :
Education was viewed as an important tool ; schooling was intended to provide
Indian children with a substitute for a civilized homelife . [The] policy
replaced the Indians' own history, legends, heroes, songs, and language with
those of white Americans."
	
(authorities omitted)
Everything was fair game . Cohen continues :
Coercive attempts at assimilation were applied to other aspects of the Indian's
life. In 1883 the Interior Department enacted a Criminal Code forbidding
90
"certain old heathen and barbarous customs ." Local agents tried to force
white civilization upon Indians, controlling such things as hair length, funeral
procedures, and beef slaughtering . Engaging in specified dances and
ceremonials was made punishable in 1921. 137
	
(authorities omitted)
From 1891 legislation allowed the Secretary of the Interior to lease land of
allottees who could not "personally and with benefit to himself improve his allotment
or any part thereof."" The leasing power was increased over the years ."
Cohen
called the allotment policy a "systematic attempt to eradicate Indian heritage and
tribalism.i140
In 1934 the Indian Reorganization Act L41 was passed creating an interlude of
tolerance in this period of destruction, and perhaps signalling a third, more liberal,
period which was to come . Allotment was ended, the trust period of the allotments
which had been made was extended indefinitely, and provisions were included which
attempted to further self-government and to protect the tribal land base .
In 1953 the direction of Indian policy was changed once more as pressure
mounted against the Indian Reorganization Act . On 1st August of that year,
Congress adopted a resolution which, while not binding, dominated Indian affairs
until the adoption of self-determination as national policy . This resolution began :
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the
Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same
laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as . . . other
citizens . . . and to end their status as wards of the United States
."'
Under the influence of this, Congress terminated the status of a number of tribes ."'
Lost along with this was the special relationship with the federal government .
By 1958 the unpopularity of termination led to its abandonment . In June of
9 1
1961 the American Indians at a national meeting in Chicago demanded some degree
of self-determination. In 1968 the Indian Civil Rights Act"
announced a new
approach to Indian issues . Following the passage of this legislation consent of the
tribe was required before a state government could extend its jurisdiction to cover
Indian lands. Since then the extent of tribal control over the lives of their members
has been gradually increasing . It now includes child welfare,' education," and
justice systems that combine traditional and American-style court systems ." This
approach to Indian issues the Cohen called the modern period .
Wilkinson in a recent book, builds on the Cohen's work ."' The first phase,
he suggests, recognized some degree of special rights for the Indians and allowed
them a "measured separatism"." This line of case law, Wilkinson suggests, is typified
by the Marshall cases, and such later decisions as Ex parte Crow Dog` and Talton
v. Manes.' In Crow Dog the Court held that the murder of one Indian by another
was punishable only by the tribe because Congress had not provided for federal
court jurisdiction. In Talton v. Mayes, the Court held that since tribal powers pre-
existed the United States Constitution, the Indians were not required to meet
constitutional standards. Both of these cases build upon Marshall's idea of the
Indians as "domestic dependent nations". This line of cases on the whole, recognizes
Indian rights .
The second historical phase, Wilkinson suggests, emphasizes federal power
and is typified by what he calls the Kagama-McBratney-Lone Wolf line of cases.
These cases are destructive of the notion of Indian rights . Kagamal52 upheld the
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Major Crimes Act153 which Congress had passed to provide for federal jurisdiction
over such crimes as murder when committed on the reservation. This, of course, was
in response to the Crow Dog case. McBratney154 allowed state jurisdiction over the
murder of a non-Indian by a non-Indian on reservation, and Lone Wolf155 allowed
that Congress could unilaterally override the terms of a treaty . This second phase
recognizes the absolute nature of the federal power over the Indian Nations .
The modern phase is marked by the change from the pursuit of assimilation
to the encouragement of some degree of self-determination . Cohen dates the
modem era from 1961 when both of the candidates for President took the position
that they would not alter the relationship with the Indians without tribal consent ."
Canby' dates it somewhat later, in 1968, with the passing of the Indian Civil Rights
Act." The date is not important. To some extent it might be said to have begun
in 1946 with the passing of the Indian Claims Commission Act" which demonstrated
the intent, on the part of the government, to come to terms with the dissatisfaction
of the Indian peoples with the treatment they had received over the years from the
federal government .
Wilkinson dates the modern period from the 1959 decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee" which recognized inherent tribal
jurisdiction over contracts between Indians and non-Indians entered into on an
Indian reservation. In this modern age for Wilkinson, the courts have started to
grapple with the "two separate bodies of jurisprudence" which have resulted from the
two earlier periods of Indian legal history
.
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Indian law by the beginning of the
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modern period, whatever starting date one might choose, is a confused body of law
.
The early cases recognizing Indian rights seem irreconcilable with the later cases
entrenching the plenary power of Congress . Wilkinson suggests that this has not
been the case .
He points out that in the modern period, one by one, the major uncertainties
have been clarified. The earliest cases of the modem period, Wilkinson suggests,
concerned the continued existence of the reservations themselves .
The Lone Wolf
line of cases established the absolute power of the federal government over the
reservation, even including the power of termination. By 1959, however, the
principle had been established that explicit language was required before reservation
status could be lost, even though it was held that it was not necessary to state the
intention to extinguish . Some cases toyed with the idea of
de facto termination once
checkerboarding was so extensive that the reserve had lost its Indian character
. This
line of cases was effectively closed in 1976 with the decision in Moe v . Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes .'
Similarly, the possibility of termination through non-
user was mooted and finally all but rejected in Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation in
1985.1
With the fight for the reservations won and the land base more or less secure,
the struggle turned to focus on sovereignty and powers of government as the Indians
attempted to assert full tribal status . Following the pattern of the land cases, similar
arguments were mooted and rejected. In U.S . v . John"
the court allowed that an
hiatus in the existence of a tribal government does not mean the end of the right to
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tribal self-government. And in Menominee v.
169
even termination was held not to
extinguish tribal status .
These cases, as Wilkinson points out, indicate that
Marshall's opinions are still very much alive .
Presently, Wilkinson suggests, the Court is attempting
to work out an
accommodation between the state courts and the tribal courts.' This for him would
represent the final step in creating a stability within which the Indian nations might
develop within the United States ." The absolute federal power of the
Lone Wolf
decision remains "broad"", but it has been balanced by the liberality of the earlier
period.
Wilkinson's analysis is a compelling one . It has however, what I would
suggest is one major fault. Wilkinson gives little weight to the trust obligation
. The
main value of the trust obligation for him is that it "provides as essential part of the
rationale for the rules of construction that are so influential in Indian law"
." It is,
I suggest, the very principle which has allowed the courts to work out a
reconciliation between the precedents of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries . We
have seen its origins as a central aspect of the Marshall decisions . It retained vitality
even during the dark years of the second period .
In the modern period too, I
suggest, the trust obligation remains a vital part of Indian law
.
c The Trust Obligation Today
The trust obligation in United States law today has three elements .
There is
first a generally unenforceable moral obligation
. This has resulted in the rules of
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statutory and treaty interpretation which assumes an intent not to
abrogate or
derogate from Indian rights in federal legislation and administration . Second there
is an enforceable duty which acts as a check on the power of the administration .
The third element is only hinted at
. It would be, if it were ever to become law, a
check on the powers of the government, that is to say Congress . All three, as we
have seen, originate in the decisions of Chief Justice Marshall and all three can be
found in Canadian law .
i
	
The Moral Obligation
That a moral obligation attached to the federal power over Indians was
acknowledged even while Congress dealt its hardest blows to Indian rights . In
Kaeama, for example, a case which upheld the right of the federal government to
pass legislation unilaterally taking jurisdiction away from the Indians, the court said :
These Indian tribes are wards of the nation ; the communities are dependent
on the United States; dependent largely for their daily food
; dependent for
their political rights . . . .
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely
due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the
treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection and
with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive, and by
Congress, and by this Court, whenever the question has arisen ."
That did not prevent the Court from upholding the legislation .
In 1877 the Court stated that the duty of protection was not a legal duty
. In
Beecher v . Wetherby, which concerned the grant of reservation land by the federal
government to the state government without Indian consent, the court had
commented:
It is to be presumed that in this matter the United States would be governed
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by such consideration of justice as would control a Christian people in their
treatment of an ignorant and dependent race . Be that as it may, the propriety
or justice of their action towards the Indians with respect to their lands is a
question of governmental policy, and is not a matter open to discussion in a
controversy between third parties."'
In 1900 an even stronger warning was heard :
It is undoubtedly true that this government has always recognized the fact that
the Indians were its wards, and entitled to be protected as such, and this court
has uniformly construed all legislation in light of this recognized obligation .
But the obligation is one which rests upon the political department of the
government, and this court has never assumed, in the absence of
Congressional action, to determine what would have been appropriate
legislation, or to decide the claims of Indians as though much legislation had
been had."
In 1903, the most extreme statement of the powers of Congress over Indian
matters was made, but even in this case, the potential of the trust obligation is
hinted at. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, it was held that the actions of Congress were
beyond the purview of the court." In that case Congress had acted in contravention
of a treaty in ceding land without the 75% vote required under the operative treaty .
The court commented :
The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian Treaty, though
presumably such powers will be exercised only when circumstances arise which
will not only justify the government in disregarding the stipulations of the
treaty, but may demand in the interests of the country and the Indians
themselves, that it should do so . When, therefore, treaties were entered into
between the United States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that
the power to abrogate existed in the Congress, and that in a contingency such
power might be availed of from considerations of governmental policy,
particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards the
Indians."
	
(emphasis in the original)
One might wonder what the Court would have said had lack of "good faith" had
been proved. In the event, the Court concluded :
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In effect, the action of Congress now complained of was but an exercise of
[full administrative] power, a mere change in the form of investment of Indian
tribal property, the property of those who, as we have held,
were in
substantial effect the wards of government ."
The court must, it felt, presume the good faith of Congress adding that if the Indians
felt injured it was to Congress alone that they could go for redress .
The court could
not even inquire into the affair ."
ii
	
The Rules Of Treaty Interpretation
Out of this background, the Court developed the principles for the
interpretation of Indian treaties . In U.S . v . Winans,
state legislation in derogation
of a treaty was attacked ."
Washington State had granted river front land to
non-Indians preventing Indians from reaching their traditional fishing sites .
These
had been guaranteed to them under treaty
. The court, in awarding easements to
reach the sites, reaffirmed the obligation, which had first been recognized in 1899
in Jones v. Meehan,18
to construe treaties as the Indians would understand them :
As we have said we will construe a treaty with the Indians as "that unlettered
people" understood it, and as "justice and reason demand in all cases where
power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care and
protection, and counterpoise the inequality "by the superior justice which
looks only to the substance of the right without regard to the technical rules
."
In 1886 the Court acknowledged that the roots of this doctrine were in the trust
obligation:
The parties are not on equal footing, and that equality is to be made good
by the superior justice which looks only to the substance of the right, without
regard to technical rules framed under a system of municipal jurisprudence,
formulating the rights of private persons equally subject to the same laws
."°
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This has become the standard for treaty interpretation in both Canada and the
United States, and the restriction put on state power has resulted in very powerful
pro-Indian decisions in recent years ."'
This standard remains good today. Cohen states :
In construing Indian treaties, the courts have required that treaties be liberally
construed to favor Indians," that ambiguous expressions in treaties must be
resolved in favour of the Indians,' and that treaties should be construed as
the Indians would have understood them.' . . . The Court has [also]
developed a number of special rules concerning construction of Indian treaties
which, taken together create a strong presumption that treaty rights have not
been abrogated or modified by subsequent congressional enactments ."
These work to constrain the power of Congress . As Cohen comments :
Since Congress is exercising a trust responsibility when dealing with the
Indians, courts presume that Congress' intent towards them is benevolent and
(that) treaties and other federal action towards them should when possible
be read as protecting Indian rights and in a manner favorable to Indians ."
This point may have been heeded, to some extent in the recent Sioux Nation
v.
U.S . 18'
Probably the best example of this attitude is Menominee Tribe v . U.S." which
concerned a tribe terminated in 1954. The tribe sued for compensation for lost
hunting and fishing rights which had been guaranteed by treaty in 1854 .1 The
Court held:
We find it difficult to believe that Congress, without explicit statement, would
subject the United States to a claim for compensation by destroying property
rights conferred by treaty, particularly when Congress was purporting . . . to
settle the Government's financial obligations towards the Indians ."'
The hunting and fishing rights were held to have survived termination . This narrow
interpretation of the intent of Congress is, it is suggested, a strong example of the
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power of the trust obligation.
The protective role prevents the inadvertent
destruction of Indian rights .
iii
	
As a Restriction on the Powers of Congress
The authoritative contemporary statement on the standard of judicial review
of the actions of Congress in Indian affairs was made in 1974 in
Morton v.
Mancari. 191 This case concerned a conflict between two Congressional acts
. Under
the Indian Reorganization Act 192
the Bureau of Indian Affairs had instituted an
Indian employment preference. In 1972, Congress passed the
Equal Employment
Opportunities Act which, inter alia, outlawed discrimination on the basis of race
."
Some employees of the Bureau brought an action claiming that the second act
implicitly repealed the earlier one . The Supreme Court did not agree and
commented :
As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfilment of
Congress' unique obligation towards the Indians, such legislative judgments
will not be disturbed . Here where the preference is reasonable and rationally
designed to further Indian self-government we cannot say that Congress'
classification violates due process ."
The Court, noting that the objects of the preference was to encourage
self-dependence, fulfil the federal trust obligation and to counteract the bad effects
of white domination, concluded that the Indian situation was a unique one
:
[I]t is an employment criteria reasonably designed to further the cause of
Indian self-government . . . .
[T]he legal status of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
is truly sui generis . 195
Obviously, this decision says more about the parameters of the due process
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requirement rather than about the limitations upon Congress .
But it does also
suggest that Congressional legislation which cannot be "tied rationally "' to a
legitimate purpose, might be declared ineffective
. Such a standard, obviously, is, as
far as native people are concerned, a very weak one .
That weakness was very
quickly demonstrated.
In 1977, in Delaware v. Weeks,'
the Court once again reiterated that the
Congressional power, while plenary, is not absolute, 198 and once again referred to the
"tied rationally" standard.
The Delaware tribe had separated into three groups
during its history. Two groups remained federally recognized Indians
. Of these, one
group, the Cherokee Delaware, assimilated into a Cherokee band in Oklahoma .
Another group, called the Absentee Delaware, settled on a different reserve in
Oklahoma
. The third group, the Kansas Delaware, took up American citizenship,
and gave up their tribal status . All three groups, in separate actions, sued the
government for land sold in contravention of treaties made before the Delaware left
their aboriginal homeland and split into the three groups . Both of the first two
bands were successful
." Even though there was evidence that the existence of the
Kansas Delaware had not been brought to the attention of Congress when it was
passing the legislation concerning the award, the third group lost .
The Court agreed that the plenary power was not absolute .
The Kansas
Delaware, it was held, in terminating their tribal status no longer retained an interest
in the tribal property .' The Court held :
[The award to the Delaware] distributes tribal rather than individually owned
property, for the funds were appropriated to pay an award redressing the
breach of a treaty with a tribal entity, the Delaware Nation
. . . . As tribal
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property, the appropriated funds were subject to the exercise by Congress of
its traditional broad authority over the management and distribution of lands
and property held by recognized tribes, an authority "drawn both explicitly and
implicitly from the Constitution itself." . . .
We cannot say that the decision
of Congress to exclude descendants of individual Delaware Indians who ended
their tribal membership
and took their proportionate share of tribal property
as constituted more than a century ago, and to distribute the appropriated
funds only to members of or persons closely affiliated with the Cherokee and
Absentee Delaware Tribes, was not "tied rationally to the fulfilment
of
Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians ."201
	
(my emphasis)
Further justification was found in the fact that the Kansas Delaware had been
excluded from a previous distribution of tribal assets and also
in the difficulties
inherent in determining the membership of the class of the Kansas Delaware ."'
The justification seems weak and it is not surprising that a strong dissent was
registered
. As well, the then Chief Justice Warren and another went as far, although
concurring in the result, as to register their disquiet with the reasoning on this
particular point.'
Mr. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, declared the exclusion to be a violation of
due process. He stated :
The statutory exclusion of the Kansas Delawares from any share in the fund
appropriated to pay a judgment in favor of a class to which they belong is
manifestly unjust and arbitrary . Neither the actual explanation, nor any of
the hypothetical explanations is "tied rationally to Congress' unique obligation
to the Indians.'
He concludes :
[N]o principled justification for the particular discrimination . .. has been
identified. And . . .
there is no reason to believe that the discrimination is the
product of an actual legislative choice
It is hard not to agree with him
. The majority decision is not a well-reasoned
argument. It is, rather, merely assertion and description
. The reasoning, if one can
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call it that, consists only in arguing that, although the Kansas Delaware were
members of the tribe when the breach of duty occurred, they are not at the time of
the award and therefore can rationally be denied a share. When one realises that
this award was made under the Indian Claims Commission Act
which was to apply
the standard of "fair and honorable dealing,"' the decision seems unsupportable .
It is also true that the dissent is not above criticism . Stevens discusses the
"tied rationally" standard as an element of due process rather than as a constitutional
limitation resulting from the special obligations owed to the Indian nations . It is
arguable that Morton v. Mancari
suggests that the due process obligations owed to
the Indian peoples are of a different order than ordinary due process because they
are coloured by the trust obligation . Stevens does not address this point
.
Not much more can be said of the "tied rationally" requirement . It can be
seen that its limits are confused . It is hard to see any real theoretical basis for the
decision of the majority in this case
. Indeed, while the Court is prepared to agree
that such a control exists, it has not attempted to elaborate upon its effects . At best
its meaning would appear to be that Congress can pass legislation under one of its
powers which violates another of its powers
. Such appears to be the meaning of the
decision in Morton v. Mancari
. Z°' That appears to leave Lone Wolf all but
untouched .
Indeed, Morton seems to have been wrongly applied in
Delaware. Whereas
Morton concerns the clash between two federal powers, in
Delaware it is the
correctness of Congressional action that forms the issue
. Certainly, exclusion of the
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Kansas Delaware is "tied rationally" to Congress' obligation to the Indians
. But
there is a further question to be answered .
Was it also delinquent? The Court
failed to address that issue .
In a more recent case that issue has been squarely
addressed and answered .
In U.S . v . Sioux Nation,21 '
the Court was asked to assess the taking of the
Black Hills from the Sioux Nation in 1877
. The Black Hills had been guaranteed
to the Sioux for their use along with hunting and fishing rights over a larger area in
the Treaty of Fort Laramie
211
By statute in 1877
212
the hills were ceded, contrary to
treaty provisions requiring approval of three quarters of the tribe in a vote, in return
for subsistence rations for as long as the Sioux should need them
."
213
The
government argued in 1980 that the rations provided sufficient compensation for the
land. The Court disagreed. It stated :
[I]t seems readily apparent to us that the obligation to provide rations to the
Sioux was undertaken in order to ensure them a means of surviving their
transition from the nomadic life of the hunt to the agrarian lifestyle Congress
had chosen for them .
214
The Sioux were awarded the value of the land taken .
This would, it is suggested, be a much better precedent than
Delaware .
Clearly, the taking of the Black Hills and the giving of rations are "tied rationally"
to the federal obligation
. Equally clearly, the giving of rations is not sufficient to
compensate for the taking of the land
. What is more, the Court has offered reasons
for reaching the decision it delivers .
This is in marked contrast to Delaware . As
Haught says of Delaware :
The proper test . . .
is whether the discrimination against the Delaware was
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest or whether it was
104
invidious or irrational . A review of the . . .
decision reveals no legitimate
interest was served by excluding the Kansas Delaware ."'
Delaware is not of any great assistance in understanding the "tied rationally"
standard .
Wilkinson's view of Sioux Nation is that it announces that judicial review of
Congressional actions is appropriate . But he also warns that one should not take too
broad a view of the case . He comments :
It is impossible to measure the extent to which the Supreme Court's
clarification of the limits on Congress's powers has caused, or will cause,
subtle modifications in the legislative process . It is reasonable, however, to
believe that some members of Congress will act with greater awareness of the
federal trust responsibility ."'
So while it may not represent the announcement that there is a constitutional check
on the powers of Congress, at least Wilkinson suggests that there might one day be
such a check. And that the trust obligation is the likely source of that check
. As
yet, however, the idea remains dormant .
IV
	
As a Check on the Powers of the Administration
This Sioux case leads us into the second branch of the relationship between
the Indians and the government : The controls on the administration and other
bodies of lower status than Congress. The powers of all these bodies, in matters
concerning Indians, results from Congressional delegation . Menominee,217
for
example, concerns attempts by a state government, in this case Wisconsin, to
regulate fishing .
The state governments, generally speaking, do not have trust
obligations to the Indians, consequently they have no duty to respect aboriginal
105
fishing rights
. But before the states can abridge aboriginal rights, whatever they
might be, the federal trust obligation must have been extinguished or
at least
delegated to the state governments . The courts have developed a fairly strong body
of procedural requirements to restrict the abuse of delegated power over the Indians .
This body of law also finds its origins in the trust obligation . It is a much
more powerful control over State governments and the federal administration than
it is over Congress, and it is much more consistently applied . What is more, it
operates to restrict not only state governments, it restricts federal officials and even
high officers of state such as the Secretary of the Interior . The cases are legion
.
I shall cover only a few .
It is my purpose here only to show the outline of the
present law in the United States .
For Marshall the Indian/government relationship resembled a guardianship ."'
In the language of today's courts, the relationship is fiduciary .
There are two
elements that should be discussed here .
First, it is useful to discuss the subject
matter of the obligations. After that, and this is the more important aspect, I shall
attempt to establish the parameters of the obligations .
For the most part, there will be no fiduciary obligations without express
statutory or other acknowledgment
. The one exception to this, it would seem, is
where Indian land or money is involved . In 1980 in Navajo
v. U.S.," the Court of
Claims said:
[W]here the Federal Government takes on, or has control or supervision over
tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally exists with
respect to such monies or properties (unless . Congress has expressed
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otherwise) even though nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or
underlying statute (or other fundamental document) about a trust fund, or a
trust or fiduciary relationship
This point was later, approved at the Supreme Court.'
The obligation as regards land had been recognized as early as 1919 in Lane
v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa.' In this case the Court prevented the Secretary of the
Interior from dealing with Pueblo land as public land . Lane, the Secretary of the
Interior, alleged that since the Indians were wards of the United States they had no
power or control over the alienation of their land . The Court responded :
Assuming, without so deciding, that this is true, we think it has no real
bearing on the point we are considering . Certainly it would not justify the
defendants (Lane) in treating the lands of these Indians . . . as public lands of
the United States and disposing of the same under the public land laws . That
would not be an exercise of guardianship, but an act of confiscation.
Before the administration can deal with Indian lands, then, it must have been
specifically authorized to do so in the manner in which it intends to .
We have seen that hunting and fishing rights are protected by the trust
relationship .' In the Winters case, the Supreme Court affirmed that rights to water
also come within its scope . Finally rights to proceeds from sale of timber are also
the subject matter of a the federal duty . In the Navaio case mentioned above, the
government was held liable to account for the sale of fire damaged timber, even
though there was no statute expressly so stating, because the Indians had a right to
timber on the reserve. These at least form the subject matter of the fiduciary
obligations of the government to the Indians .
A private law fiduciary must beware of conflicts of duty and duty, and of duty
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and interest' Where the role of the government corresponds closely to that of a
private law trustee then the duties also tend to correspond more closely.
For
example, in Manchester Band of Pomo Indians . Inc. v. U
.S' the Federal Court held
that a positive duty exists to manage Indian trust funds in the same manner as would
a private trustee, which duty includes the obligation to make trust funds productive
even in the absence of a specific statutory requirement to do so
The government had not invested the band's trust money for a number of
years and then, more recently, had placed them in the Treasury . There was a
statutory requirement that 4% interest be obtained on Treasury funds . The court
held that the 4% was merely a floor and did not overrule the normal obligation of
a trustee to obtain a proper rate of return."
Specifically, the court stated that these trust obligations had to be met by the
government :
1
	
The trustee must act solely for the interests of the beneficiary ;
2 the trustee may make loans to himself but not in bad faith
;
3 the trustee must account for profit, even without breach
; and,
4 he must use reasonable care and skill, to the level of his expertise or
that of a reasonable business, and that there is, normally, a duty to invest in
such a way as to produce income ."
The government, the court held, had borrowed the money when it placed the funds
into the Treasury rather than into short term government bonds which were paying
higher rates of interest .' It was, therefore, liable to account
.
The rigour of this holding is somewhat ameliorated by the ruling, mentioned
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above, in the Navajo case.' The court there stated :
The present accounting claims all deal with the management and disposition
of Navajo funds and property. Defendants's insistence on express or statutory
terms of trust is therefore irrelevant to these claims . Nor is the court
required to find all the fiduciary obligations it may enforce within the express
terms of an authorizing statute (or other document) .
The general law of
fiduciaries can be utilised to the extent appropriate .`
So far this is in agreement with the holding in Pomo. But the court continues :
This does not mean, however, that all the rules governing the relationship
between private fiduciaries and accountings between them necessarily apply
in full vigour in an accounting claim by an Indian tribe against the United
States. We refer to such rules as the principle that once a breach of fiduciary
duty is charged (without any supporting material), the beneficiary is entitled
to recover unless the fiduciary affirmatively establishes that it properly
discharged its trust, and the theory that failure to render the precise form of
accounting required may be sufficient, in and of itself, to establish liability .
In each situation the precise scope of the fiduciary obligation of the United
States and any liability for breach of that obligation must be determined in
light of the relationships between the government and the particular
tribe.'
	
(authorities omitted)
Regrettably, this manages to confuse things somewhat . What should be the
obligation if the government has consistently been lax in its dealings with a tribe?
Would the "scope of the fiduciary obligation" permitted be less than is normally
required?
This decision seems unnecessarily to weaken the force of the Pomo
decision without offering any "principled reasoning" in its place . In fact the court
seems to follow Pomo once having found that Navajo property is involved
."
Fortunately, some of this confusion has since been dealt with in the recent U.S. v.
Mitchell,' referred to here as Mitchell II .
In this case an Indian tribe sued the government for breach of trust in that
it had sold timber rights below value . The tribe alleged that
a trust had been
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created by the General Allotment Act.' When this case first reached the Supreme
Court, in Mitchell I ,239 the Court held that no true legal trust had been created . It
stated :
We conclude that the Act created only a limited trust relationship between
the United States and the allottee that does not impose any duty upon the
Government to manage timber resources. The Act does not unambiguously
provide that the United States has undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities
as to management of allotted lands .°
The case was remitted and once more the Court of Claims found a positive fiduciary
duty, this time on other statutes."
This time the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court . It stated :
In contrast to the bare trust created by the General Allotment Act the
statutes and regulations now before us clearly give the Federal Government
full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the
Indians . They therefore establish a fiduciary relationship and define the
contours of the United States' fiduciary responsibilities ."
The court discussed the language and provisions of the statutes and regulations
involved and, commenting on the "pervasive role"' of the Secretary of the Interior
in the sales of timber, concluded :
[A] fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Government assumes
such elaborate control over forests and property belonging to Indians . All of
the necessary elements of a common-law trust are present : a trustee (the
United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a trust corpus (Indian
timber, lands, and funds) . . . . Our construction of these statutes and
regulations is reinforced by the undisputed existence of a general trust
relationship between the United States and the Indian people.'
There is, then a true trust and a general trust obligation owed to these Indians . The
true trust is enforced more or less as a private law trust, while the general trust
cannot be enforced through the courts .
1 10
However, even where Indian property is involved, sometimes the government's
fiduciary obligations are clearly not the same as those of a private trustee . With
some varieties of subject matter, such as water rights with which the
Winters case245
dealt, the federal government has other important interests to protect. There are
the rights of other citizens, state rights and often other federal interests to respond
to .
The same standard cannot be applied to governmental fiduciaries in these
areas since the function of such persons is often precisely to make choices between
competing interests
. The governmental role is, to an extent, necessarily one riven
with conflicts of interests and duties and indeed, the very object of government is to
seek an acceptable balance between them
. Consequently, the courts have developed
a special body of law regarding these obligations of the government as fiduciary to
the Indians.
In The Three Tribes of Fort Berthold v. U.S .,
the Court of Claims not only
laid much of the groundwork of this law but also greatly clarified the pre-existing
law."
Throughout United States history Indian land has been taken by the
government under two very different powers . This fact explains
much of the
apparently conflicting jurisprudence in the area . Lone Wolf, we have seen,
established that land can taken by Congress even in violation of a treaty, and that
the courts will not second guess the adequacy of any payment made to its Indian
occupants."
In 1937 the United States Supreme Court, in Shoshone Tribe
v. U.S.," had
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restricted the effect of that case
. This case also concerned the taking of reservation
lands .
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs had placed Araphoe Indians on a
reservation created under treaty for the Shoshone . Congress had subsequently
passed a statute regularizing the situation
.' The Shoshone sued for the value of the
lands used for the Araphoe. In finding for the Shoshone, the Court said
:
[T]he Shoshone had a treaty right of occupancy with all its beneficial
incidents. . . . The right of occupancy is the primary one to which the
incidents attach, and division of the right with strangers is an appropriation
of the land pro tanto, in substance, if not in form
.'
"Spoilation," Cardozo J ., conluded, "is not management
."" So even though Congress
had approved the taking by statute, the Tribe was
awarded compensation .
Interestingly, Cordozo goes even further and states that the compensation awarded
must include "such additional amount beyond the value of the property right as may
be necessary to effect just compensation."' This seems directly contrary to the
Lone
Wolf decision. Fort Berthold
attempts to reconcile these two apparently conflicting
decisions.
The Lone Wolf
land was taken by act of Congress : this is an exercise of the
plenary power. In Shoshone,
by contrast, the land was taken by the action of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs. This, the Court held, was compensable as a Fifth
Amendmenttaking of property .'
The first case is an exercise of the fiduciary
power: the second is not
. Both takings are, up to now at least, irreversible . In Fort
Berthold,
the Court of Claims discusses the different standards which apply
:
If a taking under the Fifth Amendment has occurred, then the appellant is
. . .
entitled to "just compensation." . . . On the other hand, if there has been no
Fifth Amendment taking, appellant can recover . . .
only if it shows that the
moneys received from the sale of the lands were so far below the then fair
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market value thereof as to amount to fraudulent conduct, gross negligence,
or some other breach of its fiduciary obligations on the part of the
Government. A mere disparity is not enough .'
This raises the difficulty of how one is to decide what is a Fifth Amendment
taking and what is not. The Court is fearless in its confrontation of this problem :
It is obvious that Congress cannot simultaneously (1) act as trustee for the
benefit of the Indians, exercising its plenary powers over the Indians and their
property, as it thinks in their best interests, and (2)exercise its sovereign
power of eminent domain, taking the Indian's property within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution . In any given situation in which
Congress has acted in regard to Indian people, it must have acted in one
capacity or the other . Congress can own two hats, but it cannot wear them
both at the same time. Some guideline must be established so that a court
can identify in which capacity Congress is acting. The following guideline
would best give recognition to the basic distinction between the two types of
congressional action: Where Congress makes a good faith effort to give the
Indians the full value of the land and thus merely transmutes the property
from land to money, there is no taking . This is a mere substitution of assets
or change of form and is a traditional function of a trustee . While not every
word of every opinion can be harmonized with this guideline, it is basic to the
holdings of at least the majority of cases in this area.
	
(my emphasis)
The conclusion states the contrast between the two powers quite concisely :
In short, it is concluded that it is the good faith effort on the part of Congress
to give the Indians the full value of their land that identifies the exercise by
Congress of its plenary authority to manage the property of its Indian wards
for their benefit. Without that effort, Congress would be exercising its power
of eminent domain by giving or selling Indian land to others, by dealing with
it as its own, or by any other act constituting a taking'
This is a very clear test but, obviously, it is much easier to enunciate than to apply .
Given that the role of government is to balance competing interests, there will
be times when the courts will be at a loss to determine exactly which role the
government has been playing . This problem was addressed in the Supreme Court
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in the recent case of Nevada v. U.S.' which concerned competing rights to river
water between the state of Nevada, the federal government and the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Indians .
The background to this case is a 1973 Federal Court decision which awarded
Winters, water rights to the Pyramid Lake Paiute ." The Paiute reservation, which
was their aboriginal land, consisted of Pyramid Lake and the surrounding land . The
government, apparently in 1972,1 while acknowledging its obligation to maintain the
water level in the lake, issued a regulation claiming authority to use waters that feed
the lake for purposes of irrigation . The contract to supply the water dated from
1926.' The Indians, noting that the lake has no outflow, claimed that the lake
required that water to maintain its level and to sustain the fish stocks on which they
depend. They also noted that the water level had dropped substantially over the
previous 60 years .or so . The court agreed that the government owed a duty to
maintain the level of Pyramid lake and ordered the government to make new
regulations .
The revised regulations eventually came before the Supreme Court . The
Indians, through the United States, argued that these regulations were also in breach
of the fiduciary duty of the government . The government claimed that it had duties
not only to the Indians but also to the farmers with whom it had contracted in 1926 .
The Court responded :
Congress . . . delegated to (the Secretary of the Interior) both the responsibility
for the supervision of Indian tribes and the commencement of reclamation
projects in areas adjacent to reservation lands . . . . In this regard the
Government cannot follow the fastidious standards of the private fiduciary,
who would breach his duty to his single beneficiary solely by representing
1 14
potentially conflicting interests without the
beneficiary's consent. The
Government does not compromise its obligation to one interest that Congress
obliges it to represent by the mere fact that it simultaneously performs
another task for another interest that Congress has obligated it by Statute to
do.'
In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Brennan elaborates on the effects of this
:
The mere existence of a formal "conflict of interest" does not deprive the
United States of authority to represent Indians in litigation . . . .
If, however,
the United States actually causes harm through a breach of its trust
obligations the Indians should have a remedy against it . . . . The availability
of water determines the character of life and culture in this region . Here,
as elsewhere in the West, it is insufficient to satisfy all claims . In the face of
such fundamental natural limitations, the rule of law cannot avert large
measures of loss, destruction, and profound disappointment, no matter how
scrupulously even-handed are the law's doctrines and administration. Yet the
law can and should fix responsibility for loss and destruction that should have
been avoided, and it can and should require that those whose rights are
appropriated for the benefit of others receive appropriate compensation .'
The effect of this is, of course, that while the farmers get the water to which they
have a contractual right, the Indians, who have been on the land since time
immemorial, have a right only to compensation unless, as the footnotes to the
decision suggest,265 other water can be found to fulfil their needs . The rule is, then,
that where competing interests exist, those of the Indians will be protected by
damages and not by protection or tracing of the property or other interest itself.
There may be a rider to this : Where it is a state government to which the
trust responsibility has been delegated and the duty is an ongoing one, the rule may
be different. In U.S. v . Washington,
the Quinalt Indians of Washington state sued
through the United States to prevent the state from eliminating off-reservation
fishing by Indians
. The Court held that the state government could only regulate
the fishing as much as was necessary to preserve fish stocks .' This, it would appear,
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would protect the fishing rights of the Indians and enforce, rather than award
damages for breach of, the trust obligation .
There are three more points which it is useful to delineate . In U.S.
v. Sioux
Nation, the Court held that it was open to them to check the adequacy of any
transmutation of property . Of the situation in that case, and the method of review,
the Court said :
[T]he historical background to the opening of the Black Hills for settlement,
and the terms of the 1877 Act itself, . . . would not lead one to conclude that
the Act effected "a mere change in the form of investment of Indian tribal
property .i26'
This is an application of the Fort Berthold decision. The Court ordered the United
States to pay the value of the land taken
. The money and goods given, it held, had
been for the giving up by the Indians of their hunting and fishing rights :
The land
had not been paid for.
In Pyramid Lake Paiute, 270 the Secretary of the Interior decided on the content
of the impugned regulation on the basis of a 'Judgment call ."" The court held :
A'Judgment call" was simply not permissible. . . . The Secretary was obliged
to formulate a closely developed regulation that would preserve water for the
Tribe. He was further obliged to assert his statutory and contractual authority
to the fullest extent possible to accomplish this result . . . . Possible difficulties
ahead could not simply be blunted by a "judgment call" calculated to placate
temporarily conflicting claims to precious water . The Secretary's action is
therefore doubly defective and irrational because it fails to demonstrate an
adequate recognition of his fiduciary duty to his tribe .'
The fiduciary nature of the duty, then, allows the court to check the exercise of
discretion and also requires that the decision maker 'justify" 273 his decision
.
In the last decision I shall look at in this section, the possibility is raised that
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the federal government might be held to be liable for obligations undertaken by
state governments. U.S . v. Oneida,Z"
concerns obligations arising under various
treaties signed by the Oneida with the state of New York in 1795 and subsequently
.
The Court of Claims held that the fiduciary obligation of the federal government
continues where it has actual or constructive knowledge of the signing of the treaty .'
The case was remitted for a decision on this issue .
This gives a fairly complete overview of the nature of the trust obligation of
the United States to the Indians . It is a somewhat confusing picture
. To summarize
as best we can, the obligation originated with the Executive
but now is the
responsibility of Congress which has, to an extent, delegated it to the administration .
The power of Congress is plenary but not absolute . Any treatment which falls short
of the normal duty of a fiduciary must be "tied rationally" to the" unique obligation"
of Congress to the Indians .
Gross deviation from the duty is reviewable .
Construction of instruments relating to Indians will be liberal .
Where delegated power is being exercised the standards are stricter
. Where
Indian property is involved, the standards to be applied will be closer to those
required of a private law trustee. The more elaborate the control of the government
over the subject matter of the duty, the closer will the duties owed correspond to
those of private law trustees
. A Fifth Amendment taking by the administration will
attract damages, whereas plenary action will be compensable only when
it is
manifestly unjust.
Where there is a clash of Indian and non-Indians interests, the Indian
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interests generally will not be protected but the Indians will receive instead a
damages remedy
. Where ongoing injury to some aspect of the "trust" obligation is
perpetrated by a state government, the interest itself may be protected
.
The subject matter of the obligation very clearly includes tribal lands and
money
. It also seems to include water rights and hunting and fishing rights . And
it also includes the rights necessary for the exercise of at least hunting and fishing
rights. I am referring here to such rights as the easements to facilitate access to
fishing places .
The exercise of discretion by the government in carrying out its fiduciary
obligations to the Indians can be checked for its adequacy
. The decision maker is
under a duty to act positively to fulfil the obligation and must justify any decision
made. The historical background is relevant when checking the
exercise of
governmental discretion. Finally, the federal government might be held responsible
for obligations arising from action by a state government .
v Analysis
The trust obligation, with its origins in the earliest days of colonisation, has
become a complex obligation, part moral and part legal.
The moral obligation is
very clearly laid out by Marshall in his series of cases from the early 19th century .
That obligation is in the nature of a guardianship . But without acknowledgement
by the Executive, Congress, or a state government, that guardianship is not a legally
enforceable one.
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The necessity of recognition by the government before the guardianship has
any legal force is of crucial importance . Even uninterrupted aboriginal possession
is not compensable without it . In Tee Hit Ton, this was stated in no uncertain
terms:
Indian occupation of land without government recognition of ownership
creates no right against taking or extinction by the United States protected
by the Fifth Amendment or any other principle of law.'
Yet the Court continues to speak of the "unique obligations" owed to the Indian
peoples, and to speak of these obligations as a trust .
It must be concluded that the unique obligation is at root only a political or
moral one . If the Indian land is not the subject of legal obligations, then it is
difficult to imagine any obligations to the Indians, outside of statutory ones, which
might be . Barber v. Harvey is instructive on this point and bears repeating
:
[I]t is said that the Indians . . . [are] the wards of this government ; that
therefore the United States are bound to protect their interests, and that all
administration, if not all legislation, must be held to be interpreted by, if not
subordinate to, this duty of protecting the interests of the wards . It is
undoubtedly true that this government has always recognized the fact that the
Indians were its wards, and entitled to be protected as such, and this court has
uniformly construed all legislation in light of this recognized obligation . But
the obligation is one which rests upon the political department of the
government, and this court has never assumed, in the absence
of
Congressional action, to determine what would have been
appropriate
legislation, or to decide the claims of the Indians as though legislation had
been had."
In other words, the courts will not act unless Congress has .
This is, I suggest, the distinctive feature of the obligations of the government
to the Indians
. The trust obligation is a moral or political obligation underlying all
the dealings with the Indians
. It is an obligation which originates, as Marshall had
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said, in the dealings of both the United States and pre-revolutionary governments
with the Indians. While Marshall seemed to be suggesting that the surrender
requirement had become a fundamental principle of United States law, he did not
do so as regards the responsibilities growing out of the guardianship . That was in
fact, only a moral or political obligation . Recognition of the moral obligation as
binding is an absolute pre-requisite to its enforcement . Without it, the courts will
not enter .
Delaware v. Weeks' is an informative illustration of this point
. The facts,
as noted above, showed that Congress in excluding the Kansas Delaware from the
award, had not been advised of the interest of that group in the funds the misuse
of which was the basis of the award . They had not even been advised of the
existence of the group. The court merely read the statute making the award and
interpreted it as a valid exercise of the trust obligation . Had this been review of an
administrative act, it is not difficult to see that it would have been held that the
decision maker had failed to consider relevant facts and, therefore, would have to
reconsider his decision. In fact, as Stevens J
. points out in his dissent, Congress had
not even made a decision on the point .' It had made a mistake
. And the Court
followed the mistake .
It is almost as if the Court, in this case, has taken the statute making the
award as a statement by Congress on the parameters of the trust obligation . This
is, of course, what one would expect of the judicial system :
it leaves decisions of
policy to be made by the legislature . In this case it is to be regretted because in fact
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Congress had made a mistake which subsequently the judiciary legitimized
. As
Haught says:
[This] case is an example of what happens when Congress makes a mistake
in regard to Indian claims policy, and the United States Supreme Court
ratifies that error with a statement about Congress' unique obligation toward
the Indians.°
	
(authorities omitted)
It is this sort of poor judgment that has caused the erosion of the Indian's land and
other rights . And in this case it could legitimately have been avoided because
Marshall's underlying guardianship could have permitted the courts to have checked
the policy decision without violating the constitutional separation of powers .
It is open to the courts to maintain that once the trust obligation has been
recognized, whether by treaty, jurisdictional, or other act, it must be applied as if it
were law. In Delaware v. Weeks, the obligation had been recognized by treaty
."
Had the Court required the actions of Congress to meet the guardianship obligation,
then not only would justice have been done, but perhaps too, the law relating to
Indian people might have become more consistent .
If the trust obligation in American native law is as I am suggesting, the
question must be asked whether it is helpful, for the legal system to refer to it as a
trust
. If it is a unique political and moral obligation which underlies all the dealings
of the government with the Indians then, obviously, it can take many different forms
when it is given to legal status. And it is to be remembered that it is the legal form
that will be enforceable, not the underlying trust itself.
Sometimes recognition might produce a true trust with all the power of a
private law trust. We have seen this in
Manchester Pomo Band of Indians v. U.S.,'
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where it was held that the government had all the responsibilities of a true trustee
in relation to band funds .
At other times the relationship will be of a completely different order
resembling at times a guardianship and at other times something more akin to the
international law trusteeship . Perhaps the Pyramid Lake cases are the best
example of this .
In these cases the courts held initially, in Pyramid Lake Paiute,'
that the
government had to live up to its trust obligation . Ultimately it was found
permissible, in Nevada, for the obligation to be breached
. Like the international
law trusteeship, the obligation, ultimately, would be enforceable only through the
political process .
Occasionally, the legally recognized form will be based only upon the practice
of the parties. In Cramer,' a tribe which had not signed treaty but which had given
up its nomadic way of life, was awarded a right of occupancy against attempts of the
Secretary of the Interior to grant the land to a railway company . The Court held :
[These Indians in settling and giving up their nomadic way of life were acting]
in harmony with the well-understood desire of the government . To hold that
by so doing they acquired no possessory rights to which the government would
afford protection would be contrary to the whole spirit of the traditional
American policy towards these dependent wards of the Nation'
It was not important that the right to the land had not been recognized in statute .
They noted :
The right, under the circumstances here disclosed, flows from a settled
governmental policy.'
It is easy to see that the trust analogy is rather strained if it is to apply to
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rights which arise out of "settled governmental policy"
. All this makes the
relationship very hard to predict. When it is realized that the subject matter can
consist of less tangible things such as the right to hunt and fish, the problems of
using trust terminology are more readily apparent . With some even less tangible
subject matter, such as the protection of self-government mentioned by Marshall at
the birth of the relationship, ° use of trust terminology is only confusing
. It is
difficult to imagine the rights to self-government being considered capable of
constituting a trust corpus . Overall, it appears to this writer that the use of the term
trust for the relationship between the government and the Indians is unwise and
confusing.
Most writers, however, like the trust analogy, although for the most part they
admit to the confusion that exists . Some, indeed, have added to the confusion . For
example, in 1934 the following comment was made :
The legal title of . . . reservation lands is either in the government (in moral
trust for the tribe) or in the tribe as a legal group, but under the guardianship
of the government ."
This manages to mix up all the confusion . The comment sheds little light upon the
legal status of reservation land. It is, of course, rather unfair to use an article of
such a vintage in this way since, clearly, things were much more confused then even
than now. Nevertheless, the comment does serve to illustrate my point
.
Writing more recently, McNeill has argued for the development of a trust
remedy for breaches of the government's obligations . He is well aware of the
difficulties that stand in his way . He notes :
The Supreme Court has never recognized an Indian cause of action under
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general jurisdiction for breach of trust . Moreover the Court has never
articulated more than the shadow of a specific legal structure for the trust
relationship, and few, if any, commentators have attempted to supply one .
Lacking such a structure, the trust has tended to become a vaporous entity,
whose shifting uncertain contours have lent themselves to diverse and
contradictory interpretations by different courts .'
For McNeill the solution is to give structure to a trust remedy by "imputing
some goal to the trust itself."' He comments :
The relation can be cast into trust terms that not only impose a reliable
structure on the field but also take the uniqueness of the relation into
account.'
He suggests five different models for consideration .
The first, which he calls the model of plenary power, he recognizes as already
out of date.' It is based on
Lone Wolf and, as he comments, has the subjugation
of the Indian people as its purpose .'
The second he calls the model of partial
responsibility297
This he describes as "roughly the current situation," designed to
maintain the Indians at subsistence level
.' The third example is the model of
general responsibility.' This seems to correspond to an enforceable guardianship
designed to allow the Indians to maintain their separation from non-Indian society .
The model of restitution would allow the Indians to recover the land and
money taken by fraudulent means
.' Its intent seems to be to restore the Indians
as much as possible to the position they would have been in had the treaties not
been broken
. Finally, the model of Indian expectations would attempt to interpret
governmental obligations as the Indians would have had they been able to write out
the terms of the relationship upon signing the treaties with benefit of the hindsight
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gained through the years since ."
McNeill is not optimistic about the courts' ability to resolve the problems over
the function of the relationship . He comments :
This Court probably will, if pressed, find an Indian remedy for breach of trust.
But it will also likely limit it, through devices like the legislative intent test ."
Justice will receive a nod, and the problems of the reservation will persist.'
There is an implicit suggestion that for McNeill, the real fault lies outside the sphere
of the courts . If this is so, he is very likely correct .
And, indeed, his paper points
to a possible reason .
McNeill himself recognizes that some of his trust remedies are not actually
trusts.'
His paper is intended as an heuristic device and as such it is useful .
Certainly it illustrates the problems associated with using the term trust. But it also
demonstrates something else
. The root of the problem is not judicial interpretation
of the Indian/government relationship, it is that the Indians want different things
from the relationship than does the government .
Clearly the model of Indian
expectations would find support among many Indian groups . Equally clearly a
government intent on cutting back social programs would favour the plenary power
model. Different visions of the future produce different visions of the law
.
Chambers has something to add to this . He says :
The underlying purposes of the trust relationship . . .
are probably
determinative of the proper extent of judicial review.
If it is a short-term
"guardianship" designed to last until the wards become competent-i.e .,
acclimated to the ways of the dominant culture and/or assimilated into it
-then specific performance of trust obligations seems less important and
property can be more readily transmuted into money
. Even if the trust
relationship were seen as permanent, its purposes could be limited to
providing financial support for Indians and to ensuring that their lands and
resources were not sold for an unconscionable consideration ; in this event,
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judicial remedies limited to money damages for breach of trust would seem
adequate. A more expansive reading of the trust relationship, however, would
suggest that preservation of the trust corpus in a particular form- land and
natural resources instead of money -is itself a critical value . If, as the
Cherokee cases suggest, a chief objective of the trust responsibility is to
protect tribal status as self-governing entities, the executive extinguishment of
the tribal land base diminishes the territory over which the tribal authority is
exercised and thereby imperils fulfilment of the guarantee of tribal political
and cultural autonomy.
In short, is the trust responsibility to prevent excessive abuses or is it to protect
Indian lifestyles?
Analyzing the cases, Chambers discerns three "identifiable lines of cases ."'
The first, the Marshall doctrine, protects the integrity of the Indians as self-governing
tribes. The second, the Lone Wolf line, emphasizes the power derived from the trust
obligation. The third, a line which follows Lane, Cramer, 308 Pyramid Lake Paiute 309
and Manchester Pomo,310 prevents federal officials from acting contrary to the trust
obligation even if their action is not contrary to statute, treaty or agreement ."'
The conclusion his analysis leads him to is this :
[T]he different approaches to the purposes of the trust responsibility can be
reconciled to permit judicial enforcement as long as a distinction is observed
between executive and congressional action . Reading all the cases together,
the principle that emerges is that Congress intends specific adherence to the
trust responsibility by executive officials unless it has provided otherwise .
Such a formulation preserves the role of Congress as the ultimate umpire of
the purposes of the trust relationship while requiring strict executive
compliance with the terms of the trust."'
While this has simplicity to recommend it, it does have problems .
Chamber's analysis, like any other analysis, is based upon the jurisprudence
of Marshall. But he has given no constitutional role to the judiciary in delimiting
the trust even though for Marshall the trust seems to have been deliberately
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intended to have given them such a role
. For Chambers the judicial role is strictly
the interpretation of the legislative instruments issued by Congress . This relegates
the trust to being merely a tool of statutory interpretation
. This would appear to be
the role envisioned by Mr . Justice Rehnquist in some recent decisions
."'
Oliphant, for example, concerns the criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian
defendants on the reservation .
In holding that Indian jurisdiction requires
"affirmative delegation of such power by Congress,i 314 Rehnquist said :
By themselves, these treaty provisions would probably not be sufficient to
remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians if the Tribe otherwise retained
such jurisdiction ."'
The clear words of the treaty were not considered sufficient for a proper reading of
the situation.
Rehnquist felt it necessary to interpret the clear meaning . To do so he stood
the trust obligation on its head . He stated:
"Indian law" draws principally upon the treaties drawn and executed by the
Executive Branch and legislation passed by Congress . These instruments,
which beyond their actual text form the backdrop for the intricate web of
judicially made Indian law, cannot be interpreted in isolation but must be
read in light of the common notions of the day and the assumptions of those
who drafted them."'
It would appear that for Rehnquist, the trust obligation is nothing more than the
policy which is apparent in the legislation and in the executive instruments . And this
policy can be used to interpret even apparently unambiguous instruments . As
McNeill notes :
[This] method of construction would turn the 149 year old principle
[Marshall's guardianship] inside out . In effect, statutory ambiguities would
be resolved in favour of the government ."'
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This, of course, because government practice could be used to decide what the
government intended to write .
The guardianship would then have lost its place in the fundamental law of the
United States . If Chambers and Rehnquist, or either one of them, are to be
followed, there would be no trust at all: only a bleak rule of statutory interpretation
would be left.
A second problem exists. Having been written in 1975, Chambers' article
pre-dates the very important Sioux318 decision which has granted a significant role to
the courts in checking even congressional action . There is no sense in speculating
how Chambers would have dealt with this case . What is clear is that the Court is
prepared to carve out a role for itself checking the actions of Congress itself .
Rehnquist, in his dissent in Sioux, 319 lamented that the Court would "judge by
the light of "revisionist" historians .""' This is, I think, a telling point
. A different
view is taken of treatment of the Indians by at least some members of today's
Supreme Court than by those of former times
. Indeed, the view has changed more
than once since the days when Marshall formulated his view . As one writer has
written :
The uniqueness of the federal/Indian relationship consists . . . in a recognition
of property rights evolving slowly within an extremely politicized context ."'
This comment also serves to highlight my point that the Indians and the government
may have differing notions as to the purposes of the special relationship
.
Something more needs be said about the trust relationship here . The Indians
entered into the sphere of influence of the government of the United States with a
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recognition by that government of their unique status . They were not citizens like
any other but, as Marshall put it, domestic dependent nations . As
such, much of
their sovereignty was retained and is retained still . The guardianship originates in
the trust that the Indians placed in the United States in accepting the sovereignty of
that nation over them .
It is a fundamental mistake to suggest that this special constitutional position
can be justifiably reduced into a rule of statutory interpretation uniquely applicable
to the Indians . Perhaps Congress has the power to do so, but it would appear that
the better argument for the courts to take is that until Congress explicitly says
otherwise, that the trust obligation, whatever it might be, continues to underly the
relationship between the Indians and the government. The holding in Sioux Nation
would appear to support such an analysis ."
The alternative to such an analysis of the trust obligation would be one which
embraces opinions such as those of Rehnquist .
This would render the trust
obligation merely a special rule of statutory interpretation, and a rather weak one
at that. Indeed, under such an interpretation the obligations owed to the
Indians
would be less than those owed to non-Indians . Given the far greater power of the
government over the Indians, this would be an abdication of duty by the courts
.
It seems probable from this look at just three of the writers who have recently
supported the notion of the trust relationship that what they have in mind, as a very
minimum, is some sort of overarching moral obligation to the aboriginal inhabitants
.
It is worth noting that others agree with this position."
What seems of concern is
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the control of the power which the government has over the Indians and their
property. So while the relationship is trust-like, it is not always a true legal trust
.
They see the relationship as something other than a true trust . It does seem
sensible, then, for the terminology to be altered to fit this fact. The use of the
terminology of the legal trust is unnecessarily confusing and could lead to erroneous
decisions
. The courts have sometimes used the terminology of fiduciaries in place
of that of trusts. This has a lot to recommend it .
We shall see below a definition
of fiduciary that might fit this situation well ."
The trust in United States native law appears to be largely moral or political
;
it is legal only where Congress has decided to make it so . The power Congress
exercises over the Indians, by contrast, is constant.
It covers education, health
services, resource development as well as other subject matter . It has been
suggested that these should be considered part of the trust obligation .' Such things
do not fit easily as the res for a legal trust though . The finding in
Mitchellr that
the trust enacted in the General Allotment Act"
did not entail active duties is
illustrative of this fact .
In fact, when one looks really carefully at the relationship between the United
States government and the Indians one comes to realise that it is not the fact that
the formalities of a trust can be found that makes the Indians' position unique .
One
could, arguably, hold that the government holds public lands in the United States in
trust for the population
. Except for a very limited series of cases," such has not
been the case. What emerges from a close consideration of the cases, is that it is
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the power wielded by the government that sets the Indians apart . It is a power
which should be controllable
. Since the Indians numbers are too small to control
the power of the government through the political process, and given the unique
history of Indian/United States relations, it is a power which might properly fall to
the courts to control .
When Mitchell I was argued before the Court of Claims, counsel for the
government characterized the law of fiduciaries as "unanchored judge-created
principles."' When it reached the Supreme Court as
Mitchell II, the Court was
able to find a "fiduciary relationship" in the elaborate controls the government had
established over the resource at issue
.' It was not the existence of the requirements
of a trust that carried the day : it was the power exercised by the government
. And
this, we have seen was at the root of the trust obligation from the earliest days in
Spanish laws' as well as in Marshall's decisions in the early 19th century .'
The special position of the Indians in the law of the United States flows from
their political weakness vis a vis the immigrant population, together with the last
vestiges of their once sovereign power, which, in part, they retain within the confines
of the reservation. Chambers, it would seem, had it right when he noted that one
proper function of the obligation might be to prevent abuse .
He may have limited
it unnecessarily to acts of the adminstration
. In theory at least, it could rightly
extend to abuses by Congress : Siouf
3
might have established that it does . Only
time will tell .
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dConclusion.
This brings us to the end of this survey of the American influences on
Canadian native law. That which appears most important
in the American
jurisprudence, is the Indian's lack of political power . This was originally the result
of denial of subject status or citizenship to the Indians . Today it results from their
lack of numbers. Certain legal consequences have arisen from this
.
Since the earliest days the relationship of the Indians to the colonial
governments has been characterized as one of trust . That description has been
entrenched in the law of the United States .
I have suggested that that
characterization would appear to rest upon two main facts :
the Indian's lack of
political influence with the settlers and their governments, and the denial by the
settler governments of full property rights in the Indians over their land . The legal
consequences of the trust relationship which is at the heart of the United States
Indian law are not yet completely worked out. Certainly, there is at least a special
rule of judicial review of administrative action . Possibly it amounts to a restraint
upon Congress and the Executive requiring, in the event of violation, compensation"
or even, perhaps, affirmative or corrective action .
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As we noted in Chapter One, Johnston suggests that the United States law
"will be instructive in elaborating the nascent Canadian concept"
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and that it "could
provide an equitable and coherent theory of Crown trust responsibility in relation
to Canadian Indians ."337 She concludes :
Through its legislation dealing with Indians, the Canadian government, has
unilaterally undertaken to regulate almost every aspect of Indian existence .
Under this comprehensive statutory scheme, the Minister of Indian Affairs is
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accorded sweeping discretionary powers . The application of a control theory
of trust responsibility would lead to the recognition of a fiduciary duty
coextensive with the government's pervasive pattern of control . This approach
would provide a guide for defining the contours of the federal Crown's
fiduciary responsibilities that is both sensible and just . However wide the
discretion granted by statute, the court would be able to ensure that is
exercised correctly
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I have no doubt that the then Mr. Justice Dickson intended just that . I suggest,
however, that to stop there would be to fail the promise of the new Constitution .
The law of the United States provides, and as we can see Johnston urges the
adoption of, a fiduciary concept dependent on statute . That would mean a duty
completely subject to the wishes of Parliament . That is precisely the species of
power which has resulted in the whittling away of any meaningful special status in
the Confederation.
Constitutionally protected rights must result in some sort of limitation of the
powers of the legislative arm of the government. That surely is the whole purpose
of entrenchment of rights in a Constitution : they are rights preventing the
government from freely and fully exercising its legislative power . Constitutional
rights are in a sense, rights against the government . A concept of constitutionally
entrenched aboriginal rights which allows the full and free exercise by the
government of its legislative power over the First Nations is a concept of rights
which Bentham might have described as "nonsense upon stilts"3
39
I wish to suggest a theory which will go further than the American doctrine .
I would urge the adoption of a reading of Guerin which is truly "coextensive with the
government's pervasive pattern of control" and which fully recognizes that the
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government has "unilaterally undertaken to regulate almost every aspect of Indian
existence." It is my contention that Dickson's opinion
Guerin supports the
recognition of such a theory. The theory I suggest here is a minimal theory which
suggests only a limited restriction on the powers of government . Justice would seem
to require the recognition of an even stronger right in the Indian Nations against the
government. That, however, is an argument for another day .
The United States law has had a significant influence on Canadian Native
law. Indeed, the Guerin case would appear to import the concept of fiduciary
developed by the United States Supreme Court in Mitchell
into Canadian
jurisprudence. One very significant difference stands to warn Canadian jurisprudes
against the wholesale importing of the United States law into Canada . In Canada
aboriginal rights now receive constitutional protection
. If the trust obligation is part
of the set of protected rights, then it will be necessary to reassess the United States
trust obligation . I shall suggest below that the entrenchment of aboriginal rights in
Canada requires that the direction intimated by such cases as Sioux Nation and the
dissent of Mr . Justice Stevens in Delaware must be heeded
. I shall suggest, that if
the courts are to act in a principled manner, the law of the trust obligation
ineluctably points to a restriction on the governmental powers of the Canadian
governments .
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CHAPTER 3
ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN CANADA
There are many correspondences between aboriginal rights law in the United
States and in Canada. In both countries, the recognition of Indian special status
begins with acknowledgement of an interest in land, usually called aboriginal title .
Consequently, the early colonial instruments including the Royal Proclamation of
1763' form the background to the law of aboriginal rights in both nations . Also, the
Marshall cases are a seminal influence in Canada . And, as in the United States,
the first truly important case, the one which established the basis of the Indian-
government relationship, was, like Fletcher v
. Peck in the United States, one in
which the Indians were not represented. These and other correspondences have led
to many similarities in the two bodies of law .
It is useful to examine Canadian aboriginal rights law using the same three
part model as we used in our examination of the United States law . It is important,
however, to keep in mind that Canadian aboriginal rights law is still in a stage of
definition. There is in Canada no long tradition of Indian litigation
. Also of
importance is the passing of the aboriginal rights provisions in the new Constitution
in 1982 .
Undoubtedly, the first and second principles in the model have been
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affected by the Constitution Act . 1982 . The discussion in the following pages
addresses the pre-1982 situation for the most part . Where the new provisions might
prove significant, I refer specifically to them .
The first and third principles are largely similar in the two countries but in
Canada the boundaries of the first remain uncertain . For Chief Justice John
Marshall, the recognition of land rights in the Indian Nations led to the acceptance
of some residual power of self-government . In Canada, only the first step has been
taken:
Land rights, including hunting and fishing rights, have been recognized .
Whether this first step will result in a right to some form of self-government remains
to be decided . The lack of recognition of a right to self-government is striking
. This
is not to say that the problem is not controversial . The right has been the major
topic in four First Ministers Conferences held since 1982 to clarify the rights
entrenched by the Constitution Act. 1982, s. 35
.' The conferences ended in failure
and today the issue is today before the courts
.' For the present however, the issue
is undecided .
In the following pages I shall review rather briefly the major Canadian
caselaw using the scheme developed in the previous chapter .
I shall deal first with
the rights of the aboriginal peoples, following that with a discussion of the power of
the federal government going on to a more substantial discussion of the
trust
obligation . I deal with Indian rights first only because that fits rather more
comfortably with the content of the caselaw. It is true in Canada, as in the United
States, that the major aspect of aboriginal rights law has been, at least until 1982,
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the absolute power of the federal government.
a Indian Rights
Litigation over aboriginal rights in Canada has been restricted to a rather_
narrow range of interests. Consequently, the content of aboriginal rights in this
country is more vague than in the United States . Some rights have been recognized
by the courts. A possessory interest in land together with a right to hunt and fish
are well established. Broader claims have been made .
The Dorion Commission
mooted in 1971 that the hunting and fishing right should be expanded to include
other benefits of land ownership .' Ponting suggests a right to retention of an
aboriginal identity:
Aboriginal rights are held by the descendants of the original peoples of
Canada by virtue of their ancestor's occupancy of the land since time
immemorial. In the broadest contemporary usage of the term, those rights
are multi-faceted . A crucial component of aboriginal rights is the right to
retain one's aboriginal identity and culture rather than being subjected to
forced assimilation . . . . This implies not only certain educational rights, but
also the right of the child to be raised in his/her aboriginal culture if placed
in an adoptive or foster home . Included in aboriginal rights is the right to be
free to choose between a non-aboriginal way of life and an aboriginal way of
life.5
	
(Authorities omitted)
The First Nations themselves argue for a right to self-government . Plain, for
example, writes :
[To the] Nishnawbe-Aski, the concept is basic, simple, and unambiguous . Our
definition of aboriginal rights can be summed up in one phrase : "the right of
independence through self-government" . . . . Aboriginal rights defined in this
way include the right to develop our own life-style and our own economy, and
to protect and encourage the practice of our sacred traditions as we know
them. We, the Nishnawbe-Aski, have the inherent right to determine what
our future will be.'
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Even the Penner Report acknowledged that the First Nations may have an
entrenched right of self-government by virtue of s . 35 of the Constitution Act. 1982.'
It is not my intention here to discuss the content of aboriginal rights. I shall
confine the discussion to a consideration of how an aboriginal right might be
established and how it might be extinguished . It is not necessary, for this thesis, to
engage in an extended analysis of the content of aboriginal rights . I shall refer
occasionally to the possibility of recognition of a right to self-government only
because it represents the broadest possible aboriginal right .
The primary aboriginal rights precedent in Canada is the 1888 case, St .
Catherine's Milling and Lumber v . The Oueen.8 It, with help from Marshall, has
resulted in certain land rights for the Indian Nations of Canada . It also recognized
that the federal government was charged with a protective role over the Indian
Nations. In as much as they have not been overridden, those principles are now
entrenched in the Constitution and are, consequently, somewhat more secure . The
case also provides the precedent for the absolute power of the federal government
over the Indian Nations .
The St. Catherine's case was a dispute concerning jurisdiction over
surrendered Indian land . The provincial government disputed the ability of the
federal government to lease timber rights on the land to the St . Catherines Milling
and Lumber Company. The court found for the provincial government on the basis
of certain constitutional provisions . Neither the actual holding in the case, nor, for
the most part, the reasoning need concern us here . In the course of their decision
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the Law Lords of the Privy Council, speaking through Lord Watson, made some
incidental comments on the nature of the Indian interest in their land and the
relationship between the Indians and the government . These comments have
defined the nature of the Indian interest in land in Canada .
It should be noted that this case came before the courts at the same time as
did the Lone Wolf
case in the United States when assimilation was the favoured
policy. Marshall had preceded this era
. The different political climate may have
much to say about the attitude of the Canadian courts towards the Indian Nations .
The Canadian government also wished to avoid the expensive Indian wars which had
proved so disruptive in the settlement of the western United States and which were
then drawing to a close .'
The Privy Council did not address the nature of aboriginal title in the
abstract, but preferred to confine themselves to discussing the interest recognized by
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 . 1°
The Court described the Indian interest in their
land in this way:
Their possession, such as it was, can only be ascribed to the general provisions
made by the royal proclamation in favour of all Indian tribes then living
under the sovereignty and protection of the British Crown . . . . [T]he tenure
of the Indians was a personal and usufructuary right, dependent upon the
goodwill of the Sovereign."
The Court further recognized that the terms of the Royal Proclamation protected
also a "privilege of hunting and fishing"
." The interest of the Crown in unsurrendered
Indian land was said to be "substantial and paramount" . 13 In response to the
argument that the Indians had owned their traditional territory, the Court responded :
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The Crown has all along a present proprietary estate in the land, upon which
the Indian title was a mere burden.'
This rather dense description has received much interpretation over the years but
the comparison with the interest recognized by Chief Justice Marshall is readily
apparent.
That the Indian right was described in St. Catherine's
as "dependent upon the
goodwill of the Sovereign" strongly suggests an unfettered power in the government
to overrule Indian rights . We see also, stated rather mutely as only "protection", the
recognition of some special obligation to the Indians. It does not appear to be an
obligation enforceable through the courts however . There is no recognition of
Indian sovereignty . The Privy Council, like Marshall before them, could have
commented more broadly on the status of the then still powerful Indian
governments . Johnson v. McIntosh, Cherokee Nation
v . Georgia, and Worcester v.
Georgia had all been cited in argument by counsel
. The Court chose to ignore their
broader ramifications
: The method by which Great Britain came into its rights to
the Indian land and any residual rights in the First Nations to self-government were
not discussed
. Perhaps one can lay on this Court, the blame for the fact that there
is in Canada, no single coherent theory of aboriginal rights .
The case has engendered much criticism
. Dissents were registered when the
case had been heard in the Supreme Court of Canada urging recognition of a
scheme similar to that of Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme
Court."
Even though the Supreme Court of Canada has continued to cite St .
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Catherine's with approval, the criticism is
repeated today. Indeed, Hurley's paper
on Guerin, to a large extent, hinges on the argument that
St. Catherine's is wrongly
decided and that it should be rejected by today's courts
." Slattery and Lester,
amongst others, lend support to such an argument .' ?
In 1921, the Privy Council returned to clarify the interest they had described
in St. Catherine's . In Attorney General of Quebec
v. Attorney General of Canada ;
Re Indian Lands,18 usually referred to as the
Star Chrome case, the Court had this
to say on the "personal and usufructuary right" :
[T]heir Lordships think . .. that the right recognised by the statute is a
usufructuary right only and
personal in the sense that it is in its nature
inalienable except by surrender to the Crown ."
	
(emphasis added)
In 1983 the Supreme Court of Canada further clarified the phrase :
The right of the Indians to the lands in question was described by Lord
Watson in St Catherine's
at page 54 as "a personal and usufructuary right" .
The latter term is defined as follows :
Usufruct
1 . Law. The right of temporary possession, use, or enjoyment of the
advantages of property belonging to another, so far as may be had
without causing damage or prejudice to it .
2. Use, enjoyment, or profitable possession (of something) 1811
.
Usufructuary
1 . Law. One who enjoys the usufruct of a property, etc
.
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1959, p .2326 .
The release, therefore, is of a personal right which by law must disappear
upon surrender by the person holding it
; such an ephemeral right cannot be
transferred to a grantee, be it the Crown or an individual
. The right
disappears in the process of release, and a release couched in terms inferring
a transfer cannot operate effectively in law on the personal right any more
than an express transfer could . In either process the right disappears
.
In Guerin, we have seen, Chief Justice Dickson quotes this definition with approval
.
He adds that the interest is a legal one .
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In these cases, the Indian interest in land has been defined essentially without
reference to the method of acquisition by the Crown of its "substantial and
paramount estate" . The courts have not looked behind the "statutory scheme"
established by Parliament to see if it represents a true version of the state of things .
This is to be expected in a country such as Canada where the doctrine of the
supremacy of Parliament has prevented the courts from second guessing the policy
behind valid legislation. With the passing of the new Constitution, and in particular
s. 35, the courts must now rethink the relationship of the government with the First
Nations. In fact, the rethinking had begun somewhat earlier.
In 1973, in Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia," aboriginal title
to traditional lands arising out of the pre-contact relationship of the Indians to those
lands, was recognized as a principle of Canadian common law. In that case the
Nis'ga Nation of Northwest British Columbia, sought a declaration that they held an
unextinguished aboriginal title to their traditional lands . On the issue the case was
dismissed on a technicality but not before six of the seven justices recognized that
aboriginal title did exist in Canadian law apart from the Royal Proclamation . In his
minority dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Hall, with the concurrence of two other
justices, seemed to suggest, if the issue were to come before him, that he might be
prepared to recognize the principle of residual sovereignty.
Hall J., whose opinion is the most detailed of the three delivered by the
Court, relied on principles of British colonial law . He cited also with approval,
Marshall's opinion in Johnson v. McIntosh.' Hall J. noted that Marshall's opinion
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was in part based upon the 18th century English case of Campbell
v. Hall which
laid out the rules on the acquisition of English law in the colonies .
One of those
rules, cited with emphasis by Hall, is that the laws of conquered nations continue in
force until they are altered by the conqueror. Hall then states :
A fortiori
the same [principles particularly the one noted above] . . . must apply
to lands which become subject to British sovereignty by
discovery or
declaration."'
Earlier Hall had noted British colonial law also recognizes rights arising under
aboriginal legal systems
. In his opinion he emphasized the following quote from Re
Southern Rhodesia : 26
[T]here are indigenous peoples whose legal conceptions, though differently
developed, are hardly less precise than our own . When once they have been
studied and understood they are no less enforceable than rights arising under
English law.'
This framework allowed Hall to discuss the aboriginal title of the Nis'ga
in a
principled manner . The doctrine of aboriginal title, for Hall at least, is based upon
a recognition of the legally enforceable pre-contact relationship of the First Nations
with their land .
In Calder,
the Nis'ga had led extensive evidence of their traditional customary
practices. Having referred to this evidence, Hall commented
:
What emerges from the foregoing evidence is the following : the Nishgas are
in fact and were from time immemorial a distinctive cultural entity with
concepts of ownership indigenous to their culture and capable of articulation
under the common law . . . .2s
Given that under Anglo-Canadian law the existing laws of occupied territory would
be left in force until changed by valid legislation, at the time of contact, the Nis'ga
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had aboriginal title to their traditional lands
. Failing to find any acts in the
intervening years extinguishing the Nis'ga title, Hall concluded that it continued to
exist .
The opinion of Judson J . while not referring to the colonial law, seems to
agree with Hall's reasoning . Judson agreed that the recognition of aboriginal title
was a principle of the common law
. Having decided that the Royal Proclamation
did not apply to British Columbia, he stated :
Although I think that Indian title in British Columbia cannot owe its origin
to the Proclamation of 1763, the fact is that when the settlers came, the
Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their
forefathers had done for centuries
. This is what Indian title means and it
does not help one in the solution of this problem to call it a "personal and
usufructuary right"
. What they are asserting in this action is that they had a
right to continue to live on their lands as their forefathers had lived and that
this right has never been lawfully extinguished. There can be no question that
this right was "dependent on the goodwill of the Sovereign" .'
With this rather bald statement made, Judson passes on to the question of
extinguishment .
The particular right at issue in Calder was an aboriginal right to hunt and
fish. Such a right is now well-entrenched in Canadian law as both a treaty and an
aboriginal right
.' It has been one of the major aboriginal rights recognized in
Canada. This does not detract from the import of the decision
. The reasoning of
Hall J., as well as the comment of Judson J
., both support a much broader range of
possible aboriginal rights
. Indeed, the correspondences of the decision with the
Marshall cases, suggest that the Canadian law could follow the American law
.
In his decision, Hall J. refrained from discussing sovereignty
. He did,
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however, quote extensively from the Marshall decisions and emphasized Marshall's
recognition that the Indians were distinct, independent peoples "having institutions
of their own and governing themselves by their own laws
."" This suggests that Hall
might have recognized the Indian Nations as self-governing .
He did not however,
unlike Marshall, go beyond what was necessary for the decision in the case at hand .
The point, therefore, remained undecided and the opportunity passed . Hall J . has
left, nevertheless, the basis for a principled account of the content of aboriginal
rights .
In a more recent case, Mr Justice Mahoney of the Federal Court Trial
Division, laid down the requirements for proof of an aboriginal title . He based his
reasoning on the Calder decision. In Hamlet of Baker Lake
v . Minister of Indian
Affairs,32 Mahoney had this to say:
The elements which the plaintiffs must prove to establish an aboriginal title
cognizable at common law are :
1. That they and their ancestors were members of an organized society
.
2. That the organized society occupied a specific territory over which they
assert the aboriginal title .
3
. That the occupation was to the exclusion of other organized societies .
4. That the occupation was an established fact at the time sovereignty was
asserted by England.'
This scheme, it can be seen, also bases the present aboriginal right on the pre-
contact relationship with land .
As it stands today, what rights the Indian nations do have against the
government, have force only because of the existence of legislation and constitutional
provisions
. Only an aboriginal title of rather vague content is directly attributable
to pre-contact circumstances. A broad reading of
Calder might suggest substantial
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rights beyond those of hunting and fishing, but the courts have not yet taken such
a step. Chief Justice Dickson, whose opinion in
Guerin forms the focus of this
thesis, has chosen not to follow the broader ramifications of the Calder decision
.
And this observation is true not only in Guerin, but in other Indian caselaw in which
he has written. He has dealt creatively with the concept of aboriginal rights, but his
opinions deal with aboriginal rights which have been codified in legislation,
regulation, or government directives, and he has made a point of noting the
documented base of the rights he has proposed .
In the 1979 case Jack et al. v . The Queen,` Dickson alone in dissent on the
issue at the Supreme Court of Canada, recognized a limitation on the regulatory
power of the federal government over the fishery in British Columbia .
This
limitation, which took the form of a priority for Indian food fishery over all other
demands on the salmon stock except conservation, was founded in the long-term
practice of the government and entrenched in the British Columbia Terms of
Union.' Aboriginal rights were not relevant to the argument, he noted
:
It is not necessary for the appellants in this case to point to any underlying
basis of "rights" for article 13, whether based upon aboriginal title or treaty .
It is sufficient to detail the pre-Confederation policy
of the colonial
government. . . . The appellants' argument rests not upon any "right" derived
from treaty or aboriginal title that can be invoked against federal legislation,
rather than upon a constitutional limitation of that very federal power to
legislate in respect of Indians in British Columbia, a limitation imposed upon
the federal government by the Terms of Union .'
In another equally creative case, Nowegijick v. The Queen,
37 Dickson J., as he
then was, speaking for the Court on the reach of the tax exemption offered by s
. 87
of the Indian Act,38 declared :
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[T]reaties and statutes relating to the Indians should be liberally construed
and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indian.
These strong words do not recognize any special rights, it must be noted . They are
merely an aid in interpreting a rather vague section of the Indian Act. Dickson J.
stresses :
The prime task of the Court in this case is to construe the words [of s . 87 of
the Indian Act] .'
As in Jack, there is no attempt to recognize any aboriginal or treaty rights basis for
the tax exemption. There is only a rule for the interpretation of existing legislation .
The right has its basis in legislation, and although the doctrine of aboriginal rights
may be in the background, it plays no role in the reasoning .
This implied requirement of a recognition in legislation of aboriginal or treaty
rights, means that the Court has been able to ignore the problem of their origin and
the method of their extinguishment . It also makes it difficult to assess the reading
that the Chief Justice will give to s . 35 of the Constitution Act. 1982
. While he has
been liberal on the interpretation of existing legislation, he has not given any
indication that he might recognize the pre-contact laws of the First Nations as a
basis for aboriginal rights . This point, perhaps, explains the range of the
commentary on Guerin . The pessimists see the Dickson of the rules of
interpretation of statutory provisions : the optimists see the possibility that the
creative Dickson might give substantive content to s . 35 .
b Federal Power
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The power of Parliament over the Indian Nations has never been expressed
as clearly in Canada as it has in the United States in Lone Wolf. This is because
no right to residual self-government has been recognized . St. Catherine's, as we
have seen, characterizes the Indian interest in land recognized by the Royal
Proclamation as being "dependent upon the goodwill of the Sovereign"
. Judson in
Calder, specifically approved this point." The broad reach of the Crown's power has
also been implied in cases such as the 1959 case of Logan v. Styres42
which allowed
that the creation of a Band Council pursuant to federal legislation overruled, without
specifically so stating, and without consent, the traditional government of the Band .
The power of the federal government over Indians has been stated most
clearly in relation to the extinguishment of aboriginal hunting and fishing rights . The
six judges who wrote on the issue in Calder
agree that Parliament had, in 1973, an
unfettered right to abrogate aboriginal rights . They differed only in the standard by
which that abrogation should be judged
. Hall, following the United States' standard
suggested that a "clear and plain intention" would be necessary before abrogation
would be found .' He said of aboriginal title
:
It being a legal right, it could not thereafter be extinguished except by
surrender to the Crown or by competent legislative authority, and then only
by specific legislation.'
This test is somewhat vague .
It could require a specific provision in legislation
noting that an aboriginal title has been extinguished. One the other hand, and this
is more likely, it could require only the enactment of legislation which grants rights
inconsistent with an aboriginal title .
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For Mr. Justice Judson, also writing with the concurrence of two other judges,
only legislative intent would be sufficient . That intent could be implied if the
legislation was intended to have effect over Indian traditional lands . Of the Nis'ga
claim Judson held :
In my opinion, . . . the sovereign authority elected to exercise complete
dominion over the lands in question adverse to any rights of occupancy which
the Nishga Tribe might have had, when, by legislation, it opened up such
lands for settlement, subject to the reserves of land set aside for Indian
occupation's
Since the court held that it lacked jurisdiction in the case, no clear position emerged
on the issue.
The most complete pre-1982 word on extinguishment, is again, Hamlet of
Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs4 6 Mr Justice Mahoney of the Federal
Court, had been urged by the plaintiff Inuit, one of Canada's aboriginal peoples, to
adopt an interpretation of Hall's opinion which would require specific language in
order to effect extinguishment . Interpreting the conflicting Calder
standards, he gave
the following standard :
I cannot accept the plaintiffs' argument that Parliament's intention to
extinguish an aboriginal title must be set forth explicitly in the pertinent
legislation. I do not agree that Mr . Justice Hall went that far
. Once a statute
has been validly enacted, it must be given effect . If its necessary effect is to
abridge or entirely abrogate a common law right, then that is the effect that
the Courts must give it .'
So for Mahoney, extinguishment might be implied if it was necessary in order to give
effect to the statute . In its recent decision,
Canadian Pacific Ltd . v . Paul48, the
Supreme Court of Canada adopts the "clear and plain" language of Mr . Justice Hall
and appears to support Mr. Justice Mahoney's interpretation of the
effect of
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legislation.' In the present policy on comprehensive claims, the federal government
adopts what appears to be a very broad application of the Baker Lake position. It
states :
The purpose of settlement agreements is to provide certainty and clarity of
rights to ownership and use of land and resources in those areas of Canada
where aboriginal title has not been dealt with or superseded by law.'
(my emphasis)
It would appear that the government takes the position that a grant issued under
valid law would be sufficient to extinguish an aboriginal title .
The point is the
subject of litigation in British Columbia presently over the recent provincial grant
of the university endowment lands for a provincial parks" The lands are subject of
an aboriginal rights claim and it is feared that the grant may be intended to place
the lands beyond the reach of the comprehensive claims policy .
Like its United States' counterpart, the power as described in the pre-1982
cases appears to be unfettered . Since the entrenchment of "existing treaty and
aboriginal rights" in s . 35 of the Constitution Act. 1982,
that unfettered power has,
in all probability, been restricted . It is generally agreed that abrogation without
consent of an aboriginal right can only be effected by Constitutional amendment ."
Derogation is another matter. Some caselaw has addressed the problems of the
variation of hunting and fishing rights since the coming into effect of the new
Constitution in 1982. The issue has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court of
Canada and the lower court decisions vary widely . While the point is not central to
this thesis, some comment on one decision is worthwhile.
In a recent case, Sparrow v. The Queen, the British Columbia Court of
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Appeal suggests that the Constitution Act. 1982, entrenches a regulated right to hunt
and fish' The court allows that the level of permissible Indian fishing is capable of
continued variation without contravention of s . 35
. Any variation, however, must be
in accord with the scheme laid out in the legislation in 1982.' This placed the
Indian food fishery second in priority only to conservation . Any derogation from
that scheme would have to be justified by the government . This apparent limitation
on the legislative power of the government represents a major advance from the
position in the United States . Such rights as do exist, while they are not as
extensive, would appear now to be much better protected in Canada .
c Trust Obligation
The trust obligation in Canada, as in the United States, has been a vague
doctrine. We have seen that in the United States it finds its origin in long practice
of the governments, the Royal Proclamation and Marshall's guardian/ward
relationship. The same is true in Canada. I shall suggest in this section that the
trust obligation in Canada has three aspects . The central aspect, as in the United
States, is the unenforceable trust: the wardship
. Next in importance is what I have
termed the trust obligation codified . For the most part, this is made up of statutory
provisions which entrench aspects of the trust obligation and includes such provisions
as s. 18(1) of the Indian Act . These provisions have only the appearance of a trust
.
They may, like s . 18(1) be phrased in trusts language, but are usually are enforced
through statutory remedies which are not trusts remedies . Finally there is the true
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trust . This has found very limited favour
. The most recent example is Madame
Justice Wilson's concurring opinion in Guerin.
It seems unlikely to be followed .
In Guerin the present Chief Justice refers to both aspects in founding the
liability of the Crown. The purpose of the specific and enforceable obligation found
in the regime of the Indian Act is the protection which is the hallmark of the general
and unenforceable obligation found in the Royal Proclamation. Perhaps, as with the
dichotomy noted in relation to Indian rights above, this reference to the two aspects
also helps explain the disagreement between the optimists and the pessimists
amongst the commentators on Guerin . The pessimists see only the weakness of the
fiduciary as opposed to the true trust remedy for breaches of duty in relation to
Indian lands and money. The optimists see the possible strength in a trust obligation
which may have, through s . 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
become enforceable
and so become the basis for real rights for the aboriginal peoples . Which group is
right? It is impossible to say . I am concerned here to explore the possibilities of
the optimists' view .
The trust relationship in Canada has not been the object of much study .
Lowry commented in 1973 :
The paucity of research, writing and case-law leads to the inescapable
conclusion that this relationship has not been thoroughly analyzed
The words remain true today .
There is still no published study of the trust
obligation in Canada. There are four studies, all of which predate the
Constitution
Act. 1982, to which the writer has had access
.' All those studies conclude that a
trust relationship might be found in the Indian Act,
although they also recognize the
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difficulties relating to enforcement
. They have, of course, to a degree been
superseded by the decision in Guerin .
It is central to this thesis that there is more than one type of trust and more
than one basis for those types. Each type, I will suggest, although sharing a common
origin, has its unique purpose and its unique obligations. Professor Sanders has
suggested something along these lines :
It is the writer's view that the question of the legal or political character of
the trusteeship obligation cannot be examined in isolation from the question
of the precise obligations being considered. For example, it seems relatively
clear that we can describe the federal governments (sic) responsibility to
manage surrendered lands and band funds as a trust obligation, enforceable
by the courts . In contrast, it is easy to describe the federal governments (sic)
obligation to provide decent housing for Indians as a political responsibility,
which the courts will not become involved in trying to enforce
It should be remembered that Sanders wrote this before the passing of the
Constitution Act. 1982. It is suggested that he might now feel that the second of his
conclusions is not quite as clear as it was in 1977 .
I shall suggest here that it is not particularly useful to focus on the codified
aspects when attempting to interpret the trust obligation . A review of the judicial
commentary on the nature of the codified trust shows it to have been somewhat
chaotic and contradictory . Indeed, Native law as a whole can be chaotic and
contradictory. I suggest that the better route to a sound interpretation of the
relationship of the government to the First Nations, and a consistent Native law is
through a sound understanding of the unenforceable trust obligation : the wardship .
I have preferred to describe the obligation as a wardship because it better describes
the relationship . The duty is not simply in relation to land
: it covers a much wider
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range of objects. The Indian Act
is a witness to that .
It is suggested that using the term "trust" contributes to the confusion
surrounding the obligations of the Crown to the First Nations because it invites the
analogy to the property-centered true trust . That very technical body of law is of
limited use in describing the broad policies involved in Indian law .
The Crown took
on a special duty to the First Nations from the earliest days of colonisation . The
resulting relationship, even if unenforceable, more closely resembles the wardship .
The focus, it is suggested, should be on the unenforceable background obligation
because it is that relationship which colours the codified trust . It is the origin of the
codified obligation
. Judicial creativity has been most effective in Native law when
it has kept a close eye on wardship .
That, it is suggested, what has occurred in
Guerin . The Indian Act
provision has been interpreted in light of the trust
obligation, not simply as an ordinary statute .
In the Native law trust relationship, in the scheme of things suggested here,
there are three different species of trust
. There is the unenforceable guardian/ward
relationship recognized by Marshall . There is also an enforceable version of the
trust obligation codified in various pieces of legislation. This second version is not
enforceable as a trust but rather is enforced through the provisions of the codifying
legislation. We have seen this in the Mitchell
case in the United States .' It has
some aspects of a rule of judicial review of administrative action . There is finally,
a true trust, fully enforceable as a private law trust .
This we have seen in
Manchester Band of Pomo Indians. Inc . v. U.S .
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The Unenforceable Trust : The Guardian/Ward Relationship
The protective role of the Crown originates in the earliest colonial practice
of the European Nations in North America . We have seen above the Laws of
Burgos and the debates at Vallodolid . The protective role was embraced by the
British Crown . The Instructions to Captain Endicott of the Massachusetts Bay
Company in 1629 included:
Above all, we pray you to be careful that there be none in our precincts
permitted to do any injury in the least kind to the heathen people . bl
The 1670 Instructions to the Governors of the American colonies contain a similar
policy:
Forasmuch as most of our Colonies do border upon the Indians, and peace
is not to be expected without the due observance of and preservation of
justice to them, you are in Our name to command all the Governors that they
at no time give any just provocation to any of the said Indians that are at
peace with us
This policy made its way into law in the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 .' That
instrument speaks of the "several Nations or Tribes of Indians who live under our
Protection" and entrenches the practice of only allowing the purchase of the Indian
interest in land by treaty with the Crown "to the end that the Indians may be
convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution to remove
any cause of
discontent"
. These, and other similar provisions, we have seen, brought Chief Justice
Marshall, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia'
to say of the Indian Nations, the
"domestic dependent nations" as he called them :
[T]hey are in a state of pupilage . Their relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for
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protection ; rely on its kindness and its power
; appeal to it for relief for their
wants; and address the President as their great father
.
This same position has been adopted in Canada .
In the influential St Catherine's
case, Chancellor Boyd writing the trial decision, said of the Royal Proclamation :
This proclamation has frequently been referred to, and by the Indians
themselves, as the charter of their rights .
In 1931, D.C. Scott, a long serving Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs, called
the Royal Proclamation the "Magna Carta of all the Indians" . 67 In 1973, Mr Justice
Hall in the Supreme Court of Canada commented:
This Proclamation was an Executive Order having the force and effect of an
Act of Parliament and was described by Gwynne in St. Catherine's Milling
case at [S.C.R.] p. 652 as the "Indian Bill of Rights"
: see also Campbell v.
Hall (1774), 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045
. Its force as a statute is analogous
to the status of Magna Carta which has always been considered law
throughout the Empire .'
The policy was followed by the British government as late as 1858 . The
Instructions to Governor Douglas of the colony of British Columbia, included this
admonition:
I have to enjoin you to consider the best and most humane means of dealing
with the Native Indians
. The feelings of this country would be strongly
opposed to the adoption of any arbitrary or oppressive measures towards
them. . . . I commit [the problem of Indian/immigrant relations] to you, in the
full persuasion that you will pay every regard to the interests of the Natives
which an enlightened humanity can suggest .
The colony of British Columbia accepted the policy and continued to observe it in
1870 on the eve of its entry into Confederation
. In a Letter to the Colonial Office,
Governor Musgrave stated :
The Indians have, in fact, been the special wards of the Crown, and in the
exercise of this guardianship the Government has, in all cases where it has
been desirable for the interests of the Indians, set aside Crown lands [for the
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requirements of each tribe .]'
The policy found its way into the government of Canada after confederation . In
1873, the Department of the Interior was created and given jurisdiction over the
Indian Nations ." In the 1876 Annual Report of the Department of the Interior,
similar sentiments are expressed :
[Our] Indian legislation generally rests on the principle, that the aborigines
are to be kept in a condition of tutelage and treated as wards or children of
the State. 2
One can observe in the brief outline above, a transition in the terminology used to
describe the Indian/government relationship . First described as "protection", the
language increasingly takes on the terminology of the wardship .
The wardship obtained added strength through the work of the Aborigines
Protection Society . This group, originally part of the British and Foreign Anti-
Slavery Society, was formed in 1835 and was active in promoting better conditions
for aboriginal peoples in Canada and throughout the empire . The letter of
Governor Musgrave quoted above was written in response to inquiries from the
Colonial Office provoked by the work of the Aborigines Protection Society in
London. Through the agitation of the Society, the British Parliament created a
Select Committee to look into the condition of aboriginal peoples . Their Report,
issued in 1837 contained the following :
[W]e are bound by two considerations with regard to the uncivilized : First,
that the ability we possess to confer upon them the most important benefits ;
and secondly, that of their inability to resist any encroachments, however
unjust, however mischievous, which we may be disposed to make . The
disparity of the parties, the strength of the one and the incapacity of the other
to enforce the observance of their rights, constitutes a new and irresistible
appeal to our compassionate protection .'
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Their recommendations included :
The protection of the aborigines should be considered as a duty particularly
belonging and appropriate to the executive government as administered either
in this country or by the governors of the respective colonies . This is not a
trust which could be conveniently confided to the local legislatures . . . . The
settlers in almost every colony, having either disputes to adjust with the native
tribes, or claims to urge against them, the representative body is virtually a
party, and therefore ought not to be a judge in such controversies . . . .
Whatever may be the legislative system of any colony, we therefore advise
that, as far as possible, the aborigines be withdrawn from its control ."
In 1847, the Bagot Commission established by the Province of Canada to look
into Indian policy, discussed this Report and made a similar recommendation
suggesting that the Indians should not come under provincial jurisdiction, but should
"remain under the immediate control of the representative of the Crown" .75 Sanders
suggests that this recommendation was influential in placing the Indians in the
federal jurisdiction in 1867 at the creation of the new Canadian nation
.' He
comments:
It seems clear that the 19th century notions of humanitarianism and
protection, articulated in these reports, lay behind the decision in the British
North America Act of 1867 to give legislative authority over "Indians and
Lands reserved for the Indians" to the federal Parliament . The decision to
give responsibility to the more distant level of government, removed Indian
policy from direct competition with local interests .
Formally, Great Britain
had retained jurisdiction over Indian policy until 1860 .
That policy of
centralized authority in relation to Indians was re-established with the British
North America Act of 1867 and has been a fundamental part of Canadian
Indian law since that time ."
It is apparent that the policy of "protection" is of long duration in Canada
.
The courts have also seen the protective role of the trust obligation as an
aspect of the relationship between the government and the Indian Nations of
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Canada. The cases in which one finds these early references are concerned with
rights to land rather than the obligations of government .
As regards the wardship,
the comments are therefore obiter .
Nevertheless, the comments taken as a whole
demonstrate an awareness that the government recognized some special obligations
when legislating in respect of the First Nations .
The comments seem first to appear in legislation under the Province of
Canada. In 1846 Robinson C.J ., commented in
Bown v. West, a case concerned with
the purchase of reserve land :
The government, we know, always made it their care to protect the Indians,
so far as they could, in the enjoyment of their property, and to guard them
against being imposed upon and dispossessed by the white inhabitants .'
In 1852 Bums J., referred to the relationship between the
Indians and the
government in this way :
[T]he crown [is] in fact acting in the light of a parent and guardian for them,
as it were, for these tribes ."
Neither judge explored the rationale for their characterization of the relationship
.
Apparently the first Canadian case which explores in any depth, the policy of
the government towards the Indian Nations is the St
. Catherine's case. In the trial
decision in 1885, Chancellor Boyd had this to say of the early British policy :
The colonial policy of Great Britain as it regards the claims and treatment
of the aboriginal populations in America, has been from the first uniform and
well-defined.
Indian peoples were found scattered wide-cast over the
continent, having, as a characteristic, no fixed abodes, but moving as the
exigencies of living demanded . As heathens and barbarians it was not thought
that they had any proprietary title to the soil, nor any such claim thereto as
to interfere with the plantations, and the general prosecution of colonization .
They were treated "justly and graciously" as Lord Bacon advised, but no legal
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ownership of the land was ever attributed to them .'
He then referred to the Province of Canada reports referred to above and having
discussed the terms of Treaty 3, the treaty through which the land at issue had been
surrendered, he continued :
The liberal treatment of the Indians, and the solicitude for their well-being
everywhere manifested throughout this treaty, are the outgrowth of that
benevolent policy which before Confederation attained its highest excellence
in Upper Canada.'
The effect on Indian/government relations of signing treaty, Boyd observed, is the
following :
If . .. [the Indians] elect to treat they then become, in a, special sense, wards
of the State, are surrounded by its protection while under pupillage, and have
their rights assured in perpetuity to the usual land reserve
None of the higher courts hearing the case gave as detailed an interpretation of the
purpose of the protection of the Indian interest in land . We have seen the comment
of Gwynne J. in his dissent at the Supreme Court of Canada. Also, the Privy
Council did acknowledge that the Indians lived under the "sovereignty and protection
of the British Crown"
83
In 1916, the Supreme Court of Canada used similar language to the Report
of 1844 . In A.G. Canada v . Giroux,84 Mr. Justice Duff discussed the legislation of
Lower Canada under which the reserve at issue had been set up . The legislation of
the relevant time allowed the Governor of the Province of Canada to appoint a
Commissioner of Indian Lands in whom reserve land would be vested.' Duff
described the power of the Commissioner over the Indians as being intended to be
exercised by him as between "tutor and pupil" .' Of the power the Commissioner
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exercised over the reserve land, Duff stated :
[I]n the administration of the property the Commissioner is accountable to
the Governor. The Governor in this respect does not represent the Crown
as proprietor but as a parens patriw.'
In 1897, the Queen's Bench of the province of Quebec spoke of the King as "the
guardian of the Indians"
.' In another case in 1901, the Quebec Court Superior had
described the relationship in much the same way :
[D]e 1'ensemble de cette loi, it resulte clairement que le legislateur a voulu
traiter les sauvages comme des mineurs dont le commissaire des sauvages est
le tuteur. . . . La consequence A tirer de cela, . . . c'est une faculte
. . . qu'elle
edicte en faveur des sauvages pour les proteger contre leur inexperience ou
leur imprevoyance .'
Again in 1914 the Quebec Superior Court spoke of the Indian as living under
"tutelle" (guardianship)9°
In a 1918 case , Re Caledonia Milling,
an Ontario case concerned with the
imprisonment of Indians for non-payment of debt, Mr. Justice Middleton stated :
[T]he Indian is . . . a ward of the of the Dominion government and cannot be
taken under the laws of the province ."
In 1924 Mr. Justice McPhillips of the British Columbia Court of Appeal gave as the
rationale for the exemption from attachment for debt :
The Indians are wards of the National government (the Government of
Canada)."
In 1929 in Exchequer Court in a case for the recovery of unsurrendered lands at the
Akwesasne Reserve, Audette J . said :
The Crown is making no claim for the fee in these lands but claims on behalf
of the indians, the wards of the nation, the use and benefit of these lands for
the indians themselves.'
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In 1931 the New Brunswick Court of Appeal repeated the holding in the
Caledonia Milling case when denying to the province the power to pass legislation
allowing imprisonment of an Indian for debt." In the same year, in a case upholding
the power of the provincial law to prevent non-Indians from hunting on reserve, the
British Columbia Court of Appeal spoke of the need to "protect the welfare of these
aboriginal wards of the Crown ." In 1943, in
a case from Manitoba, the Exchequer
Court once again spoke of the need to protect the land held by the Crown for its
"wards".' In 1940 the Nova Scotia County Court disallowed a poll tax on Mohawk
steelworkers from the Kahnawake reserve in Quebec .' Judge McArthur said :
For reasons which are quite apparent, the Indian has been placed under
guardianship of the Dominion Government . He is its ward, so long as he
remains unenfranchised. . . . [The Indians] are looked upon and treated as
requiring the friendly care and directing hand of the Government in their
affairs. They and their property are, so to speak, under the protecting wing
of the Dominion Government, . . . 98
In 1948 the Exchequer Court again called the Indians the wards of the Crown
.'
In 1950 in an opinion by the then Mr. Justice Rand at the Supreme Court of
Canada, the wardship received perhaps its most positive affirmation
. The case was
another concerning illegally leased land at the Akwesasne reserve . Rand declared
of the Indian Act :
The language of the statute embodies the accepted view that these aborigines
are, in effect, wards of the state, whose care and welfare are a political trust
of the highest obligation . For that reason, every such dealing with their
privileges must bear the imprint of Governmental approval, and it would be
beyond the power of the Governor in Council to transfer that responsibility
to the Superintendent General ."
In 1973 in the Calder
case, the Supreme Court echoed the characterization by citing
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the letters of the Governors of the colony of British Columbia referred to above ."'
In Guerin,
we have seen, the Court once again refers to the protective role of the
Crown in relation to the First Nations."'
The characterization of the Indian/government relationship in terms of
guardian/ward has a long history of acceptance in Canada, both in the
administration of Indian matters and in the courts . It is found in statements of
policy by governmental officers and in obiter in the courts when the background to
legislation is being referred to
. It is an obligation the government has taken upon
itself to act with sensitivity towards the Indian Nations . It is rooted in the belief
that, in the early days of colonisation, the Indian Nations would not be able to
protect their own interests .
The government, consequently, placed itself as an
intermediary and protector between the Indian Nations and the settler populations
and their local governments .
The rhetoric, at least, was not so as to defeat the
Indian interests, it was rather to promote them .
T
language has not been applied in a rigorous fashion . Sometimes called protection,
sometimes described in terms of wardship and sometimes simply as a trust . And the
word trust itself has been used in its many meanings : sometimes in its generic sense,
sometimes in a descriptive manner and sometimes in a legal sense .
Rand, in the St
Ann's case typifies this fact, describing the wardship as a political trust
. The
wardship, at least before 1982, could only give rise-to rights when given force
through legislation
. It is to this codified wardship that we now turn our attention .
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The Enforceable Trust : The Wardship Codified
The wardship has found its way into law both through constitutional and
through ordinary legislative instruments
. Legislative provisions relating to the Indian
Nations, constitutional and statutory, have invariably had trust-like aspects
. Some
use trusts language, while others establish relationships typically found in the various
types of trust
. The Royal Proclamation is of course the first of these legislative
instruments and speaks of the "several Nations or Tribes of Indians . . . who live under
our Protection" . The Indian Act" is probably the major codification of the wardship
.
Certainly it is the one which has the closest appearance to a trust . It is the presence
of trust-like elements in the legislative scheme governing Indian matters that has
caused the legislators, administrators, courts, commentators as well as the First
Nations themselves, to conclude that the relationship between the Indians and the
government is a legal trust
. It is not, however, the origin of the trust relationship .
That, it is suggested, is the wardship .
The hallmark of a trust relationship is the separation of control and benefit .
In the constitutional provisions and legislation governing the First Nations we
frequently see a separation of control and benefit . In fact the separation of benefit
and control is an essential element of the implementation of the wardship. From
the earliest times the British government separated the responsibility over the
Indians from the governing apparatus in the colonies. While there is very little
Indian legislation in the early period, we see, as the quantity increases through years,
in the trust-like content the implementation by the Crown of its wardship over the
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Indians .
Viewing the Indian Act as a codification of the wardship allows one to
interpret policy implemented by the Crown . The lands and moneys provisions
clearly evince an intention to protect Indian interests . It is possible, I would suggest,
to go further. The lands and moneys provisions are not the major provisions of the
Indian Act . They are coloured with the intent of the Act as a whole and also by the
context of the policies carried out by the government through the Department of
Indian Affairs." If we look at the policy of the Act as a whole, it demonstrates, I
suggest, the implementation by the federal government of the wardship and, if we
view the equivocal wording of the lands and moneys sections in light of that
objective, we might be less inclined to opt for the true trust . The Act as a whole, it
is suggested, reveals the influence of the positive duties of the wardship shouldered
by the Crown. Education, economic development, and a distinct form of local
government are all suggestive of a broader wardship role .
a Codification in the Pre-Confederation Period
The governance of pre-Confederation Canada reveals that the power over the
Indian nations was for the most part denied to the colonists . Although the Imperial
government gave up most of the day to day control over life in the colonies from
the earliest times, it retained its responsibility over Indians in Canada until 1860.
Until that time control was entrusted to a series of colonial officers . As noted
above, in 1670, Indian matters became the responsibility of the governors of the
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colonies."
In 1755, an Indian Department was created for North America, with Northern
and Southern sections, the officers of which reported to the Commander of the
British forces in North America. In 1796, control over Indian matters in Upper
Canada passed to the Lieutenant-Governor, while in Lower Canada it remained with
the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces until 1800 after which it became the
responsibility of the Governor-General . For the short
.period until 1816, control
remained with the civil authorities . In 1816, the responsibility returned to the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, perhaps because of the importance of
military alliances in the wake of the War of 18121 06
In 1830, another change
resulted in the creation of two separate departments : one for Upper Canada and
one for Lower Canada . In 1841, with the Union of the two Canadas into the
Province of Canada, a single department was created under the authority of the
Governor-General . This arrangement was to last until 1860
.
Throughout this period, responsibility for Indian matters lay with an officer
responsible to the Imperial Crown acting through its prerogative powers
. Both war
and the colonies came within the prerogative. The Instructions to the Governors as
well as the general policy of the Crown which we explored above resulted, we shall
see, resulted in increasingly comprehensive legislation over Indians and their lands .
In 1860, responsibility for Indian matters was transferred from the Imperial
control to the Province of Canada
." The legislation allowed the Commissioner of
Crown Lands to exercise all the powers established under the previous Acts .
This
186
arrangement lasted until Confederation.
For virtually the whole of the pre-
Confederation period, control over Indian matters was retained by the Imperial
Crown. This special relationship is a manifestation of the wardship
. The trust
obligation also colours the policy pursued through the Indian legislation . The
concern was always to assist the Indian in adjusting to "civilization" . Trust-like
language is also found consistently in the legislation . It is telling, however, that no
trusts remedies were codified .
In 1839 Upper Canada passed legislation conferring on the Commissioners
a power to protect Indian lands from trespass preventing squatters, poachers, and the
illegal cutting of timber ." This legislation did not contain elements suggestive of
trust beyond the merely protective role assumed by the Commissioners .
The 1849
an amendment spoke of Indian lands "held in trust or in the nature of a trust for
the use of the Indians" .
In 1850 legislation was passed which was much broader in its reach . The
preamble reads :
Whereas it is expedient to make provision for the protection of the Indians
in Upper Canada, who, in their intercourse with the other inhabitants thereof,
are exposed to be imposed upon by the designing and unprincipled, as well
as to provide more summary and effectual means for the protection of such
Indians in the unmolested possession and enjoyment of the lands and other
property in their use or occupation ."
The statute covered, in addition to protection of Indian lands, protection from some
laws of contract etc, tax exemptions, prohibition of alcohol and provisions covering
statute labour on public roads which pass through Indian lands . 110
The statute in force in Lower Canada spoke in the language of trusts .
It
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began:
Whereas it is expedient to make better provision for preventing
encroachments upon and injury to the lands appropriated to the use of the
several Tribes and Bodies of Indians in Lower Canada, and for the defence
of their rights and privileges ."'
Its provisions included :
That it shall be lawful for the Governor to appoint from time to time a
Commissioner of Indian Lands for Lower Canada in whom and in whose
successors by name aforesaid, all lands or property in Lower Canada which
are, or shall be set apart or appropriated to or for the use of any Tribe or
Body of Indians, shall be and are hereby vested, in trust for such Tribe or
Bodes 12
	
(my emphasis)
This provision would appear to be strong support for the existence of a true trust .
However, although the lands as well as the power to enforce the Act were vested in
the Commissioner, he remained responsible to the Crown :
[T]he Commissioner . . . shall be subject in all things to the instructions he may
from time to time receive from the Governor, and shall be personally
responsible to the Crown for all his acts, and more especially for any act
done contrary to such instructions."'
That control remains with the Governor lends support to the argument forwarded
here that the trust-like language in the Act is a result of the wardship which it
codifies rather than an intent to actually create a trust of which the Indians were
to be beneficiaries .
In 1851, the Lower Canada legislation was again amended and the specific
use of the word "trust" was dropped. The appearance is one of trust
. The
arrangement, it is suggested, is much more like a wardship . Nevertheless, trust-like
language remained in use . The statute allowed that "tracts of Land shall be
. . . set
apart and appropriated to and for the use of the several Indian Tribes in Lower
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Canada"."' A strong assimilationist policy can be seen in the legislation of 1857
."
The
Act for the Gradual Civilization of the Indian tribes in the Canadas offered
inducements such as land and money to any Indian who would enfranchise and laid
out the conditions under which enfranchisement could be successfully sought ."'
This
legislation with its strong emphasis on economic development is further proof that
the government actively pursued its duty to promote the Indian ."'
In 1860, the Imperial government gave up all control over Indian matters to
the Province of Canada and legislation was passed to cover Indian lands throughout
the province. The legislation had little to say
on the nature of the Indian interest
in lands or the obligations of the government.
Generally speaking, it merely
continued the status quo .
The provision describing reserve lands is as follows :
s.2 All lands reserved for the Indians or for any tribe or band of Indians, or
held in trust for' their benefit, shall be deemed to be reserved and held for
the same purposes as before the passing of this Act but subject to this
provision."'
This provision, and the accompanying provisions covering Indian moneys, continued
essentially unchanged until 1951 .
The statute also codified the surrender
requirement, perhaps the sine qua non of the wardship role of the Crown
."'
The majority of the Indian legislation of the period spoke in a manner which
strongly suggests implementation of the wardship role of the Crown . The word
"trust" is frequently used and the protective role of the responsible officer stressed .
In addition, the legislative scheme established to govern the Indian lands sets up a
legal relationship which is somewhat suggestive of the true trust .
In the early days
in what are now Ontario and Quebec, the legal status of Indian lands was uncertain .
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The Crown apparently had not turned its mind to the entrenchment in law of the
reserve system.'
When in 1850 legislative controls governing reserve title were established, the
Lower Canada provisions described the lands as "in trust" for the Indians and gave
control over the "rents, issues and profits" realized from them
. In Upper Canada the
legislation required Crown approval of sales of Indian lands evidenced by an
"Instrument under the Great Seal of the Province, or under the Privy Seal of the
Governor
.""' Such language is strongly suggestive of a true trust. Bartlett, in 1979,
commented :
It is suggested that the early pre-Confederation legislation applicable to
Upper and Lower Canada expressly declared a trust relationship in respect
of Indian lands."
Such a conclusion would seem to be warranted.
Nevertheless, however trust-like the relationship appeared, the enforcement
of the wardship was not through trust remedies
. Specific powers of enforcement and
remedies were included in the legislation
. Throughout the period, it is the
Commissioners or other representative of the Crown, not the Indian "beneficiaries",
who enforce the legislation and the enforcement is in the nature of public law rather
than the protection of rights of private property .
The 1839 Act gave the
Commissioners power to enforce the trespass provisions
. It also covered procedure,
penalties, and remedies . The Indians appear to have no powers of enforcement
.
The Lower Canada provisions of 1850 also gave the power of enforcement to the
Commissioners and even went so far as to define who could be considered
a
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beneficiary of the special provisions . The definition section of this statute is the
precursor of the definition sections of the Indian Act which continue to provoke
litigation today ."
There was little litigation during this period . Consequently, the courts did not
develop very much of an understanding of the purpose of the provisions governing
Indians. In 1842 a conviction for trespass contrary to the 1839 legislation was
successfully appealed on the grounds that the Commissioners had not proved that
the lands were Indian lands." Such a holding suggests that the Queen's Bench,
concerned for the rights of an accused, felt that criminal law standards of proof
should apply. It is suggested that the had the bench been more aware of the
wardship role, they would have reached a better decision. Ultimately, they do seem
to have recognized its protective intent .
In two cases in 1850 the Court of Chancery of Upper Canada discussed the
scope of the 1839 legislation. In R. v. Strong, the court allowed a broad discretion
in the Commissioners in the enforcement of the Act .' Strong, convicted of trespass
on Indian lands, appealed on a number of grounds including an allegation that, since
the statute was a penal one, the Crown should prove all the elements of the
charge.' Evidence as to the status of the lands had been through the oral testimony
of a single witness, asserting that no surrender had taken place .
The Court, dismissing the appeal, reviewed the legislation and said :
The bare recital of the jurisdiction conferred upon us, is sufficient to establish
the inapplicability of the [arguments of the appellant] . Possibly the clearest
refutation of many, if not all, of the arguments adduced, would be found in
a careful perusal of the clause granting the appeal . One thing is apparent ;
that the legislature did not intend that the judgments of the commissioners
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should be annulled or reversed
on merely technical grounds . We are
authorized to alter and amend ."
One ground for attacking the conviction, was that no penalty had been imposed at
trial. Chancellor Blake, speaking for the Court, explained that the statute
only
required a conviction to be registered and continued :
The warrant of removal is in the nature of an execution upon this judgment ;
it may or may not be required according to the circumstances ; the power to
issue such warrant, as well as the period at which it shall be issued, are left
with the commissioners . 128
Vice Chancellor Esten, in a case heard at the same time as Strong, suggested that
Indian legislation was remedial rather than criminal and should receive "a liberal
construction" ." Had they mentioned the wardship role, the reasoning would have
been more complete .
The disability of the Indians to sell or lease their lands without the consent
of the Commissioners is, it has been suggested, an example of the protective role of
the Crown
. The disability was confirmed in cases in 1855, 1857 and 1865 . .In the
first of these cases, R . v . Baby,
the Upper Canada Court of Queen's Bench went as
far as to declare, obiter,
that the protective intent of the statute would even prevent
the enforcement of a contract with the Indians even where there was an intent to
obtain the permission of the Commissioners afterwards ."'
Such a ruling is strong
inducement to citizens to accept the Crown's role as intermediary .
In 1857, the Court of Common Pleas of Upper Canada relied upon the 1851
statute in founding a conviction for entering into a verbal lease of Indian lands ."'
In 1865, in Commissioner of Indian Lands
v. Jannel, the defendant argued that his
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purchase of Indian lands could not be impeached since the land was situated outside
the village of the Indians from whom he purchased and consequently were not
Indian lands
. The Lower Canada Court noted that the statute did not draw such
a distinction and upheld the conviction saying :
The statute is precise ; and therefore the judgment of the court below must
be confirmed."'
Such technical arguments were not to be allowed to defeat the protective intent of
the legislation .
The remedies allowed are generally those written into the statute. One case
offers weak authority for the argument that trust remedies might be obtained by the
Commissioners. The 1856 case form Lower Canada,
a case was argued on an
agreed statement of facts. In Commissioner of Indian Lands
v. Payant, the
Commissioners attempted to repossess timber cut by an Indian on Indian lands and
sold, illegally, by the Indian to a non-Indian.'
The admissions agreed to by the
parties included that the Commissioner held the lands in trust for the Indians
. With
no reference to the governing legislation, the court declared the timber to be the
property of the Commissioner and ordered it delivered up to him "in his said
capacity"
." This last phrase would seem to be a reference to the Commissioner's
capacity as trustee
. Even though it is acknowledged that the legislation in force at
the time referred to the lands as being held in trust, it is suggested that the fact that
the case was argued on an agreed statement of facts, considerably weakens
its
strength.
On a similar point the Upper Canada Queen's Bench reached a very different
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result. In Vanvleck v . Stewart,
the plaintiffs had either cut timber with permission
of the Indians or had purchased it from the Indians . The Commissioners had seized
the lumber and sold it to the defendants. The court looked at the legislation and
commented, obiter :
[U]pon a consideration of the statutes . . . I do not see that saw logs cut on
Indian lands by the Indians themselves, or cut by white people by the consent
of the Indian occupants, are liable to be seized and sold by the
Commissioners for restraining trespasses upon the lands under any of the
statutes referred to ; but further consideration of the question might lead me
to a different opinion ."
Although the Court does not rule out a trust remedy, it is clear
that their
predilection is for the statutory remedy. In fact, it is clear that for the Courts of
Lower Canada also the statute is paramount. In 1867, the Court of Queen's Bench
of Lower Canada, after reviewing the legislative provisions governing Indian lands,
commented:
It is therefore clear that, since the passing of this law (C.S.L.C., c. 14), all
rights of action, whether founded upon ownership or occupancy, are vested
in the Commissioner of Indian Lands ."
Although not conclusive, the evidence is compelling, not only that the courts,
in
keeping with the concept of the wardship, gave a broad pro-Indian reading to the
statutes, but also that they preferred the statutory remedies .
In only one case, and
that one where the trust appears not to have been argued, did the courts apply a
trust remedy.
It is suggested that the pre-Confederation Indian law is supportive of the
argument that the presence of trusts-like language is due to the wardship rather than
the intent to create true trusts interests in the Indian nations . The policy and the
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judicial commentary are too contradictory to draw any hard conclusions .
With
Confederation in 1867, centralisation of Indian matters into a single department
made possible the development and implementation, by the Crown, of a much more
consistent Indian policy . The several pre-Confederation
Acts were quickly
consolidated into a single Act, an Act which has persisted virtually unchanged up to
today. Certainly, the policy pursued by the Department showed remarkable
consistency at least until 1969 . Furthermore, the opinions of the courts rapidly
became more consistent .
b Codification after Confederation
Under the terms of the Constitution Act
. 1867, the responsibility for fulfilling
the wardship role fell to the federal government
. The Indians are unique in coming
under federal jurisdiction . We have seen that in 1844 the Bagot Commission
recommended that responsibility for the Indian Nations should be vested in the
Crown rather than the provincial authorities .
The Commission recommended :
That as long as the Indian Tribes continue to require the special protection
and guidance of the Government they should remain under the immediate
control of the representative of the Crown within the Province, and not under
that of the Provincial Authorities ."
At Confederation some 23 years later, this recommendation seems to have been
heeded.
Under the terms of the Constitution Act
. 1867, s. 91(24), legislative power
over "Indians and the Lands reserved for the Indians" was placed in the federal
government
. Section 92(13) placed legislative power over "Property and Civil Rights"
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in the provincial legislatures and by the terms of s
. 109, "All Lands, Mines, Minerals
and Royalties" belonging to the provinces at confederation were to be retained by
the provinces.
It is not possible now to ascertain the purpose for this legislative scheme .
However, it seems justifiable to conclude, as Sanders does, that Indian lands were
placed under a different jurisdiction from that governing the rest of the lands in the
nation, in order to protect the Indian Nations and their lands from the provinces
."'
If this is in fact the case, then it is unquestionably an example of the codification
of the wardship relationship and clearly places the responsibility for the enforcement
of the duties on the federal Crown.
Other constitutional provisions support this conclusion. The Rupert's Land
and Northwest Territory Order admitting Rupert's Land into Confederation in 1870
contains the following acceptance of the wardship :
[U]pon transference of the territories in question to the Canadian
Government, it will be our duty to make adequate provision for the protection
of the Indian tribes whose interests and well-being are involved in the
transfer.'
Upon the admittance of British Columbia into Confederation in 1871, the Indians
of that colony became a federal responsibility :
The charge of the Indians, and the trusteeship and management of the lands
reserved for their use and benefit, shall be assumed by the Dominion
Government, and a policy as liberal as that hitherto pursued by the British
Columbia Government shall be continued by the Dominion Government after
the Union. 1`
In 1930 through the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, the federal government
gave up control over the lands in the prairie provinces ."'
Legislative power over
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Indians and their lands, however, remained with the federal government
. These
provisions with their language and/or inference of protection from provincial
interference suggest a transfer of the wardship from the Crown in right of the
colonies and from the Hudson's Bay Company, to the Crown in Right of Canada .
It is clear that the Canadian Government actively took up its
role as
protector
. In the treaty process as pursued by the Dominion government, we see
frequent promises reminiscent of the wardship .
During the negotiation of Treaty
1, for example, we see this promise :
Your Great Mother, the Queen, wishes to do justice to all her children alike
.
She will deal fairly with those of the setting sun, just as she would with those
of the rising sun. She wishes peace and order to reign through all her
country, and whilst her arm is strong to punish the wicked man, her hand is
also open to reward the good man everywhere in her Dominions
.
Your Great Mother wishes the good of all races under her sway .
She
wishes her red children to be happy and contented . She wishes them to live
in comfort. She would like them to adopt the habits of the whites, to till the
land and raise food, and store it up against a time of want .
She thinks this
would be the best thing for her red children to do, that it would make them
safer from famine and distress, and make their homes more comfortable .
But the Queen, though she may think it good for you to adopt civilized
habits, has no idea of compelling you to do so .
This she leaves to your
choice, and you need not live like the white man unless you can be persuaded
to do so of your own choice ."'
In the Treaty 4 negotiations we see a further assurance which relates the treaties of
the late 19th century to earlier treaties :
The Queen knows that her red children often find it hard to live . She knows
that her red children, their wives and their children, are often hungry, that the
buffalo will not last forever and she desires to do something for them . More
than a hundred years ago, the Queen's father said to the red men living in
Quebec and Ontario, I will give you land and cattle and set aside Reserves
for you, and will teach you . What has been the result? There the red men
are happy
; instead of getting fewer in number by sickness they are growing
in number; their children have plenty .
The Queen wishes you to enjoy the
same blessings ."
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The wardship implicit in these promises, is much more than merely the protection
of lands.
There would appear to be also a commitment to promote the best
interests of the Indians . The treaties themselves are fairly neutral in regard to the
wardship although there are provisions promising schools, medicine, welfare when
necessary, as well as farm implements and seeds
. Taken together, the content of the
negotiations and the treaties themselves, the totality is suggests that the
federal
government actively assumed the wardship role .
c Codification in the Indian Acts
The scope of the wardship taken up by the federal government is evident in
the broadness of the legislation under which the lives of the Indians have been
governed since Confederation. 1876 saw the enactment by the federal government
of the first consolidated Indian Act .
In the years between Confederation and the
passing of this Act, great changes had occurred in Canada .
The Northwest
Territories, British Columbia and Prince Edward Island had been admitted to
Canada, with, in the case of the Northwest Territories and British Columbia, an
overt acknowledgement of the special responsibilities to, and not just legislative
jurisdiction over, the Indians. Indian affairs had been centralized into a single
department for the whole nation
. The charge of the Indians, first given in 1868 to
the Secretary of State,'" in 1873 was given to the newly created Department of the
Interior.'
The 1868 legislation covered all the four confederating provinces and gave to
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the Secretary of State, many of the powers we have seen in earlier legislation."' In
1869, an amendment extended the scope of the earlier Act to include the
enfranchisement ." This Act also extended many pre-existing provisions and added
controls on the descent of property and included provisions establishing elections for
Band Chiefs."' The Chiefs were to be given powers to pass by-laws, subject to
confirmation by the Governor in Council, over a narrow range of local matters ."
It also made possible the granting of life estates in reserve lands to individual
Indians who "from the degree of civilization to which he has attained, and the
character for integrity and sobriety which he bears, appears to be a safe and suitable
person for becoming a proprietor of land
."It is obvious from the scope of the later statute in particular, that the federal
government intended to take up the responsibility of the wardship and its
implementation into legislation . The controls on the alienation of land, on the
consumption of liquor, on trespass and the selling of timber, are examples of the
codification of the wardship of some vintage . The creation of Band Councils with
their powers controlled by the Governor in Council, can be seen as a further
example of the government implementing its wardship . One commentary has
suggested:
[T]he Act of 1868 consolidated much of the legislation passed in the previous
decade regarding protection and management of Indian interests . It
continued the "guardianship policy" of Indian Affairs officials ."'
The enfranchisement provisions of the 1869 Act, which remained in force in
some form until 1985, suggest another aspect of the guardianship . These provisions
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perhaps indicate that the wardship was intended to protect the Indians only until
they were able to govern their own affairs . The fact that native women marrying
non-natives lost their status also indicates a discrete purpose to the wardship . These
were,after all, times in which women were very much "wards" of their husbands . In
1871 Spragge, the Deputy Superintendent of Indian Branch, explained :
The Acts framed in the years 1868 and 1869, relating to Indian affairs, were
designed to lead the Indian people by degrees to mingle with the white race
in the ordinary avocations of life ."
The objects of the legislation remained, as they had always been,
threefold :
Protection of the Indians from unscrupulous settlers and traders; an intent to civilize
the Indians; and, an active role for the Crown as protector of the Indians
.'
In 1874, provisions were added that governed the taking of evidence from
Indians," and the operation of the 1868 Act as amended was extended to be
in force
in Manitoba and British Columbia." In 1876, the existing Indian legislation was
consolidated into the form which, to a large degree, it takes today." W
consolidation had been preceded by some discussion within the fledgling department
of its role vis-a-vis the Indians .
The Indian Act, as it now became known, extended the reach of the Indian
legislation, with the exception of the enfranchisement sections, to include all the
territories under the jurisdiction of the federal government." The enfranchisement
sections were to come into force in the recently acquired territory by proclamation
.
The wardship aspects of the previous Acts were continued and extended .
Certain
other sections, suggestive of a true trust, appeared for the first time .
Overall, the
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Act demonstrates, it is suggested, an increasing sophistication in the implementation
of the wardship role . It is further suggested that the wardship, though codified in
trust-like terms, is not necessarily intended to give rise to trust remedies . A review
of some of the provisions supports this answer .
i The Definition of Reserves
Section 3(6) of the 1876 Act, gives the following definition for the term
"reserve" as used in the Act :
The term "reserve" means any tract or tracts of land set apart by treaty or
otherwise for the use or benefit of or granted to a particular band of Indians,
of which the legal title is in the Crown, but which is unsurrendered and
includes all the trees, wood, timber, soil, stone, minerals, metals, or other
valuables thereon or therein.'
Special reserves were defined in the following way :
The term "special reserve" means any tract or tracts of land and everything
belonging thereto set apart for the use or benefit of any band or irregular
band of Indians, the title of which is vested in a society, corporation or
community legally established, and capable of suing and being sued, or in a
person or persons of European descent, but which land is held in trust for,
or benevolently allowed to be used by, such band or irregular band of
Indians."
The use of the phrase "use or benefit" together with the announcement that legal
title rests in a second party, either the Crown or another, evidences the separation
of benefit and control . Such separation is suggestive of a true trust
.
In 1951, the definition of reserve was amended :
"reserve" means a tract of land, the legal title of . which is vested in His
Majesty for the use and benefit of a band."
While continuing the separation of control and benefit, this provision uses the
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terminology of the true trust. For Sanders this to supports the argument that reserve
lands are held in a true trust."
Also in 1951, the separate definition of special reserves was dropped and s.
36 appears. S. 36 -provides :
Where lands have been set apart for the use and benefit of a band and the
legal title thereto is not vested in His Majesty, this Act applies as though the
lands were a reserve within the meaning of this Act."
Through s. 36, special reserves came under the general definition
. By the terms of
s. 3(6) of the 1876 Act, special reserves included lands held "in trust" for the use or
benefit of a band . S. 22 of the 1876 Act provides :
If by the violation of any such trust as aforesaid, or by the breaking up of any
society, corporation, or community, or if by the death of any person or
persons without a legal succession of trusteeship, in whom the title to a
special reserve is held in trust, the said title lapses or becomes void in law,
then the legal title shall become vested in the crown in trust, and the property
shall be managed for the band or irregular band previously interested therein,
as an ordinary reserve ."
Bartlett, who is not convinced that ordinary reserves are held in trust, suggests that
these sections taken together suggest the existence of a true trust in relation to
special reserves. He comments :
Upon such lapse or avoidance title to the reserve [under the 1876 Act] is
"vested in the Crown in trust as an ordinary reserve" . . . . Special reserves are
today defined in terms of "use and benefit" rather than "trust". It is suggested
that the 1951 revision cannot have abrogated the trust status of the special
reserves and accordingly the 1951 terminology may be regarded as an
indication of the equation to be properly made between a "trust" and lands
set apart for the "use and benefit of a band."
The arguments of both Sanders and Bartlett demonstrate the possibilities of the
Indian Act as a trust instrument .
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As both of these writers are aware, arguments to the contrary also show
plausibility. Indeed, Sanders, ultimately seems uncertain about the existence of such
a trust." And the elimination of trust terminology from the Act could be seen as
a deliberate attempt to avoid a trust obligation . Sanders comments on this :
[T]here is an evolution in the use of the term "trust" in Canadian Indian
legislation. Pre-confederation legislation uses the term as a regular part of
the statutory language
. After confederation, in the federal Indian legislation
of 1876 and 1880, the use of the term is confined to the problem of special
reserves (where title to the reserve in is a person or body other than the
Crown). With the Indian Act of 1951, the term is dropped even from the
special reserves section."
In the end, the evidence as to the existence of a true trust remains equivocal . And
indeed, since Madame Justice Wilson and two other Justices of the Supreme Court
favour the true trust, even Guerin has not completely cleared up the matter
. But
even if there is no true trust vis a vis
Indian lands, at the very least, the trust-like
aspect of these provisions indicates codification one element of the wardship .
ii Control over Band Moneys
Indian moneys, as part of the "property of Indians" have been under the same
broad controls and management as Indian lands . In the 1876
Indian Act, the
following provisions appear :
s.58 All moneys and securities of any kind applicable to the support or benefit
of Indians, . . . and all moneys accrued and hereafter to accrue from the sale
of any Indian lands, [etc], shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be
applicable to the same purposes, and be dealt with in the same manner as
they might have before the passing of this Act .
s
.59 The Governor in Council may, subject to this Act, direct how, and in
what manner, and by whom the moneys arising from the sales of Indian lands,
and the property held or to be held in trust for the Indians or from any
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timber on Indian lands or reserves, or from any other source for the benefit
of Indians, . . . shall be invested from time to time, and how the payments or
assistance to which the Indians may be entitled shall be made or given, and
may direct what percentage or proportion thereof shall be set apart from time
to time, to cover the cost of and attendant upon the management of reserves,
lands, property and moneys under the provisions of this Act, and for the
construction and repair of roads passing through such reserves or lands, and
by way of contribution to schools frequented by such Indians .
s.60 The proceeds arising from the sale or lease of any Indian lands, or from
the timber, hay, stone, minerals or other valuables thereon, or on a reserve,
shall be paid to the Receiver General to the credit of the Indian fund ."
These provisions have become increasingly complex and detailed over the years . In
1951, the sections included words of trust . Section 61 states
:
61(1) Indian moneys shall be expended only for the benefit of the Indians or
bands for whose use and benefit in common the moneys are to be received
or held, and subject to this Act and to the terms of any treaty or surrender,
the Governor in Council may determine whether any purpose for which
Indian moneys are used or are to be used is for the use and benefit of the
band.'
These provisions remain in force today
. The powers of the Minister are enumerated
in a number of detailed provisions
. The arguments as to whether these provisions
constitute the delineation of a true trust relationship are similar to those relating to
the land provisions above .
Certainly, as with those sections, the influence of the
wardship role is obvious .
iii The Powers of Management of Indian Lands and Property and Lives
Until 1883, "control and management of Indian lands and property" was
exercised by first the Secretary of State, and from 1874, the Minister of the Interior
.
In an 1883 amendment, the provision which would remain in the Act until 1951
204
appears . It states :
The Minister of the Interior or the Head of any other Department appointed
for that purpose by order of the Governor in Council shall be the
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs and shall, as such, have the control
and management of the lands and property of the Indians of Canada ."
In 1951, the section was dropped and the following appears :
This Act shall be administered by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
who shall be the superintendent general of Indian affairs ."
Apart from changes covering which Department head shall be the superintendent
general, the provision remains the same today ."' Since the 1951 Act, the powers and
mechanisms of management and control are to be found dispersed throughout the
Act. They remain substantial.
It is suggested that these controls demonstrate an intent to take up some of
the positive duties which are included in the wardship . The reserve land, it is noted,
was to provide the basis of the economy with which the Crown intended to replace
the traditional economy. The Act grants to the Governor in Council and to the
Minister responsible for Indian matters such powers which are to oversee
the
introduction of the Indian to the European economy .
The powers are particularized throughout the Acts . Some powers are
reserved to be exercised by the Governor in Council, some by the Minister, and
some even by the band themselves
. Specific provisions governed under the terms
of the 1876 Act for example, include powers over reserves," surveys and allocations
of lands," descent of property," removal of trespassers, 15
control of timber
resources,
176
arbitration where railways and other public purposes require reserve
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lands,' the maintenance of roads, 18 control ever the surrender process,
"
elections,1S0
trade, 18' enfranchisement and the swearing of affidavits
.' The Governor in Council
is granted control over surrendered lands,' the granting of patents to enfranchised
Indians" and the power to exempt Indians or bands from the provisions of the Act
."
The Act today, as well as continuing the large majority of the 1876 provisions
and some added through the intervening years, includes powers over the creation of
new bands" and the operation of farms" and schools."
Noteworthy throughout
the Indian legislation is the existence of substantial discretionary powers
in the
Minister and the Governor in Council . Typical are
the powers given over Indian
moneys in s. 61 of the 1951 Act
.' A similar power over Indian lands, which also
first appeared in the 1951 Act, exists in today's s .18 . It reads :
Subject to this Act, reserves are held by Her Majesty for the use and benefit
of the respective bands for which they are set apart ; and subject to this Act
and the terms of any treaty or surrender, the Governor in Council may
determine whether any purpose for which lands in a reserve are used or are
to be used is for the use and benefit of the band ."
Equally powerful, though not expressed in such strong language, is the power of
disallowal the Minister exercises over the Band Council by-laws ."'
The Acts as a whole evidence a separation of control from the Indians who
live on the reserves .
This, again, has trust-like appearances, but not those of a
property centered trust. Lowry argues that this in fact means that the
Indian Act
creates an express trust in relation to at least reserve lands and Indian moneys
."'
Bartlett, while he has some sympathy with this argument, notes that the broad
discretion given to the Minister and to the Governor in Council may refute the
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argument . He comments :
The language and substance of these provisions in no way deny the existence
of a trust relationship but particularize features of the trust and go a long way
in resembling a trust instrument describing the powers of the trustees and the
object of a trust. Throughout the history of Indian legislation management
of Indian property has been a matter of ministerial or Governor in Council
discretion
. This discretion might be considered to deny a trust relationship
or breach of trust action."
The difficulty of assessing the equivocal terminology of the
Indian Act is reflected
in the case law
. The courts rarely grant trusts remedies but frequently refer to the
existence of special obligations to the First Nations .
It is clear that the Indian Act
can be viewed as an entrenchment of the
wardship relationship between the government and the Indians .
The fact that these
provisions cover more than just land and money and extend to cover the daily lives
of Indians suggests a very broad conception of the wardship . A consequence of this,
it is suggested, is that even the provisions relating to the governance of Indians tend
to take on the appearance of a trust . It is not surprising, then, that the trust
argument has been taken up in litigation .
d Codification : The Views of the Courts
Many of the cases reviewed above in the section on the wardship were an
attempt to obtain a trust remedy for an alleged breach of an Indian Act
duty. In
Payant
we saw that the court assumed the existence of a trust apparently without
the point having been argued
." For this reason it is a weak authority for finding a
trust in the terms of the Indian Act .
It has in fact not been easy to place
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enforceable trust duties upon the Crown. By contrast, the courts have repeatedly
referred to the special obligations of the Crown .
i The Crown as Trustee
Despite some early problems, 195 it is now clear that it is possible for the
Crown to be a trustee ." In Walsh v. The Secretary of State for India in Council
in
1863, the House of Lords had no trouble holding the Secretary of State for Indian
in Council to be a trustee .' In that case the trusteeship was clearly evident in the
statute. Indeed, it would seem to be required in England that such be the case .
In
1932, the House of Lords, in Civilian War Claimants v. The King, said :
There is nothing, as far as I know, to prevent the Crown from acting as agent
or trustee if it chooses deliberately to do so."'
Furthermore, the Crown will not be found to be a trustee in matters of state . In
Rustomjee v. The Oueen, Lord Coleridge said :
We do not say that under no circumstances can the Crown be a trustee ; .. . but
it seems clear to us that in all that relates to the making and performance of
a treaty with another sovereign the Crown is not, and cannot be, either a
trustee or an agent for the any subject whatever ."
In Kinloch v . The Secretary of State for India in Council,' the House of Lords was
asked to find a trust binding the Crown to distribute booty .
The Order in Council
ordering distribution of booty gathered during a war, spoke in terms of trust . The
court denied the trust saying :
Now the words "in trust for" are quite consistent with, and indeed are the
proper manner of expressing, every species of trust - a trust not only as
regards those matters which are the proper subjects of an equitable
jurisdiction to administer, but as respects higher matters such as might take
place the Crown and public officers discharging, under the directions of the
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Crown, duties or functions belonging to the prerogative and to the authority
of the Crown. In the lower sense they are matters within the jurisdiction of,
and to be administered by, the Courts of Equity: in the higher sense they are
not."'
In both of the above cases the existence of a trust was denied on the grounds that
by the instruments alleged to have created the trusts, the Crown had reserved to
itself a prerogative right to decide .
A rule can be drawn from these cases . The courts will not venture to check
the operations of the Crown in matters regarding treaties, (unless of course there has
been implementation through statute), or matters within the prerogative and within
the authority of the Crown. Once rendered enforceable through statute, the courts
will exercise jurisdiction, including, should the Crown impose trust obligations upon
itself, enforcing the duties of trustee .
In Canada similar rules can be found. In Central Canadian Railway v.
The
Queen, the Exchequer Court noted
:
That the Crown may be a trustee seems clear, the only question having been
as to the mode of enforcing the trust, which, it determined, could not be
done, . . . ; but it is laid down by the highest authority that, by a Petition of
Right, a trust as well as a contract, may be enforced against the Crown ."
The procedural problems have since been eliminated by the Federal Court Act.'
In Mc.Queen v. The Queen,
the Exchequer Court commented obiter, that the Crown
could not become a trustee by implication. Mr Justice Gwynne noted
:
Her Majesty never could be placed in [the position of trustee] unless by the
express provisions of an Act of Parliament .'
The case was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada without comment on the
point.
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More recently the courts have not been so categorical. In 1934, the
Exchequer Court expanded the methods by which the Crown might become a
trustee. In Chipman v. The King, Angers J. said :
I do not think that the Crown can be placed in the position of trustee by
implication; the Crown can only be constituted trustee by express provisions
of an Act of Parliament or a contract to which the Crown is a party.
This recognizes that by the 1930's, governments were frequently contracting with the
public or with private industry . Clearly, if the government accepts a trust obligation
within such a contract, the courts would be entitled to enforce it .
The most startling of the cases must be Gardner et al. v. The Queen in Right
of Ontario in 1984. The Eagle Lake Band sought a declaration that certain
disputed lands were part of their reserve . In the alternative they argued, inter alia,
if the lands were found not to be reserve lands, that the Crown breached a trust
obligation when it took the lands. White J., found the pleadings on the point to be
wanting and struck out that part of the claim with leave to amend . In its review of
the cases on the Crown as trustee, the High Court of Justice of Ontario cited
Chipman with approval and concluded :
It is my view that the cases leave it open for the Crown to stand in the
position of trustee with regard to an asset such as the Band's reserve .
Furthermore, as I read the cases, there is no absolute requirement for the
capacity of the Crown to act as trustee to exist, that some statute or
agreement explicitly accepts on the part of the Crown that it is a trustee . In
other words, the relationship as between the Crown and the Band could arise
by implication from statute or circumstances .'
With respect, the conclusion does not appear to be supported by the review . Not
one case cited finds the Crown to be a trustee, and the most authoritative, such as
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Civilian War Claimants and Kinloch,
seem to require an expressed intent before
such a holding might be reached . It is suggested that on this point, the case tries to
accomplish too much .
It is uncontroversial, however, that it is possible for the Crown to be held to
the duties of a trustee . But it would appear that explicit acceptance of the role by
the Crown is necessary, preferably within the four corners of a statute . It may be
sufficient if the acceptance is found in the terms of a contract .
ii The Native Law Trust
Both the Constitutional provision and the legislation are ambiguous on the
trust responsibilities of the Crown. Arguably the legislation contains elements
suggestive of a true trust but never explicitly states the intention to be held to a true
trust obligation . This very much supports the argument that the origin of the trust-
like elements is the wardship .
The courts have been insistent, in the little litigation which has pursued the
issue, that the treaties and s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act
. 1867, do not create a
trust obligation in the Crown in favour of the Indians . In Attorney General for
Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario,
Canada argued that the province could be
called upon to pay the annuities owed as a result of pre-Confederation treaties
signed with certain Indians . They argued that ss
. 109 and 111 of the Constitution
Act, 1867
created a trust obligation on the part of the province to pay the annuities
out of profits realised from the surrendered lands . The sections read :
s. 109 All Lands. Mines. Minerals and Royalties
belonging to the several
2 1 1
Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick at the Union, and all
Sums then due or payable for such Lands, Mines, Minerals or Royalties
shall
belong to the several Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick, in which the same are situate or arise, subject to any Trusts
existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other than that of the Province
in the same .
s
. 111 Canada shall be liable for the Debts and Liabilities of each Province
existing at the Union."
	
(My emphasis)
The Privy Council rejected the trust argument
. There was nothing to suggest that
the Indians could bring themselves within the terms of s . 109 . Lord Watson for the
Court commented :
Their Lordships have no difficulty coming to the conclusion that, under the
treaties, the Indians obtained no right to their annuities, . . . beyond a promise
or agreement, which was nothing more than a personal promise by [the
governor of the Province of Canada], that the [Province] should pay the
annuities when they became due; that the Indians obtained no right which
gave them any interest in the territory which they surrendered, other than that
of the province; and that no duty was imposed upon the province, whether in
the nature of a trust obligation or otherwise, to apply the revenue derived
from the surrendered lands in payment of the annuities.'
In a related case, The Dominion of Canada v.
The Province of Ontario,
Canada argued that the Dominion acted as the agent or trustee of Ontario when
making treaty with the Indians in Northwestern Ontario
."' Canada sought indemnity
from Ontario for the costs of making and carrying out the treaty obligation . Lord
Loreburn commented :
[I]t seems to their Lordships that the relation of trustee and cestui que trust,
from which a right to indemnity might be derived, cannot, even in its widest
sense, be here established .
The Dominion Government were indeed, on
behalf of the Crown, guardians of the Indian interest and empowered to take
a surrender of it and to give equivalents in return . . .
. The only thing the in
regard to which the Dominion could be conceivably be thought to be trustees
for the province, namely the dealing with the Indian interest, was a thing
concerning the whole nation. In truth, the duty of the Dominion Government
was not that of trustees, but that of ministers exercising their powers and their
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discretion for the public welfare ."'
Equally, they were not an agent for Ontario . The Dominion, the Court noted, when
making the treaties, acted "with a view to great national interests" : 21 2 the expenses
were incurred "for distinct and important interests of their own
."
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His Lordship
concluded :
This is really a case in which expenditure independently incurred by one party
for good and sufficient reasons of his own has resulted in direct advantage to
another . It may be that, as a matter of fair play between the two
governments, as to which their Lordships are not called upon to express and
do not express any opinion, the province ought to be liable for some part of
the outlay. But in point of law, [there is no such obligation]
.""
So while the court recognized the existence of the wardship, they would not give it
legal significance . The statute, in this case the Constitution, covered the issue and
it had separated the right to the property from the legislative jurisdiction over it .
On the existence of trust remedies for breaches under ordinary legislation,
there also been only a limited amount of litigation, and the courts have not spoken
with the same clarity. Few cases have sought trust remedies for breach of
Indian
Act duties. Usually the remedies found within the Act itself have been sufficient
.
The cases that have been argued are equivocal on the existence of a trust. The
courts will usually find another remedy or will simply not offer a reasoned account
of the basis of the their decision. The result of this is that it is not possible to say
that there is or is not an enforceable native law trust . The most that might be said
is that there might be one .
Henry v. The King typifies the problem."' In 1905 in the Exchequer Court,
members of the Mississaugas of the Credit, sought to obtain moneys in the hands of
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the Crown
. The moneys were the proceeds from the sale of surrendered lands .
The
band also sought full payment of annuities due under a treaty made with the
Province of Canada.
The Mississaugas claimed that the money, which had apparently been paid
into the general accounts of the Dominion of Canada, was held by the government
in trust for them
. The Court agreed that in relation to Indian moneys, the Crown
was a trustee
. However, it held also, that there was no remedy against the Crown
for its breach. Burbidge J ., held:
[W]ith regard to moneys arising from the sale of lands surrendered by the
Mississaugas of the Credit, it is clear, I think, that the Crown holds them in
trust for that band of Indians . By the terms of the surrender
. . . the lands
were to be held upon the trust therein mentioned ."'
The court then referred to the relevant Act, that of the Province of Canada of 1860,
c. 151, and continued :
But it does not follow that because the Crown is a trustee for the Indians in
respect of such land or moneys, that the court has jurisdiction to enforce the
trust, or to make any declaration of the rights of the parties . . . . The Crown
. . does not in respect of Indian lands or moneys stand in the position of an
ordinary trustee . . .. Parliament alone has the authority to review the decision
come to or the action taken .""
That part of the action, consequently, failed .
For the claim for full payment of the annuities, the Band was successful
. The
Province of Canada, in agreement with the Dominion of Canada, had capitalized the
annuities and paid over the sum to the Dominion . Section 111 of the
Constitution
Act. 1867,
held the Dominion liable for the debts of the Province . It reads :
s
. 111 Canada shall be liable for the Debts and Liabilities of each Province
existing at the Union .
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Burbidge J., held :
As [the right of the Mississaugas to their annuities], rests upon a treaty or
contract between the Crown and them, and upon the [Constitution Act
. 1867],
the court has, I think, jurisdiction so to declare . . . .
The office of the court is
to define, as best it may, the rights and relations of the parties .
All other
matters arising out of the case are for the consideration of those upon whom
the rests the responsibility of advising the crown, and of inviting the co-
operation of Parliament, if it is found that such is advisable ."'
The acts of the Crown as a party to a contract are reviewable by the courts because
legislation exists which covers the issue. The acts of the Crown as trustee or ward,
by contrast, are not reviewable .
Lowry suggests that this case is decided in error because there were cases
which allowed that the Crown might be a trustee ."" It would be difficult not to agree
with his contention that the case is therefore "of little value
in relation to
enforcement of a trust"2 20 Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that Burbidge J
., was
correct in justifying his decision not to review the point by noting that no case could
be found where the Crown had been held to be a trustee ." The case is also unique
in finding that the obligation to pay the annuities is enforceable . However, it must
be remembered that while the right arises in the treaty and the long practice of the
Crown, the enforceability originates in s . 111 of the
Constitution Act. 1867.
Certainly, on the problem at hand, the case is unhelpful.
Equally unhelpful on the issue of the trust, is Miller v. The King.' There are
three claims in this case
. The first alleged breach of trust by the government of
Upper Canada in not claiming compensation for reserve land lost in 1824 to flooding
caused by the building of a canal . The second claimed another breach of trust
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resulting from expropriation without compensation of reserve lands for the same
canal in 1836
. Both these claims were denied because they were based on a right
against Upper Canada and while the Dominion of Canada had accepted liability for
the "debts and liabilities" of the Province of Canada, it had not agreed to accept any
liability for the torts of Upper Canada.
The third claim seems to have been framed as an action for breach of
contract although both Kellock and Locke JJ
., recognize the possibility of trust
liability . The Six Nations alleged that funds in the hands of the Crown realized from
the surrender of reserve lands had been improperly used to purchase shares in a
company which had eventually become insolvent . The moneys had been in the
hands of the Crown in approximately 1833 . Subsequent to that they had been used
to purchase the shares, in violation of the terms of the surrender
. It was alleged that
some of the shares had been purchased after 1840 under the jurisdiction of the
Province of Canada, thus avoiding the grounds on which the other two claims were
dismissed .
The claim was allowed to proceed. Kerwin J., based his approval on breach
of contract . Locke and Kellock JJ., as noted seem to allow the appeal on the basis
of both trust and contract
. Kellock and Kerwin allowed the claim only as it related
to purchases made after 1840 .
The broader problems which might arise if the
purchase had in fact been a breach of trust, are not adverted to
. It might be argued,
for example, that if money in the hands of Upper Canada, had been imbued with
trust obligations, then a breach by that government could result in a finding that the
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funds used to purchase the shares were not those of the Six Nations but rather those
of the government
. The trust would then follow the moneys transferred by Upper
Canada into the revenues of first the Province and then the Dominion of Canada .
Another possible argument would be that a breach occurred when the government
allowed the funds to remain in an enterprise fund which was failing. The liability
for such a breach would certainly have fallen to the Province of Canada since the
failure occurred under that government. Such implications were not addressed
. For
these reasons and for the fact that the case is concerned with the question of
jurisdiction, the case is unhelpful .
Ultimately then, we have only appearances and allegations of a true trust in
relation of Native law.
Where an allegation of trust is successful, the court has
allowed it only to find that the administration of the "trust" is unreviewable . This
is a recognition of the general unenforceable trust obligation of the Crown : the
wardship
. Only where there is legislation entrenching the wardship will the courts
enter. Or unequivocally refuse to do so
. And then with the statutory remedy . One
last example might be useful .
In Chisholm v. The King,
the widow of a lawyer attempted to obtain funds
owed to her late husband by the Six Nations .
The moneys was owed for legal
services rendered to the Six Nations who had promised to pay him out of their trust
funds. With the support of the Band, she sued the Crown
. The Department of
Mines and Resources, then responsible for Indian Affairs, refused to pay .
The court
sided with the Department. The Exchequer Court held
;
The decision of the Minister either to pay or not to pay the account is not
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reviewable by the Court'
On a second ground, that the agreement of the Six Nations was an assignment of a
portion of the Band's trust funds to the lawyer, the Court held that the Indian Act,
by denying any liability without the consent of the Minister, covered the issue .
So, it is suggested, that while the Indian Act may appear to contain elements
of the true trust, it has not been viewed as a trust instrument . Where trust-like
provisions have been justiciable, the courts have not enforced those provisions
through the use of trusts law but have confined themselves to statutory remedies .
Furthermore, it is clear that the Act as a whole reflects a much broader purpose
than simply the protection of Indian lands and moneys . It is suggested that the
Indian Act strongly supports the argument that the federal government actively took
up the wardship of the Indian nations .
iii The Enforceable Trust : The True Trust
Only three cases have found a true trust obligation owed to the First Nations
by the government . All three find the source of the trust in the Indian Act.
In 1916
in Attorney General Canada v . Giroux, Duff J., one of four judges writing in the
case, reviewing the provisions of c . 14 of the Consolidated Statutes of Lower Canada,
governing Indian lands in Lower Canada, described its provisions in these terms :
Looking at the ensemble of rights given [by the Act to the Commissioner of
Indian Lands], I can entertain no doubt that in the sum, they amount to
ownership'
The same interest would have been carried into the 1860 legislation and then into
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the federal jurisdiction at Confederation . Consequently, he finds
:
The Indian interest being, as I have pointed out, ownership, is by the terms
of the surrender a surrender to Her Majesty in trust to be dealt with in a
certain manner for the benefit of the Indians .'
This is an unequivocal statement that Indian lands in Quebec at least were held in
a true trust. The case, however is suspect .
Only five years later, the same judge writing for the Privy Council, cut out the
basis for the finding of the trust. In Attorney General for Quebec
v. Attorney
General for Canada, the Star Chrome case, Duff J
., described the Indian interest
in reserve lands in Quebec in the same terms as they had been described in the St
.
Catherine's case' Since the interest is less than ownership, then no true trust could
be created by a surrender . Duff concludes there is no trust:
It results from these considerations, in their Lordships opinion, that the effect
of the Act of 1850 is not to create an equitable estate in lands set apart for
an Indian tribe
It would appear then, that the Giroux case is either wrongly decided, or that the Act
of 1850 altered the nature of the Indian interest in their lands .
For the same
reasons, the Pavant
case is further weakened' It would appear that there is no
trust in relation to surrendered Indian lands in Quebec
.
In the second example, the 1935 case of
Dreaver v. The King," the
Exchequer Court seems to have assumed that a trust is created when a Band
surrenders reserve lands to the Crown . The case concerned the misuse of Band
funds realized from the sale of surrendered lands by the Department of Indian
Affairs
. No discussion justifying the finding of a trust relationship appears in the
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report . The Exchequer Court ordered the Crown to restore the money basing its
remedy on breach of trust. This case seems to represent the only case where a Band
has succeeded on the basis of a true trust . The decision, however, is a weak one
since the lawyers for the Crown, and the Court, do not seem to have put their mind
to argument that the relationship might not be one of trust ."'
In the history of the Supreme Court of Canada since it became the court of
last resort for Canada, the opinion Madame Justice Wilson in Guerin is unique in
laying out a principled argument supporting a finding a true trust relationship
between the government and the First Nations . For Wilson J ., the statutory scheme
governing reserve lands resulted in the creation of a trust once reserve land had
been conditionally surrendered to the Crown ." The surrender is essential to the
trust. Without that, no true trust exists . Lowry, writing in 1973, had reached the
same conclusion. He notes:
[I]t can only be assumed that it is in fact the surrender, when read with the
appropriate provisions of the Indian Act, which affect the agreement with a
trust. One may therefore reach the conclusion that it is the Indian Act which
creates the trust and not the surrender per se and it is also apparent that a
claim may be made on the basis of a contract relying only on the surrender ."
Dickson, of course, writing for the majority, disagreed with this proposition . For
Dickson, it will be remembered, the nature of the Indian interest in their lands
prevents the creation of a true trust. The relationship, though, is fiduciary and very
similar to the true trust. Given the disagreement at the Supreme Court, the point
remains undecided.
These three cases, all of which have some doubt attached to them, do indicate
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a useful point in relation to the trust obligation . That is, that if there is a true trust
relationship between the Indian Nations and the Crown, and that point is not
authoritatively decided yet, the origin of that trust is in part the Indian Act . The
significance of this is that if such is the case, then, s . 35 aside, that trust remains
subject to the will of Parliament
. If the trust were to be held to have been created
by the pre-contact relationship of the Indians to their lands or by the constitutional
arrangements then the trust would be a much powerful force . As Lowry comments :
The importance of what the Federal Government has done with regard to the
passing of the past and present Indian Act, and what it can do with regard to
Indian Acts, is directed related to whether the jurisdiction it has been
constitutionally granted created the trust relationship or the Indian legislation
created the trust. There is little doubt that the . . .
native trust cases point to
the conclusion that the Indian Act is a trust instrument and that should the
federal government desire to end its trust relationship, it could do so without
any constitutional bar."
Of course the passing of s. 35 of the Constitution Act. 1982
has in all probability
changed the ease with which the trust could be abrogated . It would not appear to
have put it beyond the reach of Parliament however .
In the law of the United States, it will be remembered, control of the trust
remains with Congress. If the trust in Canada is in fact created by, or dependent on,
the Indian Act, it too may remain subject to the will of Parliament
. If that is the
case, Guerin
may have little import in relation to the interpretation of the new
Constitution. In R. v . Sikyea, Johnson J.A
. noted in relation to treaty promises :
It is always to be kept in mind that the Indians surrendered their rights in the
territory in exchange for these promises
. This "promise and agreement" like
any other, can, of course, be breached, and there is no law of which I am
aware that would prevent Parliament, by legislation, properly within s . 91 of
the B.N.A. Act . . . from so doing.'
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The same thing might be said of a trust obligation dependent upon the
Indian Act .
One last point might be made here . Whatever the final outcome regarding
the existence or otherwise of a true trust following the surrender of reserve lands,
the majority of opinions considered support the point being pressed here . By and
large they all find the background obligation of the government to protect the
Indians relevant to the determination of the enforceable duty . This strongly supports
that it is the background duty which is the sine qua non of the Indian/Crown
relationship .
d Summary
We see three different obligations owed to the First Nations. The general
wardship, which is not enforceable except through the political process and which
underlies the dealings between the First Nations and the government . The wardship
which is entrenched into the Indian Act and is enforceable through the remedies and
powers enunciated in that Act . Finally, in s. 18(1) and perhaps in s 61(1)of the Act,
the similar provision governing Indian moneys, there is a trust-like relationship
enforced at least as a fiduciary obligation and perhaps as a true trust . The protection
offered by s . 35 of the Constitution Act. 1982, in all probability, affects all of these
.
But, it is suggested, it is the general wardship which is affected most .
The general wardship is, I suggest, a pre-requisite to the enforceable duties .
Its unenforceability should not blind one to power and importance .
Nor should its
selective and all too often devastating implementation be allowed to detract from
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its true significance. Without it, there would be no s. 18(1) and no s
. 61(1), indeed,
no aboriginal rights. In fact, the wardship informs the whole field of Indian law and
is what makes the field distinctive. Of the duty in the United States, Wilkinson has
said :
[T]he trust relationship has played a pervasive role in serving as the
philosophical basis for a number of important doctrinal advances.
I would argue at least for a similar importance in Canada .
The wardship is at the root of the constitutional arrangements and at the
heart of the Indian Act. Placing Indians and the lands reserved for Indians under
the federal jurisdiction in s . 91(24) of the Constitution Act. 1982,
has given the
federal government power over the Indians, but with that power came a duty . It is
suggested that that duty informs s. 35 of the new Constitution. The trust obligation
in Canada, unlike that in the United States, is, I suggest below, enforceable .
And
it is further suggested that Dickson's opinion in Guerin offers a principled basis for
its enforceability.
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CHAPTER 4
A SEARCHFOR COHERENCE
Unlike the Indian law of the United States, Canadian Native law has not yet
achieved the status of a coherent body of law . It was possible in 1953 for Felix
Cohen to describe Indian law in the United States as a unity. In Canada more than
thirty years later, the courts still tend to approach Native law in an ad hoc fashion.
Only a few judges have recognized the value that a consistent Native law would have
for Canadian society. Chief Justice Dickson, I would suggest, is one of those few .
He has written decisions which have given principle to treaty interpretation,' hunting
and fishing rights' and, in Guerin, has laid down a standard for the judicial review
of administrative action in relation to Indian matters .
By viewing the trust obligation as giving rise to an enforceable duty on the
part of the Crown to the Indian Nations, he has drafted a theory which can only
increase the justice which they can expect from the Canadian government . He has
at least introduced the United States' fiduciary theory of statutory interpretation in
relation to the administration of Indian matters into Canada . I explore in this
chapter how it might be possible to broaden the theory in Guerin in order that it
might fit as a basis for a theory of constitutional review.
The trust obligation, while it is central to Indian/government relations in
Canada, has not received much attention in the literature and, consequently, has
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remained a vague and uncertain doctrine . Each side has a vastly different view of
what the obligation is and what it is meant to achieve . Three groups of First
Nations described it in these terms during the patriation of the Constitution :
The elders understood that they were entering into a sacred relationship of
trust with another sovereign which would endure the passage of time and
governments .'
At the same time. the federal government was in the courts arguing in the Guerin
case that the trust obligation was not a legal duty, but was only a political one which
it was up to the government to decide if and when to implement .
It is unfortunate that the obligation has remained obscure . Its obscurity
contributes to the feelings of injustice which arise when the Indian nations see the
obligation, as they define it, breached . The courts, as we have seen have recognized
it, but rarely enforced it. When tempted to employ the trust obligation, the courts
have either found another right on which to base their remedy, or they have lost
their nerve and offered no remedy . This is perhaps precisely because there has been
so little literature on the obligation. Being uncertain as to its basis and its purpose,
the courts have left its enforcement to the legislatures . Perhaps rightly so, but in the
long run, justice has suffered .
The origin of the trust obligation is not directly the law of trusts. Its origin
is, rather, the wardship which results from the denial of sovereignty implicit in the
doctrine of Discovery, and explicit in the legislation and governmental practice which
followed. It is the wardship which finds expression in the Constitution and in
legislation such as the Indian Act . There are trust-like aspects in the codification
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of the wardship, but that is, I suggest, incidental. The protection of lands and money
and the remainder of the extensive legislative scheme of the Indian Act, I suggest,
have a common thread . That common thread is the wardship .
I have suggested three aspects to the trust obligation . I now go on to suggest
that each of these aspects has its unique purpose and its unique theoretical basis .
The wardship is designed to protect the Indians and to assist them in adjusting to the
imposition of the European way of life in North America . The true trust has as its
function, the protection of property . It has only limited application in Indian law.
The fiduciary obligation, I shall suggest, is intended to protect power, or perhaps, the
lack of it. Put another way, it is a duty which accompanies the assumption of power
by the British imperial government. Complicating the issue is the fact that there is
also a generic sense to the word trust. And in this sense also we see it in the
relationship between the Indian Nations and the government .
a A Problem of Terminology
Trust is an aspect of all social relations: personal, political or legal. We must
trust that our friends and acquaintances will deal with us more or less decently thus
enabling us to order our lives as best we might . When we are unable to reach a
mutually agreeable position privately, we must trust that the political system will be
able to arrange things so that, even though we are not in complete agreement, we
can still live together in some harmony . And we must trust that our legal institutions
will sort out the mess that results when all else has failed . Without trust our
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communities would collapse into chaos .
Essential as it is to our lives and our communities, trust remains an ill-defined
concept. It has many meanings and many uses. This in itself is not a problem .
Many words and concepts, though fundamental to our daily existence, remain
ill-defined. Democracy, for example, is capable of communicating many different
meanings, but, by and large, our democratic institutions prosper. Exact definitions
are neither always necessary nor desirable .
Many a successful relationship between persons or groups has been described
by those involved in terms of trust . And many of our relationships are defined in
terms of trust. Lack of precision only becomes a problem when the relationship
sours. Such an event might have many causes, but if and when it does occur,
disagreement as to what was the object of the trust often becomes a major source
of contention. Each party might perhaps argue that the trust relied upon required
certain conduct which was not forthcoming. The method and difficulty of solving the
resulting problems varies according to the type of trust involved .
A legal trust is a very different creature from a political trust . Trust in its
generic, or ordinary language sense, is different again. Between friends, problems
are often easily fixed. In politics they are harder to contain . Friends can talk things
out in order to resolve the disagreements caused by misunderstandings . A political
trust breached can result in people changing their vote to another person or group .
In extreme circumstances it might lead to disorders or even revolution . Legal trusts
are, perhaps, the most contentious . In legal matters it will often fall to a third party,
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the courts, to correct things .
The term trust is used rather freely in the field of native law . In this field, as
elsewhere, it is problematic because all three types occur . The government has
shouldered many responsibilities, some of which entail legal obligations and some
which carry less onerous responsibilities . Much of the confusion concerning the
obligations of the government to the Indians would not exist had those obligations
been spelled out in terms other than those of trust .
The fault is not that of the government alone, though probably it must take
the largest share of the blame. The courts are at fault also . Many of the decisions
rendered have been contradictory regarding whether the trust obligations are legal
ones or merely moral ones. While it denies that any trust created has legal force,
nevertheless, the government has consistently used the language of trusts in treaties
and in legislation . Does all this imply that the relationship is a trust relationship?
They certainly have similarities of language and content . The Associate Solicitor of
the United States Department Bureau of Indian Affairs has seen a trust in
guardian/ward relationship found by Chief Justice Marshall in the Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia in 1832,' and Worcester v. Georgia! He states :
[T]he courts have implied a trust relationship from early treaties and statutes
as early as the 1830s . The first Supreme Court decisions to expressly
formulate the trust responsibility doctrine were the two Cherokee cases .'
Is a trust relationship a trust? And if it isn't does it help to call it a trust
relationship? If we would wish to be able to state clearly where the line between
legal and non-legal obligations must lie, it is important to define terms very carefully .
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Barber, speaking of trust in its generic and political senses, has said, "Today
nearly everyone is talking about trust ."' But as he goes on to point out, they are
using the word in many different ways .' And of course, this leads to confusion.
Different types of trust carry different types of obligations or expectations . With the
legal trust the problem is similar . Mr. Justice Roxburgh in the English Court of
Chancery made the following observation about the legal trust in 1952. He said :
[A]s the principles of equity permeate the complications of modern life, the
nature and variety of trusts ever grow, and it is perhaps rash to think of some
conception of a trust having certain characteristic attributes, and then to say
that a trust which lacks one or more of those characteristic attributes is not
a trust in the full sense .'
There are, then, even within the legal world, different forms of the trust . One of the
strengths of the legal trust is its ability to change and to adapt to new circumstances .
This adaptability is important and worth preserving . On the one hand, clear
and complete definitions can help to clarify. On the other, they can be artificial and
restricting. Speaking of the legal trust Pettitt has said :
It is commonly said that no one has succeeded in producing a wholly
satisfactory definition of a trust, although the general idea is not difficult to
grasp."
We might then, aim to come close to a complete definition as long as we recognize
that we should not restrict the subject by the definition itself .
Trust can be said to range through a spectrum which contains many meanings .
I have suggested three of relevance in the field of native law . Informing the
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discussion is the ordinary language meaning which, following Barber, I have termed
its generic sense . At the other end of the spectrum, it has a legal sense . In its legal
sense it is an artificial device which is comparatively easy to describe . In between
these two there is the fiduciary obligation described by Dickson J . in Guerin. 11
Finally there is a political sense . This refers to the acts or promises of politicians
or legislatures confirming that a certain course of action will be followed . It is a
promise which cannot be given in such a way as to bind future legislatures but it
might, nevertheless, give rise to legal obligations binding for the present upon future
governments. In its political sense, trust fills the spectrum between the generic and
legal trusts. The trust obligation in Native law contains elements of all these
varieties. It is this fact that makes the Native law trust so problematic .
i . Trusts in the Generic Sense
Niklas Luhmann has said of trust :
Trust, in the broadest sense of confidence in one's expectations, is a basic fact
of social life. In many situations, of course, man can choose in certain
respects whether or not to bestow trust . But a complete absence of trust
would prevent him even from getting up in the morning. He would be prey
to a vague sense of dread, to paralysing fears. He would not even be capable
of formulating definite distrust and making that a basis for precautionary
measures, since this would presuppose trust in other directions . Anything and
everything would be possible . Such abrupt confrontation with the complexity
of the world at its most extreme is beyond human endurance . 12
Trust in its most general sense is merely the belief that things will continue
develop more or less in the way that one expects .
Barber agrees with this . He has commented :
In its most general sense, trust means the expectations, which all humans in
or
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society internalize, that the natural order - both physical and biological - and
the moral social order will persist and be more or less realized ."
Barber has also argued that there are two more specific meanings . Of these other
meanings he says :
[T]here are two more specific kinds of expectations that are meant when we
speak of trust. One is the expectation of technically competent performance
and the other is the expectation of fiduciary obligation and responsibility .
These two kinds of trust are indispensable for the maintenance of social order
and for the construction of relatively orderly social change . As individuals
deal with one another, with organizations, and with institutions, and when
organizations and institutions deal with one another, they count on both
technically competent performance and on direct moral responsibility for their
welfare ."
Of the first of these, Barber gives as an example the expectation that a doctor will
perform an operation in an acceptable manner ." Of the second he says :
Trust as fiduciary obligation goes beyond technically competent performance
to the moral dimension of interaction. Technically competent performance
can be monitored insofar as it is based on shared knowledge and expertise .
But when some parties to a social relationship or some members of a social
system cannot comprehend that expertise, performance can be controlled by
trust. A fiduciary obligation is placed on the holder and user of the special
knowledge and skill with regard to other members of his social system . Trust
of this kind, then, is a social mechanism that makes possible the effective and
just use of the power that knowledge and position give and forestalls the
abuses of that power . Society usually seeks to instill the moral sense of
fiduciary responsibility in those who wield power, whether they be parents,
government officials, . . . or professionals ."
Put this way it is easy to see how necessary trust is in our daily lives . And, of
course, hcw important it would have been to the First Nations in the early days of
European domination.
It is clear that the First Nations were urged to place great trust in the Crown
and its intermediaries . From the Instructions to the Governors, through the Royal
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Proclamation, through legislation and statements of government policy, the First
Nations have been encouraged to rely upon the good faith of the Crown . It is clear
that they recognized that they faced an uncertain future . Faced with the arrival of
the European with a new economy driven by new technology, together with the
destruction of the traditional and the fur-trade based economies, must have left the
leaders with a "vague sense of dread". They must have recognized that the
newcomers had within their grasp, the power either to assist or destroy them . Given
the constant proclamations of the good intent, is it any wonder that the First Nations
did place their faith in the Crown?
Trust was an essential part of their survival . Indeed, it is fundamental to the
functioning of the world in which we all live . Democracy itself requires it .
Democracy is founded on the delegation to politicians and to the legislature of the
power to run the institutions necessary to our society ." Without trust, in particularly
the Barber's second sense, we would not create that power in the people who run
society. Barber notes :
[T]he granting of trust makes powerful social control possible . On the other
side, the acceptance and fulfilment of this trust forestalls abuses by those to
whom power is granted. Although trust is only one instrument or mechanism
of social control, it is an omnipresent and important one in all social systems ."
(emphasis in the original)
How that control is effected depends upon the type of trust and the social context
in which it is granted. In the legal trust we see a particular instrument of control :
the courts .
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iiTrusts in the Legal Sense : The True Trust
The legal trust is probably the easiest to describe but the most difficult to
define. In the words of Aristotle, "The law speaks generally ."' That general rule has
many exceptions. It is possible to describe the many different relationships that have
been defined as trusts . That, however, would be lengthy and not very helpful. A
general definition describing the essential elements is more useful . Pettitt's, based
on Underhill's, is, probably, the best :
A trust is an equitable obligation, binding a person (who is called a trustee)
to deal with property over which he has control (which is called the trust
property) either for the benefit of persons (who are called the beneficiaries
or cestuis que trust) of whom he may himself be one, and any of whom may
enforce the obligation, or for a charitable purpose, which may be enforced by
the Attorney General, or for some other purpose permitted by law though
unenforceable .'
	
(authorities and emphasis omitted)
The trust is directly focused on the protection of property . It is not, and cannot, be
directed at protecting an Indian right to self-government or even justice in relation
to education or other social services . The courts, we have seen, when they have
mooted the possibility of the existence of the true trust, have done so only in relation
to Indian lands and Indian moneys. I have suggested that, because of its
technicalities, it is not the most appropriate legal concept for Native law .
A valid trust requires a settlor, a beneficiary or beneficiaries, a trust corpus,
words of settlement,. certainty of object and certainty of obligation . These technical
requirements are important . The implications in a true trust relationship have
caused the courts to lay down stringent prerequisites to the finding of a true trust ."
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The settlor, the person who creates the trust, must have the capacity to deal
with the subject matter of the trust.' An infant for example cannot create a trust
for land since an infant cannot hold a legal estate in land . Similarly, the
beneficiaries must have the legal capacity to hold the particular interest he has under
the terms of the trust. These requirements place significant problems in the way
of the true trust. Clearly the Indians and the government have the requisite capacity
to hold their respective interests. However, it is no easy task to determine who the
settlor is under a Native law trust . In the case of Indian Act reserve lands, the
settlor would presumably be the federal government and the creation of the trust
would be found in the setting apart . But in the case of a trust arising out of the
treaty process, one can only assume that the settlor would have to be the First
Nations themselves .
The three certainties are also necessary for a valid trust .' Pettitt cites the
judgment of Lord Langdale in Knight v. Knight' as first setting out this proposition .'
There must be certainty of intention . That is to say that the intention of the settlor
to create a trust must be clear in the instrument creating it . There is no need for
the words creating a trust to take any particular form. As Pettitt notes :
It is a case in every case of construction of the words used to ascertain
whether they (together with any admissible extrinsic evidence) establish an
intention to create a trust'
	
(footnotes omitted)
While the words "in trust" or "for the benefit of' are not necessary to create a trust,
neither does their presence necessarily create a trust.
This particular point has great relevance in the field of native law . LeDain's
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decision in Guerin at the Court of Appeal turns on the lack, in his eyes, of an
unequivocal intent to create a trust .' It is not an unreasonable position . A legal
trust is enforceable through the courts . With both political and generic forms of
trust, the enforcement must be through much weaker mechanisms . Where the line
is drawn between legal and extra-legal trusts is of vital importance to the aboriginal
inhabitants of this country . The closing words of ss. 18 and 61 of the Indian Act, the
provisions dealing with Indian lands and moneys respectively, suggest that Parliament
intended to retain for itself the decision making power in these particular areas .
The closing words read :
[T]he Governor in Council may determine whether any purpose for which
lands in a reserve (s.61: Indian moneys) are used or are to be used is for the
use and benefit of the band 31
And it is only in relation to the issues of land and money, that a true trust would
appear even to be possible .
The second certainty is that of object . This requires that, where the trust is
not a charitable one, 32 the beneficiary or class of beneficiaries must be
ascertainable .' It would appear that the aboriginal people are ascertainable .
Certainly, as regards the status Indians, there can be no argument that the class is
easily ascertainable, although the problem of protection of future beneficiaries
should not be minimized.' Ascertainment might be more difficult in the case of
non-status Indians or the Metis, but this difficulty, it is hoped, should not cause a
trust, if there were one, to fail
The third certainty is that of subject . Glanville Williams has noted that this
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might refer to certainty of subject matter of the trust or to certainty as to the nature
of the beneficial interests of the beneficiary .' Both of these would raise problems
for a native trust . Only if the subject of the trust were the full property right in
reserve lands could these problems be avoided .
The nature of the Indian interest in land remains uncertain . It was this that
caused Dickson to hold in Guerin that no true trust was possible . Halsbury says of
the trust res :
Any property or interest in property which a person can, at law or in equity,
transfer or assign, or dispose of inter vivos or by testamentary instrument, can
be affected by him with a trust by an instrument inter vivos or by a
testamentary instrument .'
	
(authorities omitted)
The surrender document in Guerin appears to suggest that the interest surrendered
to be the land . The treaties also seem to surrender a full property interest in land
but this has been refuted.' And we have seen that the Indian interest is not capable
of any transfer or assignment . It is an interest which "disappears in the process of
release".' Pettitt has commented :
Where the trust property cannot be clearly identified, the purported trust is
altogether void .'
The Indian interest as it has been recognized is far from clear . It would, therefore,
be difficult for it to form the subject of a trust .
Even if the subject matter of the trust were held, as did Wilson J . in Guerin,
to be the whole estate in the land, the nature of the beneficial interest of the Indian
people in the trust would remain equally difficult to determine with any certainty .
The instrument in Guerin" for example provides only that the reserve land was
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surrendered to Her Majesty, "in trust to lease . .. upon such terms as the Government
may deem most conducive to Our Welfare." The band's interest as beneficiary is not
easily or clearly identifiable from this description . Only when the subject of the trust
is viewed as the money resulting from the subsequent leasing can the trust be
considered to have certainty of subject .
Where the trust res is land or money it is possible to get around the
vagueness of the Indian interest as Wilson does in Guerin . But there are,
potentially, other less proprietary purposes for which the trust might have been
established. These are, admittedly, controversial. It has been posited, for example,
that the trust purpose is to preserve self-government 42 and the distinct cultural and,
even national identity .' Certainly the setting aside of reserves is intimately
connected with such issues, as is the signing of treaties . And the land right, rooted
as it is in the pre-contact relationship of the Indians with the land, is, without
question, coloured by them.
Certainly the First Nations see the preservation of national identity as a major
purpose of the trust obligation. And I have proposed that the trust obligation
suggests a broader scope than merely the protection of land . How could one
characterize such an interest so as to make the beneficial interest of the Indians
certain? The blocks which could be set in the way of such an interest, and even in
defining it, are insurmountable . Wilson's avoidance of the problem of the nature of
the Indian interest is logical. It would, however, limit the nature of the Indian
interest to only property rights in land or money . This, I would suggest, would not
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reflect the Indian view of the trust obligation.
All in all, the technicalities which surround the true trust make it an unwieldy
tool for the protection of Indian interests. Its strengths over the fiduciary obligation
for the protection of Indian interests in land and money are remedial . Trusts which
have been breached through fraud, do not come within limitations statutes . This
would be considerable benefit for the First Nations when seeking to protect their
lands. It remains uncertain whether, should the court finally adopt the true trust for
Indian lands and moneys, the land would be better protected .44
One should, perhaps, note a group of trusts, to which Pettitt refers in his
definition above,' which are known as "unenforceable trusts ."' These are trusts such
as those for the erection of monuments, for the saying of masses(if they are not
charitable), for the maintenance or benefit of animals, and certain other anomalous
cases." Known also as "trusts of imperfect obligation," they are can only be enforced
indirectly by a court obtaining an undertaking from the trustee that he will apply the
res to the unenforceable purpose . 48 The Henry case might seem to suggest that the
Native law trust should be brought within this category .' Certainly, the Native law
trust obligation has been unenforceable . It has been suggested, however, that it is
preferable to view the Native law trust as a wardship . Should the Native law trust
be held to fit within the category of unenforceable trusts it would be weakened
beyond its present state. And the entrenchment of rights in s . 35 of the Constitution
Act. 1982 would make no difference . Fortunately, no court has ever suggested that
the Native law trust is within this category .
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The obligations of the trustee vis a vis the trust corpus present further reasons
for rejecting the true trust as a model for the Native law trust . Pettit states that the
trustee must deal with the property for the benefit of the cestuis que trust .-"o But the
relationship between the Indians and the government was not established as it is for
the benefit of the Indians alone . It was, as the Privy Council has suggested, for the
benefit of all Canada." And it seems clear that the government did not intend to
bind its hands in relation to its legislative power over "Indians and the Lands
reserved for Indians", even if that were possible . The "trust" was for the purpose of
protecting Indian lands, not from the Crown, but from the settlers, the government
of the colonies, and, after 1867, the provincial governments . The provisions were
designed to pursue national aims, not just Indian ones, and to prevent the alienation
of Indian lands outside of the national policy .
It is also the duty of a trustee to avoid self-dealing . It was clearly never
within the intentions of the federal government that they should not be able to
alienate Indian lands to themselves . Their duties to the Canadian polity as a whole
would prevent them from placing such a restriction upon themselves . And indeed,
the government has taken Indian lands for its own purposes ."
We have seen how the courts resile from finding an enforceable trust in
Indian law even when they have mooted it . We have also passed rather cursorily
over some of the technical difficulties which stand in the way of the trust . It is
suggested that for all these reasons, the trust is not the appropriate legal device for
structuring the relationship between the Indians and the government . The trust in
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Native law, it is suggested, is a political, rather than a true trust .
iii Trust in the Political Sense
Mr. Justice Rand, described the obligations of the government to the Indians
as a "political trust of the highest obligation" .' Political obligations have often been
described in terms of trust.' What distinguishes the legal trust from its generic and
political counterparts is the remedies available and its enforceability through the
courts. Haisbury, for example, contains the following on the distinction between
political and legal trusts :
Ministers of the Crown often administer property for the benefit of others in
the exercise of the Crown's governmental functions . No trust arises in such
a case. If a person carrying out a public statutory duty is in breach of that
duty, there is no remedy in breach of trust or equitable account . There are,
instead, remedies of judicial review, declaration, injunction and recovery of
money if wrongly demanded and paid .'
	
(authorities omitted)
The remedies available for a breach of a political trust are more limited than are
those available for breach of the legal trust .
There are two extremes of political trust which form the limits of the range
of trust in its political sense . At one end is the normal obligation of a politician to
his constituency . At its most trivial this could include the promises made by
politicians during election campaigns . It would take a more serious form if included
in a speech from the throne as part of a program of action for a parliamentary
session. Both of these obligations, though founded upon trust, would not be
enforceable. They are simply forms of generic trust . The other end of the spectrum
consists of those obligations owed by the government or its officers under statute or,
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perhaps, executive instrument which are legally enforceable . In between these
extremes are many other species of trust in its political sense. Some give rise to
legal obligations while others do not .
a Government as Trust
Interestingly, the characterization of the obligations of the government as a
trust corresponds with the colonisation of North America . In 1689 Locke made what
is the probably the definitive statement on democratic government as trust .' Locke
saw the democratic form of society as having been created by each individual giving
up part of his absolute sovereignty over himself in order to live amongst others in
harmony under a government of laws and not under the tyrannical rule of a despot .
The delegated sovereignty was given over to elected representatives who were bound
to use the power in the interests of all those who had delivered up that power to
them. The law was to check the exercise of the power .
The law making power, exercised by the legislature was not to be absolute .
He notes:
Though the legislature . . . be the supreme power . . . it is not, nor can possibly
be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people . . . . Secondly,
the legislature, or supreme authority, cannot assume to itself a power to rule
by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice . . . . Thirdly
the supreme power cannot take from any man part of his property without his
consent'
For Locke, the relationship created by the delegation of power was a fiduciary one .
He states :
The power of assembly and dismissing the legislature, placed in the executive
a superiority over it, but it is a fiduciary trust placed in him, for the safety of
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the people in a case where the uncertainty and variableness of human affairs
could not bear a steady fixed rule . . . . [The executive is one] whose business
is to watch over the public good
Control of the executive, he concludes, rests in the public : the group who delegated
aspects of their sovereignty to the legislature . He says :
Who shall be the judge whether the prince or the legislature act contrary to
their trust? This [question], perhaps, ill-affected or factitious men may spread
amongst the people when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative .
To this I reply : The people shall be judge; for who shall be the judge
whether the trustee or deputy acts well and according to the trust reposed in
him, but he who deputes him, and must, having deputed him, have still the
power to discard him when he fails in his trust?'
The power to govern for Locke is without doubt a trust . He is not alone in this .
If governmental obligations take the form of a trust it is clear that some of
those obligations are legally enforceable and some are not . The difficulty is where
we are to draw the line between those that will be enforceable and those which will
not. Clearly the trust in Locke's sense is not legally enforceable . Also, it would
probably be unworkable to give legal effect to election campaign promises . But
given that modern governments now play such an active role in day to day affairs of
the nation, running businesses and making contracts etc, some of its agreements must
be seen to give rise to legal obligations .
One example of a trust which was not legally enforceable can be illustrated
by a comment of Mr. Justice Ivan Rand. Before patriation of the Constitution in
1982, legislation amending the British North America Act could only be passed in
Great Britain. It had become the norm for the British Parliament to do so only in
response to a request from Canada . While the British retained the legislative
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jurisdiction over constitutional change in Canada, in practice the power had been
lost. And one can assume that had the British Parliament attempted to alter the
Canadian constitution unilaterally, that Canada would not have acquiesced.
Discussing this state of affairs he commented :
[T]he British Parliament has become a bare legislative trustee for the
Dominion.'
The British Parliament, one might say, was possessed of a power which it was under
a legally unenforceable duty to legislate for Canada, only as instructed by Canada .
It has been the case, we have seen, that certain promises made to the First
Nations have been unenforceable through the courts . It is clear that to some extent
the Native law is a trust in the Lockean sense. Clearly the First Nations accepted
that the Canadian government and its predecessors would assist them in the
transition from their traditional to the modern economy . An important difference,
however, is their relative weakness in the democratic process . They were not
granted full rights to vote until 1961, by which time they had become a very small
minority dispersed across the nation . When they were in the majority they were
denied the right to vote. It can be seen that the First Nations have been denied
the power to affect governmental actions in the normal democratic fashion .
Therefore Locke's theory of democracy would accentuate the positive duties of the
Crown.
The trust obligation has always been acknowledged to place the Indian
nations in a unique position. It is a greater obligation than that owed to the general
Canadian population. Locke's theory, it is suggested, is a useful one for developing
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a theory governing the Constitutional rights of the aboriginal peoples.
b Fiduciary Duties Implied into Statutes
A second type of political trust, that found in Halsbury's definition, is
concerned with the obligations of governments or their officers under statute or
statutory instrument. As we have noted, some of these obligations give rise to legal
rights. Others raise only moral issues . The aboriginal peoples of North America are
much affected by this distinction . In Canada, for example, the status of the treaties
is one issue that comes squarely up against this dichotomy . International treaties in
Canadian law are enforceable only if implementing legislation has been passed ."
Indian treaties, which have been held not to be treaties in the International law
sense, are equally unenforceable before implementation .' It follows, then, that any
broader or general trust obligation contained within the terms of a treaty and which
finds its origin in matters relating to changes in sovereignty, must be the subject of
implementing legislation before it can attract legal remedies .
Where obligations binding in law on governmental officers are written into
law, the actions of those officers can be checked in the courts . The normal rules of
judicial review will apply and the possible remedies include mandamus, certiorari,
and injunctions. Where remedies have been written into statute, those remedies may
have to be exhausted before other review is possible . The trust obligation to the
Indians in as much as it is written into statute, comes within such rules .
Consequently, litigation relating to provisions of the Indian Act concerning, for
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example, elections and registration, is not framed in terms of the trust obligation
but rather in terms of judicial review of administration . Dickson's opinion in
Guerin is certainly at least a theory for judicial review . This second type of political
trust would appear to be fertile ground for rooting the obligations to the First
Nations .
The courts, as we have seen in the Crown as trustee cases, are reluctant to
expand the remedies. This is because of the danger of entering into the realm of
politics. Nevertheless, there are cases where the courts have implied fiduciary duties
into statutes . The remedies sought in these cases have often not been trust
remedies. In a British case where a government department had signed a lease
using the words "in trust" the lessor sought to enforce the lease . Lord Diplock
denied the existence of a true trust but did allow that the relation might be a
fiduciary one . He said:
[T]he use of the expression "in trust" to describe the capacity in which the
property is granted to an officer of state is not conclusive that a trust in
private law was intended ; for "trust" is not a term of art in public law and
when used in relation to matters which lie in the field of public law the words
"in trust" may do no more than indicate the existence of a duty owed to the
Crown by the officer of state, as servant of the Crown . to deal with the
property for the benefit of the subject for whom it is expressed to be held in
trust, such duty being enforceable administratively by disciplinary sanctions
and not otherwise'
	
(my emphasis)
The remedies are those of judicial review.
In many of these cases, the action of the courts borders on an intrusion into
the role of policy making, a role which is generally thought of as legislative rather
than judicial. This of course is very relevant to the issue at hand here . A theory of
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constitutional review which is only a thinly disguised substitution of the court's view
for that of the legislature is no theory of constitutional review at all . A series of
British cases are a useful illustration of the difficulties and dangers of a public law
fiduciary obligation. The cases allow ratepayers to follow their interest in the rates
paid into the hands of the local authorities . The uncertainty of the line separating
legitimate judicial decision making from judicial intervention into the realm of
politics, is apparent, as is the desire of the courts to justify their actions as the
adjudication of justiciable issues . The dangers of a fiduciary duty unanchored by
sound and principled theory are well demonstrated in these cases .
In 1925, in Roberts v. Hopwood, the House of Lords suggested that the
relationship between a local authority and its ratepayers was fiduciary .' The Council
had refused to lower wages during difficult economic times and had also instituted
a program of equal pay for women . Roberts sought an order of mandamus forcing
the Council to lower the wages . Issuing the mandamus, Lord Atkinson relied upon
an implied fiduciary obligation of the local council to their ratepayers and stated :
A body charged with the administration for definite purposes of funds
contributed in whole or in part by persons other than the members of that
body owes, in my view, a duty to those latter persons to conduct that
administration in a fairly businesslike manner with reasonable care, skill and
caution, and with a due and alert regard to the interests of those contributors
who are not members of the body. Towards these latter persons the body
stands somewhat in the position of trustees of managers of the property of
others.'
The duty was discussed further in 1930 . In A.G. v . Guardians of the Poor
Law of Tynemouth, a group of ratepayers sought an injunction preventing the
defendant from forgiving loans made to the wives of miners who, at the time of the
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loans, had been engaged in a long strike .' Four years after the loans were made,
the defendants, a part of the local government structure, proposed to forgive the
remainder of loans. The Court found that to forgive the loans was either ultra vires
or a poor exercise of discretion in that only the interests of the debtors were
considered and that the individual capacity of each debtor to pay was ignored . The
Court stated :
It cannot be overlooked that they [the defendants] stand in a position of a
fiduciary nature towards those whose monies will ultimately be utilised for
meeting their commitments'
The Court granted an injunction .
In 1954 in Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation, another case initiated by a
ratepayer, the Court of Appeal issued an injunction to prevent the city council from
instituting a free bus pass system for old age pensioners .' The Court held :
Local authorities are not, of course, trustees for their ratepayers, but they do,
we think, owe an analogous duty to their ratepayers in relation to the
application of funds contributed by the latter . . .. [They are not entitled] to
make a gift to a particular class of persons . . . on benevolent or philanthropic
grounds. . . . In the absence of clear statutory authority for such a proceeding,
we would for our part regard it as illegal on the ground that, to put the
matter bluntly, it would amount simply to making a gift or present in money's
worth to a particular section of the local community at the expense of the
general body of ratepayers ."
The court implied into the statute, a duty to run the bus service "in accordance with
ordinary business principles" . 72 What the court is attempting in these cases is to force
the authorities to balance the interests of the various sectors of the community
served .
In 1982, the principle was again invoked, this time by a Borough Council
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against the umbrella Greater London Council . In Bromley v. Greater London
Council, the Bromley Council wished to prevent the G .L.C. from implementing a
subsidy designed to enable the London Transport Executive to offer cheap fares .'
Under the governing Act, the G.L.C. had a duty to "develop policies and encourage
and organise and, where appropriate, carry out measures which will promote the
provision of integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities" .' The services,
to be delivered by the London Transport Executive, were to be provided with "due
regard to efficiency, economy and safety of operation" .5 One of the effects of the
scheme, which was to be implemented against the wishes of the national government,
would be to lose a £50 million grant from the national government . In a decision
which is difficult to summarize since five opinions were handed down at the House
of Lords, the court held the scheme to be invalid .
The decision is based on the same general duty to run the undertaking on
sound business principles as had been found in the cases above .' Two breaches
were discovered. Loughlin has called the first "abuse of power" ." The G.L.C. had
just been elected after a campaign in which they had pledged to lower fares . In the
Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Oliver stated :
[T]he rigid adoption of a policy simply as a matter of political commitment
to a section of the local government electorate and without regard to the
purpose for which the statutory powers are given by itself demonstrates a
breach of fiduciary duty.'
The second ground, Loughlin calls "excess of power" .' When determining the
reduction the G .L.C. had failed to consider the loss of the grant . This also
constituted a breach of duty :
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[T]he G.L.C.'s decision was not simply about allocating a total financial
burden between the passengers and the rate payers, it was also a decision to
increase that total burden so as nearly to double it and to place the whole of
the increase on the ratepayers. . . . [T]he whole of the extra £50 million was
to be recovered from the ratepayers . That would, in my view, clearly be a
thriftless use of moneys obtained by the G.L.C. from the ratepayers and a
deliberate failure to employ to the best advantage the full financial resources
available to it by avoiding any action that would involve forfeiting any grants
from central government funds . It was thus a breach of fiduciary duty owed
by the G.LC. to the ratepayers.'
Although the courts have couched their intervention in the principles of private law,
it can be seen that they are dangerously close to being driven by political
considerations rather legal ones .
Loughlin has commented :
Expenditure decisions and rate burdens are issues for which the political
process provides the most appropriate mechanism for accountability: they are
the very stuff of local politics . It seems illegitimate that the courts should be
able, in the guise of some notion of fiduciary duty of local authorities to their
ratepayers, to pre-empt political decision-making in this way ."
Loughlin's concern is in part based on the fact that the court created the fiduciary
obligation out of whole cloth rather than a close reading of the provisions of the
statutory provisions defining the duties of the local governments .
Loughlin's criticism is that the courts did not properly found their fiduciary
principle in the statute at hand. Rather they took a principle from an earlier case,
relating to a different set of statutory powers and took it to be a general rule of law,
ignoring the fact that the legislation governing local authorities had changed in the
intervening years .' In addition, the balancing to the interests between ratepayers
and other groups, whether bus passengers or debtors, if granted to the local
authority, is more properly a role for a legislative body. He comments :
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[I]t is submitted that the question of determining the proper balance between
ratepayers and beneficiaries in the absence of discrimination is for the local
authority to determine. The reason is that the courts are institutionally
incapable of dealing with the issues which arise and that the appropriate route
for persons aggrieved by the local authority's actions lies through the political
process
The courts may have reached a similar conclusion . Actions against local
authorities based on the fiduciary principle have been rejected in a number of cases
since Bromley. In Pickwell v. Camden, the Camden Authority settled a strike by
service workers by raising wages' The local auditor asked the court for a
declaration that the Council had breached its fiduciary duty in granting raises that
were excessive. Ormrod L.J. warned :
[T]here is a growing tendency to treat particular expressions, used by judges,
taken out of context, as if they were propositions of law in themselves .'
After an analysis of the relevant statute, Ormrod L.J. rejected the fiduciary
argument. Substantial revision of the related statutes, greatly limiting the powers of
the local authorities have virtually eliminated the need for the fiduciary cause of
action in this area of municipal law.
The doubtful legitimacy of the principle in these cases demonstrates the need
for vigilance when implying fiduciary obligations into a statute . The ease with which
the courts can cross the line separating the supervision of responsible spending from
the determination of social policy, should give us pause . Discussing the Roberts
decision, Branson commented :
[T]he judges altered the law in a way never contemplated by Parliament . . . .
They had in short filched the power of policy-making from elected
representatives and placed it in the hands of non-elected officials and judges .'
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The lesson to be learned, it is suggested, is that the principle, if not firmly anchored
in some substantive right, can be a dangerous one . A second lesson, more important
in my estimation, is the importance that these cases demonstrate of a need for a
clear understanding of the policy that the fiduciary obligation is intended to promote .
Although judicial intervention on this scale has not been seen Canadian
municipal law, public officers have also been held to owe implied fiduciary
obligations in Canada. In City of Toronto v. Bowes, an 1858 case concerning a
secret profit made by the Mayor, the Privy Council commented :
He may not have been agent or trustee within the common meaning or
popular acceptance of that term, but he was so substantially ; he was within
reach of every principle of civil jurisprudence, adopted for the purpose of
securing, as far as possible, the fidelity of those who are entrusted with the
power of acting in the affairs of others .'
And in 1907, in Mcllreith v. Hart, an action alleging breach of fiduciary duty in
paying the expenses the mayor incurred attending a convention on municipal affairs,
the Supreme Court of Canada went even further. The legislation at the time did
not allow the payment of such expenses . The Court held :
The right of the inhabitants to compel city corporation, that is the city council
as a body, to do its duty, rests on this: That the corporation is a trustee for
the inhabitants . . . . The city corporation is composed of all the inhabitants
and not merely the ratepayers. . . . Whether inhabitants or not, all the
ratepayers are also cestui que trustent.
While a later case has resiled from this somewhat, 90 the principle would appear to
be still vibrant since in 1979, in Hawreluk v. City of Edmonton in 1975, while no
breach of fiduciary duty was found, the Supreme Court of Canada nevertheless
accepted the applicability of the principle 9'
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It would appear that a fiduciary duty is owed by some public officers. Ellis
has suggested otherwise :
Absent statutory remedies of the Municipalities Act, there would appear to
be no fiduciary duty operative in favour of the municipality's inhabitants ."
The conclusion seems somewhat categorical to this writer. It may not have the reach
that the British duty has had, but the duty has not been denied by the highest court .
Shepherd asserts the existence of such a duty :
We suggest that it is now quite apparent that at least some public officials are
fixed with fiduciary duties ."
And Finn also has compared the duties of public officers with the fiduciary :
A striking feature of the fiduciary is the close resemblance he bears to the
public ministerial officer who, while entrusted with duties and discretions by
statute and statutory instrument, discharges those duties and exercises those
powers in the interests of the public . This resemblance is not an
inconsequential one . . . . [T]he actual obligation imposed on a fiduciary in
the exercise of his discretions mirror to a large degree the obligations
imposed on the public officer in exercising his
And ultimately, even Ellis sees a place for continued application of the duty .
Responding to a case in which the statutory duties of a councillor were narrowly
construed because of the quasi-penal nature of the provisions at issue, 95 Ellis
comments:
It is hoped that the [narrowness of vision necessary in relation to the quasi-
penal statutes] is reserved for the interpretation of statutes while the
underlying premise of fiduciary status [for elected officials] should be (and is)
allowed a separate life independent of statute and statutory interpretation
It would appear, then, even with its dangers, the fiduciary principle as a check on
governmental officers is good Canadian law which finds support amongst the
commentators.
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This body of law is interesting because in Guerin, Dickson finds a very similar
duty owed to the Indians by the officers of the Department of Indian Affairs . The
duty in Guerin is not unanchored . as is the one above because the trust obligation
owed to the Indians is so well documented in the history of Indian/government
affairs. By contrast, the "sound business principles" test is not evident in the British
legislation. The fiduciary principle is, at first glance at least, an attractive one for
defining the duties of the government to the Indians .
iv Summary
The language and concepts of the trust have been seen to be relevant to the
obligations of the government to the Indians . The true trust is not applicable in a
general theory for Indian law. The relationship of the Indians to the Canadian
governments is rooted in a generic trust placed in the Crown by the First Nations
faced by an uncertain future. I suggest that aspects of that relationship have been
altered through the intervening years . Some of the promises have been passed into
legislation, others have been implemented through policy initiatives of the
Department of Indian Affairs and other governmental agencies . Some may have
become enforceable simply by having been relied upon .'
Locke suggests that a political relationship might be considered a fiduciary
one . The relationship between the Crown and the First Nations, traditionally
described as a trust relationship, would appear to be one well suited to Locke's
model. He emphasises the duties of the government to its subjects . Locke suggested
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that enforcement of the political trust should be through the political process, but
for the First Nations that may no longer be possible . They numbers are such that
they are unlikely to have sufficient power to greatly affect the course of the
government. The fiduciary model might provide a better model for the control of
the obligation owed by the Crown to the First Nations .
Fiduciary law has been shown to be of value in controlling some
governmental obligations, and although it is not without dangers, it would appear to
be a useful body of law for the Native law trust obligation . Both Wilson and
Dickson have recognized this. I wish now to suggest how one might go further .
The object pursued by the fiduciary obligation in any situation, as well as the
circumstances amounting to breach, would, of course, rely on the particular facts and
the relevant law!' It is important that the duty be well founded in law . The dangers
of an unanchored duty have been illustrated . A fiduciary obligation owed by the
government to the Indians invites the same dangers of judicial intervention, or non-
intervention as we have seen in the British municipal law cases .
In Guerin, both Dickson C .J ., and Wilson J ., attach their respective duties to
the facts and law surrounding the land interest . The provisions of the Indian Act
and the Indian interest in the land, allow the court to interpret the discretionary
power in light of the protective role of the Crown and guide the exercise by of the
court of its supervisory role . The legal principle which ties the facts and the law
together, is the fiduciary principle . In Guerin, the resulting duty is aimed at the
protection of a property interest recognized by the Indian Act . As long as the
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reasoning is guided by the legal and factual framework, and as long as the purpose
of the duty is kept firmly in mind, the danger of excessive judicial activism is
minimized .
There is a lesson here. The unanchored fiduciary obligation can be wayward .
Therefore, if one wishes to expand the fiduciary duty recognized in Guerin, as is my
intent here, to relate to such issues as the right to cultural survival or self-
government, it must also be firmly anchored. That, it is suggested, is accomplished
in Guerin by the delineation of the five part scheme . One needs a legislative
scheme which invites the court's supervision, a recognition of the interest which is
at the heart of the controversy to be litigated, a triggering event which gives rise to
a duty, and one needs a purpose or object which the courts might legitimately
pursue. Finally, a connecting principle is needed .
I propose a broader obligation defined by five similar and analogous
elements, and which is firmly rooted in Canadian Native law and history . It is clear
that the Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35 invites the supervision of governmental action
by the courts . The interest in land remains as an important right to be protected .
Further than that, it is suggested that protection of the land interest is an aspect of
the trust obligation. We have seen that the trust obligation provides a "philosophical
basis" to the whole of Indian law . In addition, I have suggested above that the
Indian Act can be viewed as legislation implementing aspects of the trust obligation .
As evidence for this, the words of Mr . Justice Rand, bear repeating :
The language of the [Indian Act] embodies the accepted view that these
aborigines are, in effect, wards of the state, whose care and welfare are a
political trust of the highest obligation . For that reason, every such dealing
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with their privileges must bear the imprint of government approval
The treaties as well as some constitutional arrangements may also constitute
recognition of the trust obligation . There may be in this, a recognition of interests
beyond the proprietary interest in land . And if that argument is good, it follows that
the event which gives rise to the fiduciary duty is not the surrender of Indian land,
but rather the denial of Indian sovereignty . And further, that purpose may be more
than just protection and may include also some positive duties . These arguments
form the centre of the theory presented here .
b The Native Law Trust
The wardship when viewed as central to Native law suggests a broader role
for the fiduciary obligation . That broader role could be delineated by the legal and
factual background of the Indian/Crown relationship . The Indian Act forms part
of that background. Dickson and Wilson JJ., by reading the fiduciary obligation into
the provisions of s. 18(1), both recognize that the Indian Act, to borrow Cardozo's
memorable phrase, is "instinct with obligation" ." They recognize that it is intended
to protect Indian lands and moneys . I wish to suggest that role of the Act is much
broader than just protection of tangible property . I wish to suggest that the Indian
Act codifies, however imperfectly in today's eyes, an obligation accepted by the
Crown to protect and promote the Indians and to provide them with a protective
legislative scheme intended to assist them in adjusting to the colonisation of their
lands.
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1The Guardian/Ward Relationship
The wardship is related to the true trust and in Native law, has often been
confused with it. Marshall, who could be considered to be the father of native law,
referred to the government/Indian relationship as resembling a guardianship ."' Like -
the trust the wardship is an equitable doctrine . It began its existence in feudal times
as the incident of tenure known as wardship.'°Z It was originally a valuable property
right for both the King and the guardian. Lowe and White comment :
[Wardship arose] when a tenant died leaving an infant heir. On such
occasions the lord became guardian of both the infant heir's land and body.
Although there was a protective element in the guardianship, in that the lord
was supposed to look after the land for the ward and was obliged to maintain
and educate him according to his station, it was essentially profitable since the
lord was entitled to keep the profits of the land until the heir became of age .
Even the guardianship of the heir's body could be and was exploited for profit
since the lord had the right to control and therefore to sell the heir's
marriage."
	
(authorities omitted)
As Holdsworth points out this is a far cry from our present notion of guardianship
as fiduciary."
In its early days it had its own court, the Court of Wards, which was abolished
in 1660 . 105 Subsequently, under the Court of Chancery, the modern form of
guardianship as a protective relationship rather than an exploitative one developed ."
Lowe and White continue :
By the nineteenth century it had become accepted that the true origin of
wardship lay in the concept that the Sovereign as parens patriae had a duty
to protect his subjects, particularly those such as children who were unable
to protect themselves and that this duty had been trusted to the Lord
Chancellor and through him to the Court of Chancery ."
(footnotes omitted)
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So, while it was originally based on protecting the property of the infant, by the end
of last century the role of guardianship had developed into the protective form that
we know today." In 1893 in The Queen. v . Gyngall Lord Esher, M.R. spoke of the
role of the court as :
[A] paternal jurisdiction, . . . in virtue of which the Court . . . was put to act on
behalf of the Crown, as being the guardian of all infants, in place of the
parent, and as if it were the parent of the child, thus superseding the natural
guardianship of the parent."
Here we see it in its present day role as protector of the person, not just the
property rights of a minor.
It is interesting to note that wardship developed its modern sense at the very
time that the relationship between the Crown and the Indians was being worked out .
And as we have seen, Locke described the relationship between the government and
its citizens as a public trust. By 1660 colonization was a well established fact . By
1900 the Crown's role as guardian to the Indians was firmly established, even if the
obligations may not have been certain and would be, anyway, at times cynically
ignored . The analogy of guardianship with the trust is by this time clear.
Holdsworth comments :
[TJhe chief contribution which the court made to the law on this topic, was
the strict control which it exercised over the guardian's dealings both with the
property and the person of the child, and the adequate machinery which it
employed to overhaul his accounts -the analogy of the trustee was easily
applied."'
	
(footnotes omitted)
The chief mechanism developed to deal with both the trust and guardianship was the
requirement to account."' With the wardship, the obligations went further . There
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was an obligation to pursue the best interests of the ward in all facets . This would
include such obligations as obtaining for the ward a proper education and proper
housing as well as protecting the ward from exploitation .
The prime purpose of the common law wardship is to protect the person . It
is telling that this body of law developed at the same time as did the idea of a
wardship role for the Crown vis a vis the Indian peoples. It suggests that purpose
of the special protections for the First Nations in the Constitution and in legislation
is not only to protect Indian property interests, but also to protect the Indians
themselves. This protective role would include promotion of the Indians and
assistance in coping with non-Indian culture . It is admitted that the policies pursued
by the Crown in the exercise if its role as ward of the Indian Nations have varied .
The major policy has been assimilation. However, one can also find evidence of a
policy of integration for the Indians and for policies of genocide as well as what
Wilkinson, in the United States, has called measured separateness ."' The ambiguity
of purpose does raise problems, but those problems are factual and would be better
dealt with in the context of a particular claim .
It is possible to say that the history of the colonisation of North America took
place against a backdrop of an increasing concern for the rights of colonised peoples .
While that meant little in the early days of colonisation, it has come to have much
more weight. Recent years have seen extensive decolonisation . In addition, the
rights of minorities, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal have received increasing
support on the international scene . Some support for increased recognition of the
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positive obligations of the government to the Indian Nations might be garnered from
this. While it is not my intention to pursue this line of inquiry, I do suggest that it
is of some relevance in the interpretation of the obligations of the Canadian
government to the Indian Nations . A brief exploration of the international law
trusteeship, I suggest, supports the argument that the fiduciary role of the
government includes the promotion of Indian interests as well as the protection of
property rights .
ii The International Law Trusteeship
The colonisation of the Indian Nations of the Americas probably precedes the
creation of an effective International law."' Indeed, Goebel argues that the
discovery and colonisation of North America was a essential preliminary to the
development of an international code for the acquisition of territory ."' Be that as
it may, the principles were worked out during the colonisation process and were well
established by the end of the nineteenth century as colonisation in North America
was finally and irrevocably achieved . Since it is only recently that the international
law trusteeship has developed, it likely has limited significance to the position of the
Indians in Canada. Nevertheless, it can help flesh out the parameters of the Native
law trusteeship suggested here .
Snow finds the origins of the international law trusteeship in the 19th century
struggle against slavery and the movement for the protection of aborigines ."' He
comments:
The period since 1890 has been marked by a general acceptance and
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application by all civilized States of the principle of guardianship of
aborigines ."'
Its heyday is much later. Green has commented:
The concept of agency or ward and guardian became fairly significant on the
international level after the first world war with the introduction of the
mandate system under art. 22 of the League of Nations Covenant .""
In the main the Covenant was intended to regulate the conduct between nations .
One of its purposes was enunciated as :
[T]he maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations
in the dealings of organized peoples with one another ."'
Since it speaks of "organized peoples" it seems unlikely that it was intended that the
North American Indians would fall within the parameters of the Covenant .
Nevertheless, the comparison remains compelling .
Article 22 of the Covenant uses the same words as did Rand J . in the St.
Ann's case."' Article 22 states, inter alia :
1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war
have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly
governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should
be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples
form a sacred trust of civilization.
3. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of
development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its
economic conditions and other similar circumstances ."
	
(my emphasis)
In its 1971 advisory opinion on Namibia, the International Court of Justice
commented on article 22 :
[There can be] little doubt that the ultimate objective of the sacred trust was
the self-determination and independence of the peoples concerned.""
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This, it should be noted, is probably not a legal right to self determination .'
While the Indians do not meet the opening provisions of paragraph 1 of
Article 22, and so consequently are not intended to be come within the protections
offered, there is little reason to deny the relevance of the provisions in general to
a discussion of the obligations to the Indians . Both Canada and the United States
adhered to the Covenant. As an indication of the views of the government as to
their obligations the Covenant can serve as a small window .
With the demise of the League of Nations the role was taken up by the
"trusteeship" provisions of the Charter of the United Nations .' These provisions are
stated much more narrowly . They are to apply only to territories previously under
mandate, territories detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World
War, and territories voluntarily placed under trust by the authorities responsible for
them." Clearly the Indians do not come within these .
The terms of the trusteeship were to be agreed upon by the States directly
concerned." The basic objectives were stated in section 76 and include :
(b) to promote political, economic, social, and educational advancement of
the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development
towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the
particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned .
(c) to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms .`
O'Connell comments on the agreements concluded pursuant to the provisions :
All the agreements contained provisions : (i) to promote development of free
political institutions suited to the territory ; (ii) to ensure the inhabitants a
progressively increasing share in the administration of the services of the
territory; (iii) to develop participation of the inhabitants in advisory and
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legislative bodies and in the government of the territory, both central and
local, as may be appropriate . . . ; (iv) to take all other appropriate measures
with a view to the political development of the inhabitants in accordance with
Article 76(b) . 12'
Although the trusteeship was well-intentioned, the reality fell somewhat short
of the intention. Thullen notes :
Disparity between the administering authorities' concept of the trusteeship
system as an institution for supervision of colonial administration, with
promotion of political development only a secondary and long-term concern,
and the anti-colonial's interpretation of the system as a channel for rapid
attainment of independence by trust peoples gave rise to constant friction and
conflicts."
The rather poor record of the trusteeship need not weaken the value of the
trusteeship as informative of the nature of the role of the government vis a vis the
Indian peoples . Given that a similar disparity exists between the views of the
Indians and of the _government, its value is perhaps heightened . While, as Green
comments, the trusteeship is "completely devoid of legal significance i" it can inform
the search for the true meaning of the guardianship of the government over the
Indians .
Snow, at least, holds that the trusteeship has great relevance to the situation
of the Indian peoples . He also feels that its basis is the protection of the person,
much like the guardianship in the common law . He states :
When "trusteeship is used in this sense, it has not the meaning of trusteeship
in the private law, but is used in a broad sense conforming to the literal
meaning of the word . In the private law a trusteeship is the relation between
persons arising out of the deposit of money or property by one with the other .
. . . A trust, in its literal sense, is a relationship of an essentially personal
character. In its modern derivative sense, especially as used in the politico-
legal language of the present day, the word "trust" covers all relations of a
fiduciary character in which a person assumes a relationship of responsibility
for or to another. . . . In this broad sense, trusteeship is a generic term
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including all fiduciary relationships relating to the person or property, and
thus includes the relationship of parent and child, husband and wife, . . . as well
as trustee and cestui que trust, etc .
Using trusteeship in its literal sense and also to some extent in this
generic sense, it seem (sic) to be the most appropriate word to describe the
relationship between a civilized State and all its colonies and dependent
communities of whatever character .
The trusteeship of a civilized State for its colonies and dependencies
is, however, a trusteeship essentially relating to person rather than property,
and therefore the closest analogies which the private law furnishes for
determining the problems of this trusteeship are those derived from the rules
of private law relating to patron and apprentice, and guardian and ward ."'
Snow concludes :
The conclusion which seems to follow . . . is that the power which a civilized
State exercises over all its colonies and dependencies is, according to the law
of nations, a power of trusteeship, and the power of guardianship over its
dependent aboriginal tribes is one of the manifestations of this general
power . 131
Certainly the relationship with colonized minorities within the nation is comparable
to that with colonized nations outside the country .
If the international law trusteeship, and indeed the trends within the field of
international law generally, has any significance to the situation of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada, it suggests a set of purposes for the guardianship . Again, I am
not suggesting that these are in any way legal obligations . They show only a general
current towards, and perhaps a moral obligation to recognize, increasing rights for
aboriginal peoples ."' The "rights" might include the content of the Covenants and
the United Nations Charter : they might include "well-being and development",
"political, economic, social, and educational advancement", "development towards
self-government or independence", and "self-determination" . The development of the
trust obligation precedes and parallels the development of the international law
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trusteeship . That contemporaneity lends weight to the argument for a broader role
for the trust obligation than merely the protection of property rights . It suggests also
at least moral and perhaps political obligations to promote the First Nations and to
assist them as they adapt to the changed circumstances precipitated by colonization.
iii The Native Law Trust: A Wardship
The function of trust in society is, in Luhmann's words, "to anticipate the
future. It is to behave as if the future were certain ."" It is a way of coping with a
future which has become, or has been realized to be, too complex to be coped with
in the raw, so to speak ." This fits quite accurately the Indian situation after the
colonization of North America. Taylor has written of the Indian insistence, in the
face of government resistance, on including in the treaties provisions for education,
agricultural assistance and other help in making the transition to a new life . He
says :
To the Indians, these additional treaty terms were necessary because of their
fear and anxiety about their own survival ."
The treaty process, from the Indian point of view, was to provide for a continued
separate existence as Indians in their traditional lands .
The Crown, as we have seen, promoted such an idea of their responsibility
to the Indians . From the earliest days of colonization, the First Nations were
assured that their best interests would be protected by the Crown . The Doctrine
of Discovery, the Instructions to the Governors, the Royal Proclamation, the various
provisions in the Constitution, and even the Indian Act, speak to the Crown's
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insistence that it will not only protect, but also promote the interests of the Indians .
To provide for the future which they desired, the Indian peoples signed
treaties with the white man. Incorporated in those treaties were all forms of trust .
Much was only the generic form . Some took the form of political obligations which
could not be legally enforced. Some of the obligations, have become, if they were
not originally, legal obligations, often through codification . All in all, this process,
which has given the wardship its content, corresponds with the international law
trusteeship. The common law wardship ultimately was intended to protect the
person of ward, not the land. With the Indian wardship, it is suggested, the intent
was to protect the Indian communities. Consequently, the interest protected by the
wardship, and arguably the fiduciary obligation, is the continued existence of the
Indians, not merely the protection of some of their land . Its purpose was to help the
Indians survive colonisation and to secure for them a meaningful participation in
Canada's future . Exactly what that future was to be, assimilation, integration, or
measured separateness, was not completely worked out, either by Canada or the
Indians themselves . The failure of the First Ministers Conferences, suggests that it
may fall to the courts to work out the meaning of s. 35 .
c Guerin: The Basis of a Theory?
Guerin, since it predates the passing of the Constitution Act. 1982, is not
concerned with aboriginal rights beyond the statutory protection offered by the
Indian Act . Consequently, Dickson J., as he then was, could confine himself to a
283
discussion of the interest in land which was at the heart of the dispute . The
fiduciary principle he posited there found its origin in the surrender requirement
codified in s . 39 of the Indian Act, was focused on the Indian interest in land
recognized by s. 18 of the Indian Act, and had as its underlying rationale the
protective role of the Crown . The five elements came together to require the courts
to supervise the actions of the Crown . But not all actions of the Crown : The
supervision is only of the discretionary power granted by Parliament and it requires
the courts to make certain that discretionary powers granted are used without fraud
in the best interest of the Indians .
The Guerin decision is concerned only with Indian Act interests. Since the
cause of action predates 1982, the Musqueam were obliged to limit their action to
what were at that time justiciable issues, and, consequently, the Court have done the
same. But we have seen that Dickson particularly, ranged much wider than the
Indian Act, and that, I have suggested, could be seen as an indication by the Court
of how it is predisposed to deal with the new constitutional provisions . If this is so
then we are obliged to look behind the decision to search out its underpinnings . I
have suggested above that logically, the interest which the fiduciary principle protects
can be taken further than it is in Guerin . Let us look once more at Dickson's
opinion, this time in light of the above exploration of the legal history and this time
seeking out any implications for constitutional interpretation of the obligations to the
Indians .
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iThe Triggering Event : The Assumption of Sovereignty
We have seen that the guardian/ward relationship in the general law starts
with the protection of the property rights of minors, but develops very quickly into
a protection of the person. Protection of the person was only necessary because
the ward lacked the factual and legal capacity to conduct her own affairs without
excessive vulnerability to the unscrupulous. The responsibility flowed naturally from
merely preserving the property of the ward to including the obligation to equip the
ward to protect her own interests when that time came . We have traced a similar
development in international law.
The wardship of the Indians, I suggest, is analogous. While the wardship first
manifests itself in relation to land, in fact it encompasses greater responsibilities, and
the importance of the Royal Proclamation is that it constitutes the recognition of a
special responsibility of the Crown vis a vis the First Nations . Because of the
dangers to the Crown inherent in the unregulated taking of Indian lands, the Indians
were denied the power to deal with their lands, and ultimately, denied any legal
capacity at all . The denial of legal capacity was accompanied with an acceptance of
a special responsibility to promote their interests . The resulting relationship is the
wardship: A particular sort of fiduciary obligation . This, until 1982, has been a non-
justiciable aspect of the trust obligation .
The obligation in Guerin has its roots in aboriginal title and is raised because
"the Indian interest in the land is inalienable except . . . to the Crown"."' Aboriginal
title, we have seen, is itself a recognition of the pre-contact relationship of the Indian
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Nations with their traditional lands . The surrender requirement, as Dickson realises,
was first established as a legislated policy in 1763 through the Royal Proclamation."
However, the surrender requirement may in some cases precede this date . Certainly,
the practice was common in the 17th century ."' Arguably then, although Dickson
does not say so, the fiduciary obligation he recognizes extends back beyond the
enactment of the first federal Indian Act in 1876 and perhaps even beyond the
promulgation of the Royal Proclamation in 1763 . It is clear that the fiduciary
obligation is intimately bound up with the colonisation of Indian lands . But one can
go further than that .
We have seen that in the United States, Indian law has developed from a
recognition of land rights towards a recognition of some right to continued
sovereignty. The opinion of the then Mr. Justice Dickson in Guerin points to the
possibility of a similar development in Canada. Dickson J. explains at great length
that the Indian interest in land was not, and is not, a proprietary right . Referring
to Johnson v . McIntosh and the doctrine of discovery which gave the discovering
European nation rights over those of other European nations, Dickson notes that the
rights of the Indian nations were diminished upon discovery but that "their rights
of occupancy and possession remained unaffected" ." So while the rights in land
were not themselves affected, the ability to deal with those rights was .
Put another way, the effect of colonization on Indian rights in land was
incidental: It is the power to exercise them that had been taken. He continues :
The principle that a change in sovereignty over a particular territory does not
in general affect the presumptive title of the inhabitants was approved by the
Privy Council in Amodu Tijani v. Southern Nigeria (Secretary), [1921] 2 A .C .
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399. That principle supports the assumption in Calder that Indian title is an
independent right which, although recognized by the Royal Proclamation of
1763, nonetheless predates it ."
It is not, then, rights in the land which are altered by discovery : It is Indian
sovereignty. Necessarily then, the fiduciary obligation rests not on the rights to the
land, since they have not been altered, but must rest, to some extent, on the denial
of sovereignty in the Indian nations and the assumption of that sovereignty by the
discoverer. It is the denial of sovereignty, and that alone, which appears to have
legal significance to the raising of the duty . Such an analysis is supported by the
discussion in Guerin. Describing the fiduciary obligation in the abstract, Dickson
comments:
[W]here by statute, agreement, or perhaps by unilateral undertaking, one
party has the obligation to act for the benefit of another, and that obligation
carries with it a discretionary power, the party thus empowered becomes a
fiduciary ."'
	
(my emphasis)
We see here that Dickson not only moots a power based theory of fiduciaries but
also that he suggests that the power can be an assumed one . Consequently, a
fiduciary obligation based on the denial of sovereignty, would date not from
legislative enactment, or perhaps even from contact or colonisation, but from the
date of discovery .
We could go further. Dickson states that it is the surrender requirement
which gives rise to the fiduciary obligation . The Royal Proclamation and the Indian
Act deny that right to the Indian nations, not to individuals . No right in individual
Indians has been recognized. This is clearly an aspect of sovereignty . And the
particular aspect of sovereignty which Guerin explores is the power to deal with
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rights in land. But that is not necessarily the end of it . As Dickson explains in his
opinion, the denial of sovereignty dates from discovery . If, as Dickson also says, the
Indian Act only narrows the fiduciary obligation then possibly so does any Roya_i
Proclamation related fiduciary obligation and, potentially at least, much greater
responsibilities might lie behind the justiciable obligation. And these responsibilities
might not have to relate closely to land .
There is a point of massive import here which drives home the potential
importance of Guerin for constitutional analysis and the importance for developing
the theoretical basis for a broad reading of the case . The fiduciary obligation
explored in Guerin originates in the denial of an aspect of sovereignty which both
the Indian Act and the Royal Proclamation acknowledge . It is possible, and I would
argue necessary for a sensible reading of the case and of the duty, that the obligation
extends back to the time of the denial of sovereignty . And that logically it might
also embrace other aspects of sovereignty . It is suggested that the wardship is itself
an aspect of the fiduciary obligation recognized in Guerin, albeit an unenforceable
one in the case itself.
Let us put the argument simply. If the rights in land have not altered since
contact, land can have only a very limited legal significance to the fiduciary theory .
Since it is an aspect of sovereignty which has changed, then it is sovereignty which
must have legal significance . Support for this proposition can be garnered by
looking back at sections 18(1) and 38(2) of the Indian Act."' Dickson, it will be
remembered, notes the importance of the narrowing of the fiduciary obligation
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permitted by these sections . Some aspects of the narrowing are clearly based upon
Indian involvement in the surrender process . These are such aspects as conditional
or qualified surrender and restrictions of the government discretion through treaty
and surrender conditions . Such Indian involvement could be characterized as a
reclaiming, or exercising, of some aspects of the ancient power of self-government .
If not that, it is certainly a regaining of the power of self-determination .
Be that as it may, if the fiduciary obligation is created at the time of the loss
of sovereignty, it must at least date back to the time of contact . It must date back
at least to the creation of the policy of surrender in 1763 . The scope of the
obligation, of course, would vary according to the particular course of dealing
between the different Indian nations and the Crown . But at root and in theory, the
obligation owed to all the aboriginal peoples could be the same . The duty would
vary with the facts relevant to any particular aboriginal group .
It is important to note that the scope of the Indian Act is much broader than
merely the protection of land and money. It contains a complete governmental
scheme and a remarkably complete one ."' Covering everything from birth through
education to death, it suggests that the protective role of the Crown has been seen
by the federal government itself as incorporating a much broader scope . In addition,
the gradual increase in the range and power of the governmental powers granted in
recent years to the First Nations further supports that one might and should see a
broader set of obligations in the Crown's role vis a vis the Indians . The
international law also suggests a broader obligation . And if, as I argue below, these
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obligations are part of the content of s . 35, then it follows that Dickson's opinion
logically provides a theory for the limitation of the legislative power of the Crown .
Viewed in this way, Dickson's opinion in Guerin is an exciting one which has
great potential for correcting some of the injustices suffered by Native people . The
result in the case itself, while the damages may be somewhat small," is a just one .
As a theory for judicial review of administrative action Dickson's opinion works well .
As a theory for constitutional review it has great potential . Unlike the American
situation outlined above, in Canada the protection of existing aboriginal rights may
require a constitutional amendment before Canadian governments can affect
aboriginal rights . At the very least the same sort of balancing of federal or
provincial and Indian rights as takes place in the United States between the State
governments and the Indian Nations will be necessary ." Guerin might just provide
the constitutional tool to make certain that the balancing take place in a principled
and rights-based fashion . If it does, the analysis proposed here suggests that the
rights arise when sovereignty was denied . That is, at the time of discovery . It
suggests further that the full range of governmental powers may be subject to s . 35
limitations .
ii Fiduciary Law: The Background
The theory I have suggested is based not upon the recognition of an interest
in land, but rather on a taking of power the of regulation over that land. The
question arises, is it possible for a fiduciary obligation to be based on the assumption
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of power rather than the transfer of a property right . The answer, suggested here,
is a qualified yes .
The fiduciary concept is a very fluid one and consequently difficult to define .
It is, of course, the type of the obligation owed by a trustee to his beneficiary ."'
While it originated in the law of trusts, it has developed to become relevant in many
more fields. As Sealy noted it is fairly recently that it has become a much used
term." Its current multiplicity of meanings developed during the last half of . the
19th century as a term to cover those relationships which had been termed trusts but
which, because of the increasing technicality of the trust itself, could no longer meet
its more and more rigid requirements ."'
The development has produced confusion, not least because neither the courts
nor academics have produced a satisfactory theory of fiduciaries . In fact there has,
until very recently, been little interest in the law of fiduciaries as an object of study
in its own right . As Finn says in his recent text on the topic :
[T]he legacy of this neglect has been doubt and confusion . The cursory
attentions which so far have been given to "fiduciaries" have nonetheless
produced one notable conclusion - the term "fiduciary" is itself one of the
most ill-defined, if not altogether misleading terms in our law ."
Finn, and Shepherd in another recent text, 150 have attempted to correct this state of
affairs .
There is good reason for the difficulty of definition . The law of fiduciaries
has developed in a variety of areas, of both law and equity, and over a considerable
period of time. Shepherd comments :
The law of fiduciaries has not developed as a separate area of the law, or
even as an offshoot of one particular area of the law . Rather, it has existed
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for centuries as a fundamental and often unstated assumption underlying the
areas of agency, trusts, corporations, wills, and restitution generally . Within
each of these areas of law, rules and approaches have evolved to deal with
this "fiduciary assumption", but it has only been in the last hundred years or
so that any cross-pollination has occurred . The result . . . is that the fiduciary
duty is not yet treated consistently in situations which although factually
different, are analytically the same ."'
It is useful to review at least the outline of these origins and their different effects .
The Indian law fiduciary is one sui generis. Consequently it might contain aspects
of many varieties of fiduciary ."
Of the role of the trustee and his responsibilities, we have seen something
above. While it is of an early vintage it is not as old as the agency. Shepherd
describes the agency in this way :
Agency as legal concept existed, long before the advent of the Court of
Chancery, as a segment of the common law . It had then, and still has to deal
with two sets of rights and responsibilities- those of the principal, and those
of the agent. As to the rights and responsibilities of the principal, the
theoretical basis was that of the agent as amanuensis : a tool, capable of
many wonderful things, but not independent action . That approach has
survived, with only superficial variation, and to this day the position of the
principal remains primarily common law in its roots ."
The agent, then, is treated as if he were an inanimate object .
The trustee, by contrast, treated originally by the law as if he were completely
unencumbered. Shepherd describes this relationship :
The essence of the trustee-beneficiary relationship has never been one of tool
and actor. In the common law, the trustee was the actor, and the beneficiary
had no legal existence . The courts of equity quickly recognized that the issue
was one of property ownership, and therefore created rights and obligations
inter se that reflected that approach . Instead of trying to limit the rights and
powers of the trustee, as the common law did with agents, Equity chose to
expand the rights of the beneficiary to achieve the necessary balancing of
interests. The method adopted to accomplish this was the idea of beneficial
as opposed to legal ownership."
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The corporation, which of course developed centuries after the creation of the trust,
contains a mixture of legal and equitable fiduciary relationships . This is because of
its rather odd genesis . Shepherd notes :
Agency and trusts come together in the application of the fiduciary principle
to corporate interrelationships, especially the position of the director . The
most common form of business organization in the 17th and 18th centuries
was the Deed of Settlement company, which had two sets of fiduciaries : the
trustees, who held the company's property on behalf of the members ; and the
governors, later called the directors, who made the day to day decisions on
behalf of the members . 155
In the modern corporate form, both of these roles have devolved to the directors,
even though, theoretically at least, it is the corporation itself that holds the property .
Furthermore, the members, once almost partners, have become, as shareholders,
mere financiers." The legal result is, once more in Shepherd's words, that the
directors, from the shareholders point of view, are at once "their agent in the
management of the business and their trustee in the holding of its assets ."" This is,
of course, only one of the many fiduciary relationships that abound in the corporate
world .
These three types of fiduciary relationship are all based in control of property .
There is a second group which are, in Shepherd's analysis, influence based . In the
law of wills, at least in the United States, a fiduciary relationship has been
recognized as existing between the testator and his prospective beneficiaries ."
The last influence on the modern law of fiduciaries is the law of restitution .
Restitution covers areas such as "inter vivos influence, inequality of bargaining
power, unconscionable transactions, and the like ."" Like the law of fiduciaries itself,
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restitution is a mixture of varying influences from both law and equity . Its basis is
"some concept of unjust enrichment .""
Modern fiduciary law has built upon this base and has in the process become
more complex. It is neither possible nor necessary to cover that complexity here .
It is enough to note here that fiduciary relationships have been found in the law of
local government, 16 ' the armed forces,162 bankers," and, of course, in the law relating
to native people," as well as many other areas too numerous to mention . It has
even been suggested as supplying the basis for impeachment in the United States.'
As can be seen by this cursory look at fiduciary law, it is a flexible and fertile
field. Indeed, its very flexibility has been the cause of the reluctance to attempt
definition." Shepherd adds another reason for the difficulty in defining the term .
He sees the law of fiduciaries as having a very large role to play in society. He
comments:
The law of fiduciaries is the legal system's attempt to recognize the more
blatant abuses of trust we place in each other ."
This comment brings us full circle to Luhmann's definition of the role of trust in
society."
Shepherd goes further. For him it is a very political doctrine . He notes its
recent development, particularly in the control of the corporate form, paralleling the
development of industrial society and comments :
We are now in the tail end of the corporate opportunity phase of fiduciary
doctrines, and in the infancy of a new phase based on unconscionable
transactions . Again, social influences, chiefly the development of a
Post-Industrial Society with a strong social democratic component, have
caused fiduciary law to expand into a new area ."
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For Shepherd, at least, it is a body of law looking for new fields to conquer . With
Guerin Mr. Justice Dickson, as he then was, might just have provided one of those
new fields .
iii The Connecting Principle: The Transfer of an Encumbered Power
Modern fiduciary law is most often thought of as having a number of
categories. Sealy, for example, has four ." Shepherd has three traditional and a
fourth catch-all category ."' Finn prefers not to create a list saying :
[I]t is meaningless to talk of fiduciary relationships as such . Once one looks
to the rules and principles which actually have been evolved, it quickly
becomes apparent that it is pointless to describe a person - or for that matter
a power - as being fiduciary unless at the same time it is said for the purposes
of which particular rules and principles that description is being used . The
rules are everything. The description "fiduciary", nothing."
Finn prefers only to note that there are two basic types of fiduciary .
The first describes the situation where powers given by one are to be
exercised for the benefit of another . The second describes "in a very general way,
persons who are acting for, or on behalf of, or in the interests of, or with the
confidence of, another."" On this scheme he imposes a description of the duties
and standards of conduct required of many different fiduciary roles .
Those in the first group, for Finn, are under a duty to "act honestly in what
they consider to be (another's) best interests ."" The second must adhere to the
standards laid down by equity for the trustee . These vary according to the duty
owed." He finds eight duties which might be owed by this second group of
fiduciaries . The duties concern :
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1 :
	
Undue influence.
2 : The misuse of property held in a fiduciary capacity.
3 : The misuse of information derived in confidence .
4 : Purchases of property dealt with in a position of a confidential
character .
5 : Conflict of duty and interest .
6 : Conflict of duty and duty .
7 : Renewals of leases and purchases of reversions .
8 : Inflicting actual harm on an "employer's" business."
Finn analyses each area noting what types of relationships will be held to which duty
and to what standards . Finn's types, it is readily apparent, are defined, not by a
relation to property, but by the fact that the fiduciary exercises power for another .
However, his analysis, while it might be helpful in defining the duties of this sui
generis fiduciary, is not as clearly supportive of the suggested theory as is Shepherd's .
Shepherd takes a different approach. Out of his history and a survey of the
same modern fiduciary law as Finn, Shepherd develops a general theory for fiduciary
relationships. The definition he uses as a base for his theory is a very useful one for
my purposes." He proposes this definition and explanation :
A fiduciary relationship exists whenever any person acquires a power of any
type on condition that he also receive with it a duty to utilize that power in
the best interests of another, and the recipient of that power uses that power .
The essence of this theory of fiduciary relationships is that powers are a
species of property, which can be beneficially owned by one person while
being exercised by another person, who may be referred to as the legal owner
of the power."
He calls his theory "the theory of the transfer of encumbered power ."" While it
seems rather unnecessary to describe a power as property, the support which this
theory gives the fiduciary duty proposed above is clear . We have seen that the
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power exercised by the Crown over the Indian nations is an encumbered one .
Shepherd's theory supports describing the power as a fiduciary one .
Further support can be gleaned from two recent decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada. In Frame v. Smith, 180 Madame Justice Wilson, in dissent, laid out
a description of the fiduciary obligation which has been adopted by the majority in
the more recent Lac Minerals Ltd. v . International Corona Resources Ltd . ."' Frame,
beyond the discussion of the fiduciary relationship, is a family law case and has little
significance to the field of native law . Wilson comments on the difficulty of defining
the fiduciary relationship except by defining the conditions under which it arises .
Having said this, Wilson J ., lays out what for her constitutes a fiduciary obligation .
She describes the conditions which give rise to a fiduciary obligation in this way :
Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation have been
imposed seem to posses three general characteristics :
(1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or
power .
(2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so
as to affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests .
(3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the
fiduciary holding the discretion or power."
It is worthy of note that Wilson allows, in her second principle, that the fiduciary
obligation protects more than just a property interest ." This could be extremely
important for Native peoples. She adds, by way of illustration :
[T]he corporation's interest which is protected . . . is not confined to an
interest in the property of the corporation but extends to non-legal . practical
interests in the financial well-being of the corporation and perhaps to even
more intangible practical interests such as the corporation's public image and
reputation."
297
Wilson J., does not clarify this comment but it does leave one with the impression
that the interests protected might be broad indeed .
The particular interest protected in Frame is the relationship between the
non-custodial parent and the child . She notes :
It seems to me that the three underlying characteristics of relationships in
which fiduciary duties are imposed are present in the relationship under
review. The custodial parent has been placed as a result of the court's order
in a position of power and authority over the children with the potential to
prejudicially affect and indeed utterly destroy their relationship with the
noncustodial parent through improper exercise of that power . There can be
no doubt also that the requisite vulnerability is present and that in practical
terms there is little that the noncustodial parent can do to restrain the
custodial parent's improper exercise of authority or to obtain redress for it .
The options open to an aggrieved noncustodial parent in the face of a
campaign by a custodial parent to cut the noncustodial parent off from the
child are exceedingly limited .'
Madame Justice Wilson clearly advocates a concept of the fiduciary which is not
required to be based in the protection of a property right .
Mr. Justice LaForest, in Lac Minerals, suggests that there are three types of
fiduciary relationship. The first group are the relationships which are essentially
fiduciary in nature . These include such relationships as the solicitor/client,
trustee/beneficiary and director/corporation. It was these, LaForest suggests, to
which Wilson was referring in Frame.' The second group consists of those
relationships which are not essentially fiduciary but which become so. He comments:
"[A] fiduciary obligation can arise as a matter of fact out of the specific
circumstances of a relationship ."" These first two are legitimate fiduciary
relationships .
The third type, LaForest rejects . These he describes as cases where the
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relationship is imposed "because of the view that certain remedies, deemed
appropriate in the circumstances, would not [otherwise] be available" ." In rejecting
a remedial notion of fiduciary law, LaForest lends support to the notion that the
Indian law fiduciary duty should be a principled and rights-based one . In accepting
Madame Justice Wilson's description in Frame, he also allows that a non-proprietary
relationship might give rise to a fiduciary relationship .
The duty in Guerin is clearly what LaForest would describe as an essentially
fiduciary one. The more general relationship, being one of wardship, is also an
essentially fiduciary one . Both would be, if we follow the reasoning of LaForest in
Lac Minerals, duties for breach of which all appropriate equitable remedies would
properly be available . Furthermore, in describing the essentials of the relationship
in terms of those adopted by Wilson in Frame, LaForest also emphasises the
importance of vulnerability and the unilateral exercise of power . Consequently, a
broader fiduciary duty owed by the federal government could very easily fit within
the parameters of both of these recent decisions . The factors emphasised in these
two cases supports the adoption of Shepherd's transfer of encumbered power theory
as descriptive of the fiduciary obligation owed by the Crown to the First Nations .
Some of the commentators on recent developments in fiduciary law also
would appear to accept the possibility of a fiduciary obligation unrelated to property
rights. Emond, for example, in his discussion of the Guerin decision, suggests that
the obligation "need not attach to anything."Finn, in a recent article, discusses
some of the recent cases which extend fiduciary duties to protect non-proprietary
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interests such as a name, and business goodwill . He speculates :
[I]f a relationship does give one party access to what both parties would
reasonably acknowledge to be a thing of value in the circumstances, is there
any justifiable reason for allowing the custodian to utilize it disloyally for his
own profit and without being accountable therefor, simply because that "thing"
does not fall within our conventional conceptions of property? 190
Waters also recognizes that Guerin may have opened doors to court supervision of
Indian interests against not only the Crown but also the non-aboriginal population
of Canada. He comments :
In the highly sensitive political environment of competing interests that now
surrounds Indian assertions and aspirations, particularly with regard to land
claims and the Indian desire for self-government, the courts are likely
increasingly to find themselves called upon to replace the hesitations of a
faltering political process and therefore to solve the disputes between these
contending interests as well as determine the obligations of the Canadian
taxpayers, through the instrumentality of the federal government, to the
Indian peoples."
Unfortunately, having said this, Waters, perhaps the leading expert on Canadian
trusts law, fails to provide any advice on how the courts might or should do this . He
presents only a series of questions which the courts are likely to be called upon to
address .
Flannigan in his analysis of the business trust moots a control test for
determining principal status ."' It is this theory to which Johnston refers for support
for in her discussion of Guerin. 193 His argument is that when attempting to
determine who in a business trust should be held to have principal status and its
resulting liabilities and benefits, the courts should look to the locus of control rather
than to the nominal form of the enterprise . His is, of course, a property centered
test and so offers only limited support to the theory suggested here . Nevertheless,
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in focusing on the importance of control in fiduciary relationships, his writings, as
Johnston comments, can assist in understanding the duty arising in Indian law .
Ultimately however, it must be admitted that none of the commentators seem
inclined to suggest how a non-proprietary fiduciary theory might be developed .
Similarly, none have attempted to develop a broader theory for the Crown's
obligation towards the Indian nations . Even Shepherd prefers to describe power as
a form of property rather than to moot a theory unrelated to proprietary interests .
This is unfortunate. It would appear that for the moment at least, it is the Supreme
Court of Canada, notably Madame Justice Wilson, which has gone the furthest in
asserting such a principle . We can take heart in that .
If at the heart of the Native law fiduciary obligation there is the assumption
of power linked with a duty, then such a relationship might have existed since the
beginnings of colonisation. Until 1982, the duty was largely unenforceable. With the
passing of the Constitution Act. 1982, all that may have changed . The unlimited
discretion existing at large under the obligation that I have called the wardship has,
I suggest, been narrowed and has become justiciable . By enacting s . 35, I argue, the
Canadian Crown has narrowed its discretion vis a vis the First Nations by requiring
that aboriginal and treaty rights be respected. The wardship, once only a moral or
political duty, has become a legal one . If we view Dickson's fiduciary duty in light
of a power-based theory, it reveals, it is suggested, a minimal standard by which to
check the exercise of the legislative power of the Crown .
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d Summary
I have suggested here a fiduciary duty consisting of five elements : A
recognized legal interest, a triggering event, a legislative scheme which invites the
supervision of the courts, a purpose, and a connecting principle . Guerin recognized
all these elements in relation to reserve lands held under the Indian Act. I have
suggested that the history of Indian/Crown relations coupled with the legislative
scheme under which the Indians are governed, serve to both broaden the duty and
to advance the date of its creation to the date of either contact or discovery .
The legal interest recognized by the Colonial law is the pre-contact
sovereignty of the Indian nations . The triggering event would be the assertion of
sovereignty by the colonial nation and the duty which came with the denial of Indian
sovereignty. The law of fiduciaries can provide a legal principle uniting the elements
of the theory, and the aboriginal rights sections of the Constitution Act, 1982 serve
as a legislative scheme which invites the supervision of the courts . I have suggested
that a property interest is not necessary for a fiduciary relationship . It only remains
now to discuss these provisions in order to ascertain what the justiciable scope of the
wardship has become. Under the Indian Act only limited aspects were enforceable
through the courts. In the next chapter I shall look at the aboriginal and treaty
rights provisions of the Constitution Act. 1982 and suggest what a broader fiduciary
obligation might mean for Constitutional review .
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CHAPTER 5
A FIDUCIARY THEORY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
I have suggested that the fiduciary principle enunciated by Chief Justice
Dickson in Guerin supports a general theory applicable to the constitutional rights
of all aboriginal peoples .' Its scope and content will in all probability vary according
to the legal and factual history of any particular First Nation . It is suggested that
the concept results in a restriction on the legislative power of the Crown which
requires it to consider the aboriginal interests when drafting and passing legislation .
I suggest that only such derogation or abrogation of aboriginal or treaty rights as can
be justified by the Crown should be able to pass constitutional review . The courts,
I suggest, under the fiduciary principle would be required to interpret legislation
affecting aboriginal rights by applying a presumption that the government intends to
respect those rights . Where derogation or abrogation can be justified, I suggest that
the courts should interpret the legislation so as to minimize the deleterious effects .
Aboriginal and treaty rights would, of course, remain susceptible to alteration
through constitutional amendment .
To close the chapter, I apply the theory developed in the thesis to three
current problems in Indian law .
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a The Aboriginal and Treaty Rights Provisions of the new Constitution
For the purposes of the theory advanced here, I have suggested that the
aboriginal rights provisions of the . Constitution Act. 1982 constitute the legislative
scheme which invites the scrutiny of the courts . This raises the question as to what
interests are protected by these provisions. The discussion of the wardship suggests
that the complete range of the Crown's legislative powers are charged with a duty
to the First Nations. The first consideration here is to determine which aspects of
the wardship have been rendered justiciable through the aboriginal and treaty rights
provisions of the new Constitution. Those aspects which are not within s . 35 must
remain part of the unenforceable moral and political wardship .
Part II of the Constitution Act. 19822 is devoted entirely to the rights of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada. It contains only four sections. The most important
of these provisions is s. 35(1) which provides :
The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada
are hereby recognized and affirmed .
Part II of the Constitution Act. 1982, contains only aboriginal rights provisions .
Part I of the Constitution Act. 1982, contains the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms and delineates certain rights held by all citizens against the
government. The aboriginal rights provisions are protected from the effects of the
Charter by s . 25 . This important provision provides :
25 The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be
construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any treaty or aboriginal or other
rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada . . .
This is not the full extent of the provisions, but it is enough for the present. We
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shall look at the complete provisions below . The meaning of these provisions is not
yet clear. There has already been much learned discussion of the import of these
provisions and, since the scope of the constitutional protection is only incidental to
the intent of this thesis, I shall not deal exhaustively with them. It is necessary,
however, to outline the understanding of them which informs this thesis .
In Kruger and Manuel, 3 Mr. Justice Dickson, as he then was, said :
Claims to aboriginal title are woven with history, legend , politics and moral
obligations. If the claim of any Band in respect of any particular land is to
be decided as a justiciable issue, it should be so considered on the facts
pertinent to that Band and to the that land, and not on any global basis ."
This statement should not be interpreted too simply. It seems unlikely that the
learned Justice was suggesting that the law relating to aboriginal title could vary
from region to region in the Nation . It is not the legal doctrine of aboriginal title
which must be considered on "pertinent" facts: it is an aboriginal rights claim which
must be confined to only pertinent facts . The nature, scope and effect of aboriginal
rights must have a common basis in law and must, at some point in Canadian
history, have been the same, from a theoretical standpoint, for all aboriginal peoples .
While it is possible that the aboriginal title of a particular First Nation may differ
in its incidents, either in content or in the method of extinguishment from that of
another First Nation, it would appear that at root, the law requiring the recognition
of the rights themselves must rest on the same rules of law for them all. The legal
basis of the Indian and the Inuit duty, since for constitutional purposes they are the
same,5 must also be similar .
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i Section 35: A Purposive Analysis
The Supreme Court of Canada has not yet spoken on the policy behind the
constitutional entrenchment of aboriginal rights. We must, then, start with an
analysis of the document itself since, as section 52(1) states :
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the
inconsistency, of no force and effect .
Clearly it will be necessary in developing a theory to determine the limits of
legislative power, to have an understanding of the policy which underlies the s . 35
rights. To fully understand the fiduciary obligation we must know the context in
which it lives .
The interpretation of a constitution is not the same process as reviewing
statutory provisions. In Hunter v. Southam,b Chief Justice Dickson, speaking for the
Court, warned :
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of
construing a statute. A statute defines present rights and obligations . It is
easily enacted and as easily repealed . A constitution, by contrast, is drafted
with an eye to the future. Its function is to provide a continuing framework
for the legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when joined by a Bill
or a Charter of Rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights and
liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended .
It must, therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to meet
new, social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers .
The judiciary is the guardian of the Constitution and must, in interpreting its
provisions, bear these considerations in mind . Professor Paul Freund
expressed this idea aptly when he admonished the American courts "not to
read the provisions of the Constitution like a last will and testament lest it
become one".'
Aboriginal rights, although not within the Charter, do have their own Constitutional
status. Part II is, one might say, the aboriginal peoples' Charter. Arguably, the
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existence of s .35 in the Constitution Act. 1982 requires that aboriginal rights too
must meet with an interpretation which will allow "growth and development over
time to meet new social, political and historical realities" . Charter jurisprudence,
then, is useful to an understanding of s . 35 rights .
The court has taken a "purposive approach" to the interpretation of the
Charter. In R. v. Big M Drug Mart,' Dickson J., as he then was, said:
The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter [is] to be
ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it [is] to be
understood, in other words, in the light of the interests it was meant to
protect .
In my view the analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the
right or freedom in question is to be sought in reference to the character and
the larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate
the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts
enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other
specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the
Charter. The interpretation should be . . . a generous rather than a legalistic
one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for the
individuals the full benefit of the Charter's protection. At the same time it
is important not to overshoot the actual purpose of the right or freedom in
question, but to recall that the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum, and
must, therefore, . . . be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic and historical
contexts .9
In that case the court discussed various laws from Tudor times to the present in
order to interpret the purpose of s . 2(a) of the Charter. The same practice is clearly
permissible with the interpretation of aboriginal rights .
In Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act,(B.C.), 10 Lamer J., speaking for
the Court on this issue, said of the process of Charter interpretation :
I have in this judgment taken the purposive analysis in accordance with the
method established by this Court in R . v . Big M Drug Mart, (supra) .
Accordingly, the point of departure has been a consideration of the general
objectives of the Charter in light of the general principles of Charter
interpretation. . . . This was followed by a detailed analysis of the language
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and structure of the section as well as its immediate context within the
Charter ."
Assuming it to be proper to adapt this reasoning for our purposes, the interpretation
of s. 35 is best commenced by seeking the general objectives of Part II of the
Constitution Act, 1982 . The next step would be to look at the language of s . 35 in
the context of the Constitution Act. 1982 itself. Section 25 will require us to review
the relationship between the Charter and Part II . It would seem proper to utilise
such an approach to the interpretation of s . 35 rights .
ii The Purpose of Entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights .
I suggest here that the purpose of Part II of the Constitution is to assure the
Indian Nations some degree of separateness rather like that which Wilkinson
describes in relation to the United States Indians. Section 35 rights are
constitutional rights and s .25 evidences that they do to some extent override the
Charter rights and freedoms. The relationship of aboriginal and treaty rights to
Charter rights, which is to a large degree the relationship of s . 25 to s . 35, is the
major difficulty in the interpretation of the aboriginal and treaty rights provisions of
the new Constitution. I suggest here that, if we utilise an approach similar to that
applied to the Charter, we shall be led to conclude that s . 35 is designed to protect
some degree of self-determination for the aboriginal peoples .
Following Big M Drug Mart and Reference Re Motor Vehicles Act, I shall
look first at the general objectives of the aboriginal rights provisions within the
Constitution and then follow with an analysis of the specific provisions of ss . 25 and
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35. It is suggested that both the overall scheme of the Constitution Act. 1982 as well
as the analysis of the provisions, lend support to the view of Wilkinson expressed
above, that the aboriginal peoples are intended to retain some separateness from
non-Indian society and values .
a The General Objectives
The Constitution Act . 1982 is separated into seven parts . Part VI is of no
significance since it consists of amendments to the Constitution Act. 1867 . Part I,
of course, is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . Part II consists only of
sections 35 and 35 .1. Part III details a commitment to promoting equality across the
nation and to the principle of equalization payments . Part IV, which consists of two
sections obligating the governments of Canada to a series of constitutional
conferences intended, inter alia, to identify and define aboriginal rights . Part V
contains the amending formula . Part VII contains the general housekeeping
provisions. The major provisions of this part are a declaration that the Constitution
of Canada is the supreme law of Canada and that the English and French versions
are equally authoritative .
What is striking about the general scheme of the instrument, given our focus
on the aboriginal rights section, is that it is really only in parts I and II that the focus
is on substantive rights . It might be argued that the amending formulae and some
of the other provisions, for example the obligation to hold constitutional conferences
or the protection of equal status for the French and English versions, are in fact
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rights . However, it is suggested that they are much more procedural or
interpretative provisions rather than substantive ones . Part I, the Charter outlines
freedoms of the individual, including aboriginal persons, against the state . Part II,
the section 35 rights, states the existence of additional, as yet undefined rights of the
aboriginal peoples against the state . Both of these parts, in that they consist of
substantive rights restricting the power of the Crown, are prima facie of similar
status.
This may seem a rather bold assertion . The Charter is after all some 34
sections in length whereas Part II contains only two sections which consist of only
one substantive provision, three interpretative provisions and a commitment to
consult the aboriginal peoples before amending certain constitutional provisions .
However, the simplicity of the part is deceptive . The constitutional conferences
required by Part IV were to have fleshed out the parameters of s.35. Their purpose
was to identify and define the rights of the aboriginal peoples "to be included in the
Constitution of Canada"." Had the conferences been successful, it is likely that Part
II of the Constitution would have become considerably more complex ." And indeed,
it may yet become so. It is not necessary here, nor is it possible, to examine the
possible range of topics which might eventually find their way into s .35, but since the
concept of self-government was agreed to by all the First Ministers, it can be
imagined that the range of possible topics is wide indeed . It is not, therefore, absurd
to suggest that Part II has an importance at least on a par with the Charter
contained in Part I .
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bThe Relation of s . 25 and s . 35
Reviewing the interplay of ss . 25 and 35 supports this suggestion. Section 35,
of course is the substantive section. Section 25 is a saving section. It reads in its
entirety :
The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be
construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other
rights that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal
Proclamation of October 7, 1763 ; and
(b) any rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so
acquired."
It does not of itself award any rights ." The fact that it is found in the general
section of the Charter supports such an argument .
The purpose of s. 25 is generally agreed to be to protect the aboriginal rights
from the effects of the Charter." The implication here, is that aboriginal peoples
possess, and, since they were consulted in the framing process, deserve a different
set of values from those to which the rest of Canadians adhere . This is not to say
that the Charter does not apply to Native persons : clearly where a s. 35 right is
not involved, aboriginal persons can take advantage of Charter rights against the
government. And even where s . 35 rights are involved, Charter rights might be
. invoked as long as they do not contravene the s . 35 rights. Their position is
enhanced, not restricted . Part II is not an entrenchment of a form of apartheid .
The purpose would appear to be to put those rights which an aboriginal
person has as a result of aboriginality, above the rights which are possessed as a
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result of Canadian citizenship. The preamble of the Charter states that "Canada is
founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law ."
These then are the values which underlie the Charter provisions. This preamble has
no effect on Part II and its protection of aboriginal and treaty rights . This, arguably
at least, is a recognition that Native society may be governed by a different set of
values than is the dominant society. It is a recognition of separateness .
Furthermore, the authors seem to be unanimous that s. 1 which limits the
application of the Charter to those rights demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society, cannot restrict the effect of s . 25 since the rights s. 25 protects
are not Charter rights. Section 1 confines its operation to Charter rights and
freedoms. In addition s . 25 explicitly protects certain "other rights" from the effects
of the Charter. This would appear to include rights originating in legislation such
as the Indian Act." Both of these facts further support the contention that s . 35
rights are of equal status to Charter rights. They are, then, powerful rights designed
to allow the aboriginal peoples to preserve at least some aspects of their
aboriginality .
Support for the special status of s . 35 rights over the Charter can be gleaned
from the case law. As we have seen, the conditions under which the aboriginal
peoples became members of the settler society, and therefore members of the
Canadian society, are unique. Such aboriginal rights as may exist do so in part
because of the manner in which the aboriginal peoples were colonized . They are
pre-existing rights which have persisted and which still persist. The trust obligation,
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which is I suggest is central to those rights, in a sense represents the basis of the
understanding upon which the aboriginal peoples entered confederation . It is
possible, looking at them in that sense, to analogize those rights to the status of
certain Constitution Act.1867, provisions for the founding provinces .
In Reference re Bill C 30. An Act to amend the Education Act(Ont.), 18 the
Court held that the right enshrined in the Constitution Act.1867, s.93, which protects
Ontario's legislative rights in relation to Catholic education, takes precedence over
the provisions of the Charter . Speaking for the majority, Madame Justice Wilson
commented:
It was never intended, in my opinion, that the Charter could be used to
invalidate other provisions of the Constitution, particularly a provision such
as s. 93 which represented a fundamental part of the Confederation
compromise."
The Ontario Court of Appeal had called s . 93 as a "small bill of rights" .' The right
to discriminate in the field of education on the basis of religious affiliation is, in
effect, fundamental to Confederation . In effect it allows the provincial legislature
to pass laws which would otherwise be contrary to the Charter . Aboriginal and
treaty rights too, since they predate both the 1867 and 1982 Constitutions, should be
considered fundamental, and in a similar way, and should take precedence should
they clash with legislated or even Charter rights .
This does not mean that they would be cast in stone . Constitutional rights,
as with all legal rights, must always adjust their scope to permit others to exercise
their own rights. Consequently, it must be assumed that the s . 35 rights of an
aboriginal person might be adjusted when they come into conflict with the Charter
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rights of another. And, of course the opposite would hold true . The first point has
been made in a recent decision from the Ontario Court of Appeal .
In R. v. Agawa,' Mr. Justice Blair, speaking for the Court, said :
Indian treaty rights are like other rights recognized by our legal system . The
exercise of rights by an individual or group is limited by the rights of others .
Rights do not exist in a vacuum and the exercise of any right involves the
balancing with the interests and values involved in the rights of others . This
is recognized in s . 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which
provides that limitation of Charter rights must be justified as reasonable in
a free and democratic society . In the United States the rights proclaimed by
the Bill of Rights are not qualified by a provision similar to section 1 of the
Charter, yet they have been subjected, nonetheless,to reasonable limitation
by judicial decisions
The Court is not suggesting that the Charter rights are supreme over the s .35 rights,
only that they will not be overruled by them' Where a conflict exists, a balancing
must take place. Unfortunately, he offers no principled basis for that balancing .
Let us summarize the above discussion. The Part II rights are both equal to,
and in another sense superior to, the Charter rights of Part I . For the aboriginal
person, the s . 35 rights can override Charter rights. Therefore, when they clash, it
is the s. 35 right which would take precedence . In this sense, the s . 35 rights are
superior to the Charter rights. However, should a s. 35 right clash with a Charter
right of a non aboriginal person then a balancing must take place In this sense
they are equal . The theory presented here is intended to apply when the s . 35 rights
are in opposition to the rights of non-aboriginal persons or when the Crown purports
to act in manner contrary to an aboriginal or treaty right .
c The Purpose of s . 35
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We are not here engaged in a determination of the content of s . 35 . The
issue examined here is the policy which underlies it . Part II of the Constitution
contains no preamble such as is found in Part I, the Charter, and we can find no
clear declaration of policy in the history of the provisions . Indeed, many
commentators have noted the inconsequential nature of the legislative history of s .
35. Sanders, for example, has commented :
The legislative history for s . 35 of the Constitution Act. 1982, gives little
guidance as to what the provision means or was intended to mean . It was the
result of political bargaining'
And in fact, the legislative history is of little consequence in Canadian law. Mr
Justice Lamer in Reference re Motor Vehicles Act commented that while the
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee are admissible to prove
the intent of the constitutional provisions, they "should not be given too much
weight".' It is, therefore, of very limited utility .
What is clear is that Part II rights are group rights not individual ones . The
provisions speak in terms of the aboriginal peoples whereas the Part I provisions use
such terms as everyone, every citizen, every individual, and any person . The
commentators seem agreed on this point. Pentney asserts :
Aboriginal rights are collective rights, which inure to the benefit of native
groups. These rights have always been understood to derive from the
existence of native groups as organized societies prior to contact with colonial
powers, and the activities to which the claims relate were, and remain, group
activities'
That the aboriginal peoples as a group have a set of rights in addition to those of
other Canadians, supports the assertion that some measure of separateness underlies
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the special protections of the Constitution .
The factual history of Canadian Indian policy also offers some perhaps
equivocal support . The Indian policy is, like the legislative history, somewhat
ambiguous since it is a fact that it appears that often conflicting policies were
pursued at the same time. The earliest legislated policy, up to and including the
Royal Proclamation of 1763, was clearly to permit the Indian nations to regulate
their own lives outside the influence of the colonial government . During the early
part of the nineteenth century for the most part they seem to have been permitted
to govern their own affairs with little interference by the colonial administrations .
Where the interest and expertise existed, it also appears that healthy Indian
economies were encouraged and developed, sometimes with government support.
We have seen above the legislation which was passed to protect Indian occupation
of the reserves .
Smith chronicles the history of the Mississauga Indians of what is now
southern Ontario.' During the mid-Nineteenth century, the Mississauga of the
Credit River Reserve were a successful band of farmers and fishermen receiving
some support from the colonial administration. This suggests that the government
took their duty to promote Indian development seriously .
The experiment at the Coldwater Reserve north of Lake Simcoe was
implemented in the 1830s and was intended to create independent farmers of the
Indian. It had a strong assimilationist component, but it too demonstrates the
seriousness with which the government viewed its obligations to the Indians . The
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project tried to encourage the integration of Indians through constant interaction
with the local settlers . Ultimately, the project failed, in part because of lack of
funding and an unenthusiastic administration on the part of the Indian
Administration .'
These examples show that the administration encouraged the Indians to
remain on their reserves and to develop their economies in some measure apart
from the majority of the population . Yet the same time more insidious
assimilationist policies were advanced . The 1830s also saw the "plan" of Lieutenant-
Governor Bond Head to remove the Indians, whom he saw as a doomed race, from
Southern Ontario to Manitoulin Island where they would be able to live out their
"twilight years" ." Others thought isolating the Indians on reserves would enable the
church, schools and the Indian agent to wean them of their Indianness3 2 While both
of these policies had as their object the integration of the Indian into the
mainstream society, it is a fact that a degree of "measured separateness" was an
integral element.
After Confederation the reserve system remained an integral part of the
Canadian Indian policy and, as we have seen above, legislation was developed which
created a separate system of governance for the First Nations . That the Indian Act
was strongly oriented towards the assimilation of the Indian peoples is unarguable .
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Act has also had the result of preserving
Indian aspirations to independent status within Canada, and many leaders have
argued for its retention until better legislation might be drafted to replace it.
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Certainly the policies pursued by the Department of Indian Affairs have not been
unequivocally devoted to the destruction of special status . Often the rhetoric with
which the various programs and policies have been announced has advanced the best
interests of the Indians as a primary component .
During the negotiations for the surrender of the prairie lands through the
numbered treaties, for example, the promises made to the First Nations clearly
declared a policy of allowing and even encouraging separateness as well as
announcing a commitment on the part of the government to assist in the adjustment
to the new reality. During the negotiations leading up to Treaty No . 1, for example,
Lieutenant-Governor Archibald explained the reserve system in this way :
Your Great Mother wishes the good of all races under her sway . She wishes
her red children to be happy and contented . She wishes them to live in
comfort. She would like them to adopt the habits of the whites, to till the
land and store it up against time of want . . . . Your Great Mother, therefore
will lay aside for you "lots" of land to be used by you and your children
forever. She will not allow the whiteman to intrude upon these lots . She will
make rules to keep them for you, so that as long as the sun shall shine, there
shall be no Indian who has not a place that he can call his home, where he
can go and pitch his camp, or if he chooses, build his house and till his land ."
The treaties themselves contained similar sentiments . Treaty 6, for example, states :
And Her Majesty the Queen hereby agrees and undertakes to lay aside
reserves for farming lands, . . . for the benefit of the said Indians, to be
administered and dealt with for them by Her Majesty's Government of the
Dominion of Canada.'
The Crown also committed itself to provide schools as well as commodities for
economic development . Such commitments seem to undermine the notion that the
policy of the Indian Department was solely intent upon the destruction of separate
status for the Indian peoples .
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Elias, in his study of the Dakota, shows the inconsistency of Indian Affairs
policy.' The Dakota, who came to Canada in 1862 and 1863, were first given some
reserve lands and then were largely left alone to develop their economies under their
own governments . By the late 1800s with some help from the Canadian government,
a number of them had developed into moderately successful farmers in the western
part of the province of Manitoba . At the same time other Dakota were in the
process of becoming a "dependable urban and rural labour force" .' Their traditional
governments were left intact . This suggests that the government was at that time
pursuing a policy of substantial separateness .
During the 1890s this was to change . Elias notes :
During this decade, the Indian department finally displaced the traditional
leadership of the bands; it wrested management of most aspects of the
Dakota economies from Indian decision makers and entrusted them to agency
representatives; and it imposed political guidance upon them .
These measures were intended to assist the assimilation of the Dakota into
mainstream Canadian culture . Even so, the attempts must be seen as equivocal .
While the traditional governments were being undermined, there seems to have been
no real attempt to actually assist the Dakota to become part of the dominant
economy.
Controls were placed on Indian farming which prevented them from adapting
to the changes which occurred in prairie agriculture through the first half of the
twentieth century . The Dakota farms, for example, were limited in size by the
Indian department, and so became uneconomic .' At the same time, the Dakota
were denied homestead rights" and poor education restricted their entry to the job
332
market." The policy of assimilation through destruction of the traditional band
structure, it can be seen, was not pursued in the area of the economy . Even though
the Dakota demonstrated some ability to adapt to the dominant economy, the
Department of Indian Affairs discouraged and thwarted their efforts to adapt . That
was not completely at odds with the Dakota's wish to retain their traditional identity .
As Elias points out, the Dakota wished to retain their distinctiveness :
Perhaps the Dakota could have improved their economic lot by dispersing
into the general population as did so many other people in western Canada .
. . . Nevertheless, the historic record indicates that the Dakota drew the line
at sacrificing the last of their distinctive Dakota ways, and accepted that their
economic strategies would leave them poorer, but wiser ."
For Elias, the history of the Dakota in Canada is an example of a people living apart
within Canada managing and nurturing their own lands, resources and people in
"ways that are culturally comfortable". 43 This he suggests is "virtually a
demonstration" of the concept of "Indian self-government"." It is clear that the
policy of the Indian department facilitated, as well as discouraged, the Dakota .
One could find examples of the ambiguous nature of the First Nations'
experience under the Indian Act from all areas of the country . It is clear that the
government of Canada has rarely presented an unequivocal face to the First Nations .
McDonald has said :
It is important to point out the considerable ambiguity about the aim of the
Indian Act and the whole notion of aboriginal and treaty rights . On the one
hand, special provisions for native people in the Act and in various treaties
can be seen as recognizing an historically based obligation to Canada's first
peoples . . . . On the other hand, such special provisions for the Indians have
been seen as essentially transitory intended to provide a temporary measure
to assist in the assimilation of Indians into a (superior) civilisation."
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A clear example of this ambiguity can be seen during the first Mulroney
administration . When the Mulroney government came to power it quickly instituted
a special task force under the leadership of the deputy Prime Minister Eric Nielsen
to review government spending. The Report, issued in 1986, recommended that the
federal power over native people be given up and that the majority of programs be
transferred to the provinces4 6 At the same time, the Minister of Indian Affairs,
David Crombie, was advocating self-government, renewal of the treaties, and was
even recognizing new bands in Northwestern Ontario .' Weaver has commented on
the unreconcilable nature of these programs ."
When the government has committed itself to a clear policy of termination,
as it did in the White Paper of 1969,49 the reaction has been swift and unequivocal :
The aboriginal peoples have consistently rejected the notion of complete
assimilation. And today, the government too has abandoned termination . Since the
rejection of the White Paper, there has been a gradual transfer of the administration
of Indian matters to the band councils. In 1973 the National Indian Brotherhood
issued its demand for Indian control of education .' By 1981, shortly before the new
Constitution came into force, over one third of the federal Indian schools had been
transferred to band controls' The process has continued .
In response to the recommendation of the Penner Report in 1983, 52 which
proposed constitutional entrenchment of Indian governments, the government
introduced a Bill which was intended to introduce some measure of self-
administration for the First Nations.' The Bill died on the order paper in 1984
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when an election was called . The present government is also committed to Indian
self-government. In 1985, it passed the Sechelt Band Self-Government Act s` which
permits the Sechelt Band to exercise some municipal-like governmental powers . The
Community-Based Self-Government initiative, which is designed to encourage other
bands to negotiate legislation similar to the Sechelt Act, proclaims ;
The federal government is committed to the objective of self-government for
aboriginal people .'
A clearer statement of separate status for the First Nations could not be made .
While it is admitted that the intent of the government towards the Indians has
been ambiguous, it cannot be seriously be argued that the idea of separateness has
not consistently been present . It is suggested, regardless of the underlying intent,
assimilation, integration, or simply a will to let them live out their twilight years, that
placing the First Nations apart from the general population is one of the consistent
elements of government policy . In the years since the White Paper, the concept of
Indian self-government has gained more currency. At the last two of the First
Ministers Conferences required under s . 37.1 of the Constitution Act . 1982, the sole
topic of discussion was aboriginal self-government . None of the first ministers were
opposed to the concept . Clearly, the policy of some sort of "measured separateness"
is now a fundamental aspect of Canadian governmental policy . It seems acceptable
to assume, therefore, that s . 35 recognizes some measure of self-government for the
First Nations .' It clearly must recognize some separate status .
d Summary
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While the United States' jurisprudence is not decisive in the interpretation of
the Canadian Constitution, it has been influential' And in Indian law matters, that
influence is compounded .' Given the influence of the United States' law, it is useful
to keep an idea of its scope in mind when interpreting the Constitution . I have
suggested that the United States jurisprudence on Indian law has three components :
First, the Indians are considered "domestic dependent nations" who live under the
protection of the federal government ; second, Congress, and perhaps the Executive,
has the absolute power to legislate on Indian matters, included in these powers is
the power to terminate Indian status over the objections of the Indian Nations
themselves ; and third, where the government has legislated for the Indians, in the
absence of a statement to the contrary on the face of the statute itself, they owe a
trust or fiduciary obligation to the Indians, the scope of which will be discerned from
an interpretation of the legislation viewed in light of a presumption that the federal
government intends to respect the residual sovereignty of the Indian Nations
Wilkinson suggests that this law, together with the history of Indian/U .S .
relations, is designed to allow the Indian nations to live separate lives within the
United States. He views the late nineteenth century cases expressing the
unrestricted power of Congress over Indians as the remnant of an assimilationist
policy which has been tried and discarded. While the power remains, it is now
rarely invoked. He comments :
Implicit in all the talk [at treaty time] was not only that each tribe would
remain a people, but also the perception that a homeland, separate and
distinct from the surrounding white culture, was a requisite element for that
survival . . . . The essence of [the] laws, then, as viewed by both Indian tribes
and by the United States, was to limit tribes to significantly smaller domains
336
but also to preserve substantially intact a set of societal conditions and tribal
prerogatives that existed then'
	
(authorities omitted)
This separateness, while it does not have constitutional protection, is the guiding
principle, Wilkinson suggests, which restricts the courts, the executive, and Congress .
The Indians' rights to pursue their own future within the United States are, for
Wilkinson, part of the essence of the United States. They are not, however,
constitutionally protected .
Such separateness has not been explicitly expressed in Canadian law, but, I
suggest, it has been, and remains, an important aspect here also . The above analysis
of the aboriginal and treaty rights suggests that Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982
recognizes and entrenches a measured separateness for at least the First Nations in
Canada. The protection of Indian collective rights from derogation or abrogation
by the individualistic Charter rights is consistent only with such a conclusion . Add
to that the continuous existence of a governmental practice which preserved,
intentionally or not, the separateness of the First Nations and one seems led
inescapably to the notion that s. 35 must entrench separate status. Such an
entrenchment would appear to provide, in contrast to the situation in the United
States, some limitation of the legislative power of the Crown . At the very least, the
s. 35 rights of aboriginal peoples must be balanced with the Charter rights of a non-
aboriginal person .
iii A Closer Look at s . 35
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aThe Content of s. 35
Section 35, since it contains the troublesome word "existing", is better dealt
with in relation to specific rights. The specific right upon which this thesis focuses
is the fiduciary obligation, in particular the enforceable aspect of the wardship . For
this section however, I shall deal with the entrenchment of the fiduciary obligation
recognized in Guerin : the land related fiduciary obligation .
We noted above the absolute nature of the legislative power of Parliament
under the old Constitution. The scope of any fiduciary duty is to found in federal
legislation and the instruments surrounding the surrender . Consequently, before
1982, the scope of the duty which was breached in Guerin could have been changed
at will by the federal government by an amendment to the Indian Act . If we assume
that the Guerin interest has been entrenched as a s . 35 right a question is raised as
to whether the federal government can still change that legislation at will and,
thereby, alter the scope of the fiduciary duty? If they can, the entrenchment may
have been an empty exercise . If they cannot, where does the balance lie?
Section 35 has generally been interpreted to provide two effects . First that
Part II will not operate so as to revive any previously extinguished rights ." Secondly
that the rights that have been entrenched are entrenched in the form in which they
existed in 1982 . This second effect does not mean that s. 35 rights are frozen as of
April 17, 1982. Some of the entrenched rights, and the Guerin fiduciary obligation
may be one of these, are rights which have long been subject to legislated limits .
Some aspects of that subordinate status remain . A recent case from British
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Columbia illustrates this point .
Sparrow v. The Queen holds that, since they were regulated rights at the
time of entrenchment, the Constitution Act . 1982, entrenches regulated aboriginal
rights to hunt and fish.' The power to regulate in response to existing conditions
has not been lost . This seems an uncontroversial interpretation of the word
"existing". The power to regulate, however, has been limited by the entrenchment
of the aboriginal right to fish .
The Musqueam Indian Band, whose reserves are part of their traditional
lands around the mouth of the Fraser River, fish salmon under "Indian food fish
licences" issued under federal legislation.` The court held that this was an "existing
aboriginal right"' In 1984, the fisheries officials reduced the size of net permissible
from that which had been allowed since 1982 . When certain band members
continued to use the larger net, they were charged with fishing contrary to the terms
of their licences . They argued that, since the fishery was an aboriginal right, the
level of regulation was frozen as of 1982 . The authorities argued that their
regulatory power was unchecked by the passing of the Constitution . The court
disagreed with both .
The court reviewed the history of the regulation of the B .C. fishery and found
that regulation dated from 1876, and that the Indian fishery had been covered since
1888. They recognized that both Indians and non-Indians had valid interests in the
fishery. The problem was one of balancing . They held:
There continues to be a power to regulate the exercise of fishing by Indians
even where that fishing is pursuant to an aboriginal right but there are now
limitations on that power .'
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The limitations they found in the regulatory scheme in force at the passing of the
Constitution Act . 1982 looked at in light of the history of the regulation of the
fishery. The court stated :
The essential limitation on [the] power [to regulate the fishery] is that which
is already recognized government policy as it emerges from the evidence in
this case . That is, in allocating the right to take fish, the Indian food fishery
is given priority over the interests of other user groups . What is different is
that, where the Indian food fishery is in the exercise of an aboriginal right,
it is constitutionally entitled to such priority . Furthermore, by reason of s .
35(1) it is a constitutionally protected right and cannot be extinguished.'
The test they established for determining the validity of further regulation is this :
Those regulations which do not infringe the aboriginal food fishery, in the
sense of reducing the available catch below that required for reasonable food
and societal needs, will not be affected by the constitutional recognition of
the right. Regulations which do bear upon the exercise of the right may
nevertheless be valid, but only if they can be reasonably justified as being
necessary for the proper management and conservation of the resource or in
the public interest. These purposes are not limited to the Indian food
fishery'
	
(emphasis added)
The case, which is awaiting decision on an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada,
offers a reasonable rule for the determination of at least some aboriginal rights and
how they might be balanced with other rights .
The rule suggested by Sparrow is this : Where an entrenched regulated
aboriginal right is not affected by further governmental action, the governmental
action is not reviewable . Where an entrenched regulated right is affected by
governmental action, judicial review is appropriate . The governmental action will
be checked against the requirements of any legislative scheme governing the matter
viewed in light of the history of governmental action and policy in relation to the
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matter. This rule should be familiar . The rule established for the fiduciary
obligation in Mitchell II in the United States which was discussed in Chapter Two
above, is all but identical .' It is also very similar to the rule in Guerin itself. The
essence of the test is that the government must be able to justify, according to some
rational standard, any action which derogates from an aboriginal right . The Crown's
legislative power over regulated aboriginal rights, while it survives constitutional
entrenchment of those rights, has become a limited one .
It is uncertain at this time whether the fiduciary obligation has been
entrenched by s. 35. The obligation at issue in Guerin has its origin in rights arising
from the Royal Proclamation and the Indian Act. It is probable that such rights are
"other rights," protected by s. 25 from the operation of the Charter, but not explicitly
entrenched in the Constitution ." It is generally agreed that aboriginal title, which
was recognized in Canada in Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, 72 must
be within the parameters of s . 35?3 Given that, it would appear that all the while
the Crown retains its control over the First Nations' power of disposal of that
interest, then the duty of the Crown in relation to land surrenders, will remain a
legally enforceable fiduciary one . Indeed, such a conclusion may be a necessary
element of aboriginal title itself, if the interest is in fact inalienable except to the
Crown as Canadian caselaw has consistently held.
The scope of the obligation, found as it is in statute and other instruments,
was a variable one at the time of entrenchment. Consequently, one can assume, it
remains so. But it is not variable at the will of the Crown as it was before . The
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unilateral power to vary or abrogate the duty by amending the statute has been lost .
Sparrow v. The Oueen suggests that the Constitution Act. 1982, entrenches a
regulated right to hunt and fish susceptible to further variation. That being the case
it seems very probable that any fiduciary obligation which might have been
entrenched, will also be capable of continued variation from time to time . The
scope, as before the entrenchment, would be determined through scrutiny of the
legislation governing surrender, together with the terms and conditions of the
surrender viewed in light of the negotiations during the surrender process itself . Any
attempt by the Crown to unilaterally limit the scope of the duty through legislation,
regulation, or even administrative policy, would be reviewable to make sure that
the variation fits the entrenched duty . The test would be a variant of the Sparrow
test. The Crown could be required to justify the variation against a rational standard
derived from the history and policy governing land surrenders . That, it is suggested,
is the very least that Guerin can stand for. And, weak as it may be in that it does
not absolutely prevent derogation, it is a substantial advance from the situation
existing before 1982. Its strength is that it permits the First Nations to shoulder the
duty.
The authors seem agreed, and it seems a reasonable position, that it is
possible for the First Nations themselves, to agree to a surrender of their aboriginal
rights without the need for a constitutional amendment." Assuming this to be the
case, the government could terminate its fiduciary obligation if it were to give to the
First Nations themselves the power to deal with their lands as they wish . They could
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do this either in the terms of a surrender or through constitutional or perhaps even
legislative amendment.' In as much as it retains its discretion over the use of Indian
lands, it would appear that the Crown must act as a responsible fiduciary . Any
breach would be considered a breach of a legal and constitutional duty .
b Recent Judicial Discussion of the Fiduciary Obligation.
Two recent cases illustrate the value of this interpretation of the fiduciary
obligation . In Kruger v. The Oueen,76 the Federal Court of Appeal held that the
fiduciary obligation recognized in Guerin applied to the expropriation of reserve land
held under the Indian Act as well as to surrenders. Kruger and other members of
the Penticton Indian Band sought a declaration that land expropriated in 1940 and
1943 had been wrongfully taken. They alleged, inter alia that the Crown had
breached its fiduciary obligation to the Band .
Three opinions were handed down . The judges agreed that the fiduciary
obligation applied to this non-Treaty B .C. land. Two judges agreed that there was
no breach of duty on the facts and that there was no fraud since the expropriation
was completed openly and without concealment' The third held that the
government had breached its fiduciary duty but that the claim was statute barred .
The application was dismissed .'
Heald J., in dissent on the point, held that the government was in a conflict
of duty situation during the expropriation process . This was so because it was
wearing two hats at the time, acting for the Indians through the Department of
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Indian Affairs, and against them through, at one time, the Department of Transport,
and at another time, the Department of National Defence . Heald J., found a breach
of the fiduciary obligation since the government failed to act exclusively for the
Indians .
While Urie J . agreed that the Crown owed a fiduciary obligation to the Band,
he held that there was no breach because the evidence showed that the Indian
Affairs Branch through the Band's Indian agent and the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs were "articulate, forceful and passionate spokesmen for the Penticton
Indians".' He comments:
[T]he transport officials, too, owed a duty in the performance of their
functions, not a direct duty to the Indians but a duty owed to the people of
Canada as a whole, including the Indians not to improvidently spend their
monies8°
With respect, it is suggested that Urie has misunderstood the nature of the fiduciary
obligation. The duty is owed at the time the decision is made, not only during the
discussions leading up to the decision. It is not enough for the appropriate
department to advance the proper arguments for the Indians : it is necessary for the
Crown to fully weigh them against its other duties at the time it makes its decision .
After all, the statute gives the duty to approve expropriations to the Governor
in Council, not to the officers of the Indian Branch, 81 and it is the Crown which owes
the duty. Urie seems to assume that once the arguments are made, that no breach
by the Governor in Council is possible. With respect, the fiduciary duty, if it is to
be a useful concept, must extend, and be reviewable, up to and including the highest
level . It cannot be put too forcefully that when exercising its discretion, the
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Governor in Council is exercising a duty delegated to it by Parliament . It is subject
to the will of Parliament and it was Parliament which wrote the fiduciary duty into
the Indian Act.
If Urie went too far against finding a fiduciary duty, it is suggested that Heald
perhaps also went too far but in the other direction . It would be impossible for the
government to legislate effectively if it were not able to wear two hats at one time
on occasion. To hold that the duty to the Indians cannot be balanced against the
interests of other Canadians, would be tantamount to entrenching an absolute
aboriginal right, and to have done so through ordinary legislation . Since this cause
of action arose before 1982, such seems unsupportable . A more supportable grounds
would have been to follow the reasoning put forward earlier in this chapter, and to
require the government to justify its taking of the Indian land rather than other
provincial or private land . The fiduciary obligation should have at least required the
government to demonstrate a rational basis for its acting against the interests of the
one to whom it owes a special duty .
It would be hoped that the government could not engage in a conflict of duty
situation such as is found in this case without justification. Just as Sparrow suggests
that the Government must meet a certain legal and constitutional standard when
derogating from the s . 35 right to fish, so too, it would be hoped, would the
government have to justify its derogation from the fiduciary standard when in a
conflict of duty situation. The result would be that the expropriation would have to
be, not only valid, but also justifiable . Such, I would suggest, should have been the
345
holding in Kruger itself.
In fact, Heald, having stated that the duty to the Indians must not be
breached, does seem to suggest that justification may be possible . In relation to the
1943 expropriation Heald had found additional breaches of the fiduciary standard
in that there had not been full disclosure and that the price paid was less than the
valuation. He commented :
[T]he Governor in Council is not able to default in its fiduciary relationship
to the Indians on the basis of other priorities and other considerations . If
there was evidence in the record to indicate that careful consideration and
due weight had been given to the pleas and representations by Indian Affairs
on behalf of the Indians and, thereafter, an offer of settlement reflecting those
representations had been made, I would have viewed the matter differently.'
Even so, for Heald to have been satisfied, it seems that the Governor in Council
would have to have reached a different conclusion . The decision taken, Heald
makes clear, was absolutely not acceptable .
Apssassin et al . v . Canada,' is the second case which deals extensively with
the fiduciary duty. In this case the plaintiffs and other members of two Treaty 8
Bands, alleged several breaches of the fiduciary duty in relation to the surrender of
certain reserve lands and minerals . The mineral rights were surrendered "in trust
to lease" in 1940 . In 1945 the reserve was surrendered "in trust to sell or lease" and
in 1950 the surrendered lands complete with the minerals were transferred to the
Director of the Veterans' Lands Act who subsequently disposed of them. In 1950,
the Bands were granted new lands but did not receive the mineral rights with those
lands.
This case, it is important to note, came to trial after 1982 and after the
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decision in Guerin. In Kruger, the Department of Indian Affairs agreed, in exchange
for the expropriated lands, to a sum less than the appraised value . In Apssassin
when it transferred the surrendered lands, in this case to the Director of the
Veterans' Lands Act, it did so for a price less than the appraised value . Addy J .
found this to be in breach of the fiduciary duty of the Crown . But that is not all .
The lower price was a breach also because the Crown was unable to justify the
deficiency. He noted :
The defendant had a duty to convince the Court that it could not reasonably
have been expected to obtain a better price
This demonstrates a more sophisticated view of the obligation than that found in
Kruger, and supports the reasoning suggested above .
Addy makes another very useful point in Apssassin. He suggests that the
fiduciary obligation does not require the Crown to treat the Indians as if they were
not sui °uris' This would appear to be correct. The fiduciary obligation is intended
to protect the Indian Nations from third parties, not to prevent them ever taking
over their own affairs.' Also the Guerin decision clearly recognizes the power of
the Indians to restrict the discretion of the Crown during the negotiation process .
A further point that Addy makes which illustrates the sophistication of his
understanding of the Crown's fiduciary duty is his recognition that Treaty 8 may also
have created further fiduciary duties .' Rejecting an allegation of the plaintiffs that
the Treaty included a promise to supply reserve lands as they might become
necessary, he notes:
Because of the special relationship existing between the Crown and the
Indians, the illiteracy of the latter and their dependency on the advice of the
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agents of the Crown [at treaty time], if there was in fact any representation
made to the Indians to that effect previous to signature, any such
representation would be fully binding at law on the Crown, notwithstanding
the fact that it might not have been fully incorporated in the formal terms of
the treaty
This acceptance of the enforceability of the promises made during treaty negotiations
is a major step forward for Canadian native law. It is to be regretted that no
rational basis for the assertion is offered .
Nevertheless, there are some problems with Addy's discussion of this point .
It is suggested that he goes too far when he suggests that there is no legal duty to
protect the Indians. If hitherto unenforceable terms of the treaties have become
enforceable it can only be because of the passage of the Constitution Act . 1982 . It
is also clear that hitherto unenforceable aboriginal rights, such as that in Sparrow,
have become enforceable.' That being so, it would seem unwise to make such
rather all-encompassing statements . He states, for example :
There might exist a moral, social or political obligation to take special care
of the Indians and to protect them (especially those who are not advanced
educationally, socially or politically) from the selfishness, cupidity, cunning,
strategems and trickery of the white man . That type of political obligation,
unenforceable at law, which the Federal Court of Appeal in the Guerin case
felt should apply to the Crown following surrender (which concept was, of
course, rejected by the Supreme Court), would be applicable previous to
surrender."
The problem with this is that the passing of the Constitution Act. 1982 may very well
have rendered such an obligation, or perhaps some aspects of it, justiciable . That
at least is the argument in this thesis .
Furthermore, he comments of the Indian Act :
The Indian Act was passed pursuant to the exclusive jurisdiction to do so
granted by the Constitution Act . 1867 . This does not carry with it the legal
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obligation to legislate or to carry out programs for the benefit of Indians
anymore than the existence of various disadvantaged groups in society creates
a general legally enforceable duty on the part of governments to care for
those groups although there is of course a moral and political duty to so do
in a democratic society where the welfare of the individual is regarded as
paramount!'
	
(emphasis in the original)
With respect, it is suggested that here too, he is wrong . It is just not appropriate to
compare the aboriginal peoples with "disadvantaged groups" . The rights of the First
Nations originate in a unique history . Indeed, the aboriginal peoples are not
disadvantaged in every sense. Their special constitutional status, in one sense, makes
them especially advantaged . It may just be the case that some ministerial and
cabinet discretions have become enforceable . It is possible, for example, that the
education provisions of the Indian Act are also enforceable.' It need have nothing
to do with a disadvantaged status .
A final criticism which it is possible to make with Addy's discussion of the
Guerin type fiduciary relationship is that he speaks of the duty attaching to the land
or the proceeds of its disposition' With respect, this would seem to be misleading .
If Dickson J., as he then was, is correct, the fiduciary duty does not attach to the
land but rather is owed to the Band . The land, or the proceeds, provide only a
method of setting damages for breach . It would appear that it will not be possible
to follow the land and Addy sees this .' Consequently, it is misleading to speak of
the duty "attaching to the land". Only if Wilson J .'s opinion were to be followed, and
the relationship deemed to be one of trust, would the duty attach to the land .
Improperly taken land, it would appear, will be lost to the Band. It is a minor
quibble, but worth commenting on in passing .
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Complaints aside, Addy's decision is a useful one for examining the possible
scope of the fiduciary duty . In the final analysis, it would appear that these two
cases support the argument that the best interpretation of the fiduciary obligation
as a constitutional doctrine, would be one that would require the government to
justify any actions which operate to the detriment of the Indian Nations . We find
support for such a position in the meagre case law that has so far taken place . This
would make the fiduciary obligation considerably stronger than the equivalent
obligation in the United States .
iv Summary
The argument, it is suggested, is compelling. The fiduciary obligation
recognized in Guerin when entrenched in the Constitution would go further than
allowed by Urie in her. The Constitutionally entrenched duty would remain one
variable through federal legislation . The power to abrogate the duty, it is suggested
has been lost and the power to vary has been limited . Where the variation does not
affect the Indian interest in land, the Crown may vary without permission of the
affected Indians. Where the variation does affect the Indian interest, the Crown may
vary its obligations only if it has the informed consent of the affected of the Indians
or if it can justify the variation as being in a proper exercise of its power to govern .
This will be necessary when the interests or rights of others clash with the Indian
rights or interests protected by the fiduciary obligation. Finally, it may be possible
that positive duties to legislate so as to protect the Indian interest may also exist .
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Such a point can only be proved or disproved in relation to specific facts
b A Fiduciary Theory for Constitutional Review
The analysis of Dickson's opinion offered here suggests that the fiduciary
obligation recognized in Guerin contains five elements : a recognized legal interest,
a triggering event which gives rise to a duty, a legislative scheme which invites the
supervision of the courts, a purpose, and a connecting principle . In Guerin it is an
interest in the land, the aboriginal title, which is at the centre of the law . The duty
to protect the Indian interest in the land is triggered by the surrender requirement .
I have suggested that this is in effect a denial of the right to the Indians to regulate
and alienate their land . The purpose of the duty is found in the protective role of
the Crown, recognized throughout Indian/European and Indian/Canadian relations,
and which is also apparent in the provisions of both the Royal Proclamation and the
Indian Act . The fourth element is a legislative scheme which invites the scrutiny of
the courts . That is provided by the Indian Act and its delegation of discretion to the
Governor in Council. Finally, the law of fiduciaries provides a principle to connect
the above elements and guide the courts in their review of the actions of the
government. The theory, of course, is intended to protect the Indian land rights and
is, I have suggested, now entrenched in the Constitution.
But I would go further than simply protecting land rights . I wish to suggest
that Guerin can provide a minimum standard for the interpretation of s .35 rights .
I would suggest that the interests recognized in the Guerin case are inevitably
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limited by the facts of the case itself . So, consequently, is the law . Guerin is a pre-
1982 case concerned with land issues . But I have suggested that the recognition of
land rights is only one element of the full range of aboriginal rights . The special
status of the aboriginal peoples as peoples, as the First Nations, is, I have argued,
the essential aboriginal and treaty right . A general theory must, if it is to be useful,
be relevant to the implications of this special status . And I have argued that Chief
Justice Dickson's opinion might contain the germ of such a general theory .
The protection of rights in land, I suggest, is merely the result of the
recognition of special status . It is an aspect of the wider hitherto unenforceable
obligation of the government inherent in the Doctrine of Discovery . Land rights
seem to be the premier aboriginal right only because they have been the first to
come to court. Recognition of the land right, it can be argued, implies special status .
The Constitution Act . 1982, s. 35 if it entrenches anything, must entrench that special
status. Special status gives the aboriginal peoples of Canada a right to a measured
separateness of which special protection of the interest in land is only one aspect .
i The Constitutional Fiduciary Theory
Both Chief Justice Dickson and Madame Justice Wilson imply the existence
of a background fiduciary obligation in Guerin9' The judgement in the Federal
Court of Appeal rests firmly upon an unenforceable duty ." It is my suggestion that
s. 35 has made at least some of that background duty enforceable .
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aThe Origin
Chief Justice Dickson founds his fiduciary theory in the aboriginal title of the
Musqueam Band. I have argued above that a broader principle underlies the
doctrine of aboriginal title . I have argued that at root, the doctrine of aboriginal
title rests upon the pre-contact sovereignty of the First Nations . I have suggested
that Dickson's opinion even intimates this fact .
The doctrine of aboriginal title is a recognition that before colonisation, the
Indian nations of North America governed themselves and their lands according to
their own ideas of governance and their own ideas of property and right . The
government policy of negotiating treaties of peace and friendship as well as the later
land surrender treaties with the Indians as tribes rather than individuals is a further
recognition of the pre-contact sovereignty of the Indian nations . And the Royal
Proclamation and the Indian Act also indicate that some limited recognition was
given to Indian sovereignty . The legal interest which gives rise to the broader
fiduciary obligation is the pre-contact power of the Indian nations to regulate their
own affairs. That is to say, their pre-contact sovereignty .
b The Triggering Event
The event which triggers Dickson's fiduciary obligation is the unilateral
imposition of the surrender requirement by the Crown . It is to be noted that, since
the fiduciary obligation might have unenforceable aspects, it is not necessary that the
surrender requirement be justiciable or even of itself give rise to justiciable rights .
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Justiciability is a separate issue. The surrender requirement is, I have argued, only
one aspect of the more general disability which is effected by the Doctrine of
Discovery. The Doctrine of Discovery did not only deny the right to regulate and
alienate the interest in land, it also denied the Indian nations any input into, or
power over, the new scheme of governance in their homeland . It was a denial of
sovereign power and of any right to self-determination .
Such a rule was contrary to the British colonial law requiring that the laws
of the inhabitants of occupied colonized lands be respected . That the colonisation
of Canada occurred for the most part without the conquest of the Indian nations,
meant that the colonial governments should have respected the pre-existing Indian
rights. When the European nations decided to override the rights of the aboriginal
peoples of the Americas, they did so justifying their actions through the Doctrine of
Discovery. The power it gave the colonial nations came charged with a duty . That
duty, it has been suggested, is an essential part of the trust obligation . The Doctrine
of Discovery requires that the colonial government take up the trust obligation
towards the Indians whose rights they have ignored . It is suggested that the denial
of Indian sovereignty through the imposition of the Doctrine of Discovery is the
origin of a special duty owed to the Indian nations .
c The Legislative Scheme which invites the Supervision of the Courts
While the Royal Proclamation and the Indian Act operate to make the land
interest in Guerin justiciable, s. 35 of the Constitution Act . 1982 acts so as to make
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the broader obligation justiciable . This is not to suggest that all and every aspect of
pre-contact Indian sovereignty has become justiciable . It will remain necessary that
any particular interest be proved to be justiciable .
d The Purpose of the Duty
I have shown above that the fiduciary obligation, if it is not properly
channelled, often proves somewhat wayward.' The protective role of the Crown
serves to prevent the Guerin obligation from allowing the courts to make political
decisions. I have argued that s. 35 of the Constitution Act. 1982 entrenches a
"measured separateness" . It is suggested that this is the purpose of the broader
fiduciary obligation. The purpose of the land right recognized by the Royal
Proclamation and the Indian Act, I would argue, is to permit the First Nations to
adjust to the new regime which the colonists imposed upon them . Measured
separateness is what Wilkinson has called the similar right in the United States ."'
I have suggested that the purpose of the entrenchment of aboriginal and
treaty rights in the Constitution is to permit the aboriginal peoples to develop, within
Canadian society, in some measure in accord with the dictates of their own traditions
and their own culture . Again, this will not make any particular interest justiciable .
It merely assists the aboriginal peoples and the legislative and judicial arms of the
government to determine what is and what is not a permitted interference with an
established aboriginal or treaty right .
355
eThe Connecting Principle
As in Guerin, the four elements are connected by the fiduciary principle . It
operates to protect rights which are subject to variation, the control of which is not
in the hands of the rights-holders themselves. The Constitutional fiduciary would
limit the power of the Crown so as to permit only those variations of any aboriginal
or treaty right, and perhaps of "other" rights, that can be justified in accord with a
rational scheme. The rational scheme, we have seen, is to be found in the past and
present practice of the Crown .
f Summary
Such then are the elements of the theory . Paraphrasing the Chief Justice one
might put them together in this way . The fiduciary theory of Constitutional review
of aboriginal and treaty rights, finds its origin in the denial of Indian sovereignty at
the time of discovery, coupled with the fact that the Indian nations were denied any
input into, or power over, the new governing regime . The fact that, under the
Doctrine of Discovery, the colonial government pledged to govern with due regard
to the Indian presence gives rise to the particular purpose of the obligation which
is to allow the aboriginal peoples a degree of measured separateness . Finally 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982 invites court supervision of governmental action . Crown
action will be judged according to a fiduciary standard . Only those variations of
aboriginal or treaty rights which can be justified will pass constitutional review .
What might be justifiable will depend on the legislative and factual history of the
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particular right being litigated and of the aboriginal group litigating .
ii A Measured Separateness
The above, of course, says nothing of the particular interests protected . I
have avoided delineating the interests protected because such issues can only be
determined in relation to specific facts .'° ' That cannot be done here . It is possible
nevertheless, to offer some general guidelines . I have argued that measured
separateness permits the aboriginal peoples to live within Canada in some measure
of accord with their own traditions and culture . Although it may not be a necessary
part of measured separateness, the reserve system is perhaps the clearest illustration
of the concept . The right to special schools under treaty and the Indian Act, may
be another. The Indian law of the United States has recognized the concept of a
measured separatism and offers a possible test for the determination of the content
of s. 35. While the United States' jurisprudence is not decisive in the interpretation
of the Canadian Constitution, it has been influential ." And in Indian law matters,
as we have noted previously, that influence is compounded ."
I have suggested that the United States jurisprudence on Indian law has three
components: First, the Indians are considered "domestic dependent nations" who live
under the protection of the federal government . Second, Congress, and perhaps the
Executive, has the absolute power to legislate on Indian matters . Included in these
powers is the power to terminate Indian status over the objections of the Indian
Nations themselves . And third, where the government has legislated for the Indians,
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in the absence of a statement to the contrary on the face of the statute itself, a
presumption operates to limit its impact on the status of the tribes . The
presumption originates in the trust or fiduciary obligation by the federal government
to the Indians . Its effect is determined by an interpretation of the legislation viewed
in light of a presumption that the federal government intends to respect the residual
sovereignty of the Indian Nations ."
Wilkinson suggests that this law, together with the history of Indian/U .S .
relations, is designed to allow the Indian nations to live separate lives within the
United States . He views the late nineteenth century cases expressing the
unrestricted power of Congress over Indians as the remnant of an assimilationist
policy which has been tried and discarded . While the power remains, it is now
rarely invoked. He comments :
Implicit in all the talk [at treaty time] was not only that each tribe would
remain a people, but also the perception that a homeland, separate and
distinct from the surrounding white culture, was a requisite element for that
survival . . . . The essence of [the] laws, then, as viewed by both Indian tribes
and by the United States, was to limit tribes to significantly smaller domains
but also to preserve substantially intact a set of societal conditions and tribal
prerogatives that existed then . '°s
	
(authorities omitted)
This separateness, while it does not have constitutional protection, is the guiding
principle, Wilkinson suggests, which restricts the courts, the executive, and Congress .
The Indians' rights to pursue their own future within the United States are, for
Wilkinson, part of the essence of the United States . They are not, however,
constitutionally protected .
Such separateness has not been explicitly expressed in Canadian law, but, I
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suggest, it has been, and remains, an important aspect here also. I have suggested
above that Wilkinson's three part model is useful in analyzing Canadian Native law .
American law provides a perspective from which to view the history as well as the
growing jurisprudence on aboriginal rights in this country. I have suggested that s .
35 is intended to protect a measured separateness for the Canadian First Nations .
The right to live in accord with a particular set of values and rules, leads one to the
conclusion that the set of rights which has been entrenched must consist of those
rights which are essential to aboriginality .
Wilkinson suggests that such is the case in the United States . Wilkinson's
review is mainly concerned with the jurisdiction of the Indian tribal court systems .
But it does have relevance for the argument advanced here . As noted above he
suggests that the United States' law has progressed from dealing with land rights,
through rights to sovereign status within the United States, to developing a rule for
the balancing the jurisdiction of Indian and non-Indian governments and courts
systems. He states :
The identification of legitimate tribal interests is the touchstone for refining
and specifying the general promises in old laws . . . . The modern decisions
have recognized various legitimate tribal interests that, taken together, have
the potential of fulfilling the major promise made by the United States to
Indian tribes - the guarantee of a measured separatism ."
"Legitimate tribal interests" which have figured in recent cases include "an overriding
interest in economic development", providing services to reserve residents, and the
establishment and enforcement of norms and values in their communities ."
These interests are subject to certain limitations . The courts have held that
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the treaties and treaty substitutes were intended to protect the Indians only against
"unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty" . This, Wilkinson comments,
allowed the courts to restrict Indian control over non-Indians in criminal matters .'°8
Further limitations limit off-reservation fishing rights, and perhaps water rights, to
those necessary to provide a "moderate living"." In the economic sphere, only those
tribal economic activities which are "tied to value created on the reservation" have
been allowed to operate free of state legislation . This restriction has denied to one
group of tribes, for example, the power to avoid state taxation of cigarettes which
are sold to off-reservation residents."° A second limitation in the economic sphere
requires tribal revenue raising to be related to the provision of governmental
services."' Wilkinson concludes :
[T]he concept of legitimate tribal interests [is] a useful device by which to
bind together aspects of doctrine that are now treated disparately . The choice
of legitimate interests as the benchmark of analysis is non-doctrinaire : it
simply collects ideas, some of which benefit tribes and some of which do not,
that are embodied in the treaties and treaty substitutes and that can efficiently
and fairly focus judicial analysis ."'
Canadian native law is badly in need of a concept which binds together disparate
aspects of doctrine .
I do not suggest that the Canadian courts should follow the United States
lead in the incidents of legitimate tribal interests . I do suggest that the rule could
serve usefully in this country. I have covered the United States' law at some length
simply to illustrate the strength of the concept. The aboriginal peoples of Canada
as well as the Canadian courts and governments will have to determine the elements
of legitimate First Nations' interests in this country . The content of measured
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separateness, which is to say the range of rights protected by s . 35, could be such
rights as are essential to aboriginality and which have found some measure of
protection in legislation, subordinate legislation, treaties, and governmental practice .
Those rights, I would suggest are inextricably bound up with the wardship .
iv The Wardship : A Final Comment
The concept of a legislative power over the First Nations, charged with a duty
to protect a measured separateness is an adequate description of the wardship
assumed by the Crown at the time of colonisation . Since the earliest days of
colonisation, the First Nations of Canada have lived under the special protection of
the Crown. We have seen that much the same might be said of many, if not all, of
the aboriginal peoples of the Americas . The Spanish, the British and the United
States have all held themselves to owe a special obligation to their aboriginal
inhabitants . For the most part, the aboriginal peoples have had to rely on the
largesse of the colonial and successor governments to enforce that obligation . Only
some aspects have been entrenched into law . Nevertheless, the trust obligation, as
it has been called in Canada and the United States, even where not entrenched into
law, has coloured and guided governmental policy and practice . Often it has been
used cynically . One author has called it the "vague doctrine of guardian-ward -
which may be subject to the self-serving and patronizing discretion of a paternalistic
"protector""."' At other times it has given great support ."' Mr Justice Hall likened
it to the Magna Carta."'
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I have argued that the trust obligation, and I have called it the wardship to
emphasize the positive duties which it contains, informs the whole of the legislative
and administrative scheme under which the Indians are governed in Canada . The
wardship has been for the most part, only a moral or political obligation . The
Crown, until 1982 at least, has chosen to make only some aspects of the wardship
enforceable. For example, I have suggested that the Indian Act can be viewed as
a codification of certain aspects of the wardship . It codifies, for example, the Guerin
interest. In addition, it codifies, amongst other things, certain aspects of the
wardship relating to education, status, governance, and economic development .
Other instruments may also codify aspects of the wardship . The doctrine of
aboriginal title, the Royal Proclamation, the Indian Act, the treaties, orders in
council, and perhaps even governmental policy all might provide the basis of
enforceable rights.
Before April 17, 1982, few, if any, of the Indian Act or other provisions would
have been protected from alteration by Parliament . The positive duties in the
treaties, such as the provision of schools for example, have been unenforceable
unless written into legislation. In addition, wardship provisions of the Indian Act
such as the obligation to provide schools are couched in permissive, not mandatory,
language."' Consequently, it is doubtful if, for example, a Band could have forced
a reluctant government to provide or upgrade a reserve school . With the coming
into force of the new Constitution, all that may have changed .
Section 35 of the Constitution Act. 1982, 1 have suggested, protects all those
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aspects of the wardship which have found their way into law, whether through
legislation, the common law, or perhaps even governmental practice . It may also
render enforceable some of the positive duties contained within the trust obligation .
Arguably, anything that is "essential to aboriginality" might come within the wardship
and s. 35 .
In the early days of colonisation, the Indian nations were denied input into
the new governing system . Today that is no longer the case . However, they now
lack the numbers to be able to effectively assert their special interests in Parliament
and the legislatures . It can be argued then, that the trust obligation has become
essential to the First Nations because of their political vulnerability to the majority
of Canadians. The trust obligation serves to balance that political power at least
until such constitutional arrangements as are necessary to protect the special status
of the First Nations have been agreed upon and entrenched .
I have suggested above that the trust obligation requires that the government
both protect and promote the aboriginal peoples . The concept of measured
separateness supports that the government might have positive duties in relation to
the aboriginal persons . It is clear that should it be proved that a law derogates in
an unjustifiable manner from an. existing aboriginal right, that that law will be
declared of no force and effect in accordance with the requirements of s . 52 of the
Constitution Act. 1982. I would suggest further, that where the lack of legal
protection permits the destruction of aboriginality, there may also be a positive duty
on the Crown to pass legislation. In the absence of that, it might fall to the courts
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to find a rule in the common law allowing them to order compliance with the
Constitution. I have argued elsewhere that such a rule may be found ."'
This would be a rare occurrence . It may now be possible for bands to insist
upon schools which, not only protect and promote the aboriginality of their
communities, but which also are the equal of those provided to non-aboriginal
communities .
v The Theory
We can now lay out the theory in its entirety. It is a theory which supports
an interpretation of s. 35 of the Constitution Act. 1982 and which amounts a minimal
limitation on the powers of the Crown . Section 35 entrenches the rights of
aboriginal peoples as they existed as of April 17th, 1982 . At that time, aboriginal
rights were susceptible to both provincial and federal legislation . Many were subject
to variation by regulation or even through changes in administrative policy . Many
of the rights entrenched therefore, will have been entrenched as variable rights. The
rights of the aboriginal rights of the aboriginal peoples while they have received
constitutional protection remain within the scope of the federal and perhaps
provincial legislative bodies.
The interpretation of these very vague aboriginal rights requires a principled
approach which is guided by a sound theory . The theory proposed here is based
firmly in the unique history of the relationship between the Crown and the First
Nations and the long history of fiduciary law . It is based upon a broad reading of
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the decision of the now Chief Justice Dickson in Guerin.
The purpose of the entrenchment of aboriginal and treaty rights is to allow
the aboriginal peoples to live within Canada in accord with their own culture and
their own traditions . Section 35 is intended to protect for the aboriginal peoples, a
degree of "measured separateness" within the Canadian nation . The concept of a
measured separateness was entrenched into the Constitution in compliance with a
long tradition of granting special status for the aboriginal peoples . It is a tradition
which finds its roots in an historic duty shouldered by the Crown since the very
earliest days of colonization.
The special status has its origin in the pre-contact sovereignty of the Indian
nations. The denial of that sovereignty through the Doctrine of Discovery, together
with the denial of the right to input into, or any control over, the new governance
of their traditional lands, gave rise to a special duty owed by the Crown to the
Indian Nations . The denial of civil rights to the occupants of the colonized lands
required that the imperial Crown act to protect the now politically powerless original
inhabitants from the excesses of the settlers and their local administrations . It
required also that the Crown take up an obligation to assist the original inhabitants
to adapt to the changed circumstances and make the transition from their traditional
lifestyles to full participation in the new .
The special relationship which this gave rise to is now called the trust
obligation. I have here also described it as a wardship so as to emphasize the fact
that the duty is not only to protect Indian existence, but is also intended to promote
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their adaptation. That transition is not yet complete . The measured separateness
entrenched in the Constitution, is designed not only to allow the First Nations to
follow the dictates of their own culture, it is also intended to protect them during the
period of transition. Once the transition is complete, and the First Nations have a
viable and secure place in the new Canadian nation, the duty to promote may fall
away. The right to a measured separateness will persist.
The fiduciary theory therefore, will protect those rights or aspects of the
wardship which have found recognition in Canadian legislation and administration .
It will protect in addition any rights which are essential to the measured
separateness, that is essential to aboriginality. Where legislation or administration
threatens an aboriginal right, or an interest essential to aboriginality, the
Constitution can be called upon to prevent its operation so as to detrimentally affect
aboriginal rights . The aboriginal group litigating the issue would have to prove that
the interest has received recognition or that it is essential to aboriginality .
Where either has been proved, the theory would then require the Crown to
justify the encroachment it proposes . Derogation would be allowed only where a
valid a justifiable purpose can be proved . The wardship would to some extent supply
the standard: the Crown would have to justify failing to meet the duty to protect
and promote the First Nations . They could do this perhaps in two ways. They could
show that the derogation has a purpose which, while it may have some detrimental
effects, has overall a beneficial one ."' Second, they might show that a valid national
interest requires that the rights of the aboriginal group be balanced against those
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of other Canadians.
This, of course, is only the bare bones of a theory. We have seen that the
United States' Indian law has further checks within a similar theory . Further checks
and balances would have to be worked out in relation to specific facts and particular
aboriginal peoples . Conservation, for example, is a sensible limitation on the
aboriginal right to hunt and fish . Nevertheless, the proposed theory, it is suggested,
is a useful place from which to start. It is a theory which attempts to live up to the
promise which the commentators have seen in the opinion of Chief Justice Dickson
in Guerin.
I shall close the chapter, and the thesis with three examples of how the
proposed duty might operate and how the courts might review the sufficiency of the
governmental action.
c Some Applications of the Theory
i Child Welfare
It is only recently that Indian families have been subjected to the imposition
of the provincial child welfare systems . In 1951, the Indian Act was amended to
allow provincial laws of general application to apply on reserve ."' This made
provincial child welfare laws applicable on reserves . They have had a massive effect.
In 1955, for example, less than 1% of the children in care in British Columbia were
Indian. By 1964 the figure had risen to more than 34% . '20 It has been estimated
that in 1980 Indian children were 4 .6 times more likely to be represented in the
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child welfare system than non-Indian children ."' In 1983, the Penner Report
concluded :
The imposition of non-Indian views of child care, through the enforcement
of provincial child welfare policies on reserves, has had tragic effects on
Indian family life .'
In their submission to the Penner Committee, the Alberta Council of Treaty Women
described the excessive apprehension of Indian children as a "process of cultural
genocide"."
Since the mid-1970s, the worst excesses of the problem have been dealt with .
The administration of Indian child welfare has been increasingly given over to the
First Nations . Many provinces have entered into agreements giving control to the
First Nations" and some have altered their legislation so as to require the
consideration of Indianness as an essential element of the best interests of the
child.' In addition, the courts too have recognized that Indianness is an important
aspect of the best interests of the child . The problem, as a problem of Indian versus
non-Indian values, has, for the most part, been eliminated .` However, it is
interesting to examine what might have happened had the fiduciary theory been
brought to bear upon this problem before the adjustments had been made .
The protection of children in need of care would clearly have been within the
scope of the pre-contact sovereignty of the First Nations . It was not, however, an
interest which, before the late 1970s had received recognition in legislation or in any
other instrument of which I am aware . Similarly, I am not aware of any
governmental policy which addressed the issue . The First Nations, then would have
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to prove that the problem of provincial intervention is one which threatens an
interest essential to aboriginality .
Though I do not intend to do so here, that would not be a difficult task . A
policy of removal of the children of a community clearly threatens its viability . In
1980 the Chief of the Spallumcheen Band, a band of some 300 members, realised
that since the 1960s, 150 children had been removed from the reserve . Johnston in
his book on Native Child Welfare comments :
That represented virtually an entire generation."
To allow such a state of affairs to continue would clearly threaten the existence of
the Spallumcheen Band .
Once the Band had proved the threat to their aboriginality the loss of their
children would be, the burden would pass to the Crown to justify their intervention .
It is difficult to imagine how that could be done . The wardship would require the
Crown to protect and promote the Band and s . 35 would require the protection of
the measured separateness. The Crown would be required to undertake just what
has occurred : Establish child welfare systems which recognize the importance of
Indianness, or permit the establishment of on-Reserve systems . Should they fail to
do so, the Courts would have had to fashion a rule including Indianness as one of
the best interests of the child . It is interesting to note in passing that such a rule
would operate against the Crown in both its provincial and its federal manifestations .
ii The Treaty Right to Post-Secondary Education
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On May 24, 1989, the Indigenous Bar Association made a submission to the
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs arguing for the existence
of a treaty right to post-secondary education.' They base their arguments on the
text of the numbered treaties, the content of the negotiations at treaty time, and the
judicial standard of treaty interpretation . They also assert that the fiduciary duty
recognized in Guerin establishes a right to post-secondary education as an aboriginal
right in those areas where the treaties do not cover education or where there are
no treaties .
Having noted the tenor of Chief Justice Dickson's opinion in Guerin, the
I.B.A. goes on to comment on the effects of colonization :
[Y]ou have a situation in which the way of life of Indians is being destroyed
with the grace and approval of the fiduciary, the federal Crown . Hence the
Indian populations who become dispossessed are left in a very humbled state .
In an effort to alleviate the situation, the Crown introduced special measures
to promote the education of Indians, to make them better able to deal with
the change in lifestyle .'
They then note that the practice of the Crown in relation to the issue, included the
recognition of the importance of the post-secondary education . Crown documents
went as far as to describe the post-secondary assistance program as an "[essential
service] which must be provided to meet federal obligations"."' So far the argument
is effective .
Unfortunately, at that point it falls apart . The I.B.A. then merely asserts :
Arguably, given the fiduciary nature of the Federal-Indian relationship, the
policy of providing post-secondary education assistance to Indians has
crystallized into a specific aboriginal [and treaty] right . This is reinforced by
the fact that successive Ministers of Indian Affairs have articulated that post-
secondary assistance shall be provided to all those who apply . This is further
supported by the mandatory nature of the program . . . . If post-secondary
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education was an existing aboriginal and treaty right as at April 1982, then,
it may be unconstitutional for the Minister to make the changes he is
proposing."'
This assertion ignores that the right recognized in Guerin, was one which functioned
to protect an interest in land . And they have not made the argument that it can be
broadened to protect less tangible interests, and most certainly they have not made
the argument that the obligation might encompass positive duties such as an ongoing
obligation to fund education .
Finally, they suggest that the consent of the First Nations will be necessary
before the rate of funding might be cut."' This too seems something of a leap from
the opinion of the present Chief Justice in Guerin. There is no blanket requirement
for the consent of the First Nations in Guerin . And Kruger makes it clear that
reserve lands can be taken over the objections of the First Nations ."
It is suggested that although Indigenous Bar Association is not convincing, the
argument can be made . The theory presented here shows how the obligation might
be broadened to include such elements of the trust obligation as education.
Education is clearly an aspect of the pre-contact sovereignty of the First Nations .
The duty raised by the assertion of sovereignty clearly includes the obligation to
provide an education sufficient to allow full involvement in the modern society . The
I.B.A. makes the argument for the importance of education to the transition of the
First Nations to a place within the new society .
However, when asserting the right to continued full funding they are on
shakier ground. A absolute right which would allow any First Nations member the
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opportunity to obtain post-secondary education would not serve the transition from
a traditional to a modern economy . The right necessary for the transition would
require perhaps only such funding as would allow the First Nations to compete on
a basis equal to that of members of the dominant society . At the point where the
First Nations have a number of say university graduates equal to that of the
dominant society, then it would seem to be possible for the Crown to justify cutting
back on funding. Until that point, however, I would suggest that the First Nations
could prove the need for, and the obligation of the Crown to provide, post-secondary
funding to all who might apply . The right, however, would seem to be a variable
one.
In support of the argument that it is a variable right, it might be noted that
any right to post-secondary education existing on April 17th, 1982 would have been
subject to Parliament. Furthermore, the power to regulate funding was exercised as
a matter of policy through the Department of Indian Affairs . It is then, a matter
very similar in scope to the aboriginal right to fish first recognized by Dickson in
Jack" and more recently by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Sparrow." It
is a regulated right. Arguably the right remains subject to justifiable variation .
Consequently, the I.B.A. should attempt to prove that the numbers applying for post-
secondary funding still remain below the numbers necessary for the First Nations to
be able to compete effectively in the dominant economy .
The application of the theory advanced here would place the onus on the
federal government to prove that the aboriginal peoples are not being condemned
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to second class citizenship by the refusal to assist the aboriginal peoples, as peoples,
to attain a level of education sufficient to permit full participation in the Canadian
society. It would, I believe, support the call of the First Nations for continued full
funding for all those who apply .
iii The Sechelt Band Self-Government Act
The Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act' s , has greatly changed the land
law in that part of Indian country . By s.23(1), of this Act the government has passed
complete ownership in the reserve lands to the Band . Fee simple title is now vested
in the Band. Section 24 protects any previously existing interests, including any
reversionary rights the provincial government might have if the Band were to
become extinct . Other provisions refer to the operation of provincial laws on the
Band's land. Many questions are raised as to the effect this might have on the
Crown's fiduciary obligation and the application of provincial laws .
It is worth prefacing this discussion by noting section 3 of the Act . It reads :
3. For greater certainty, nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to
abrogate or derogate from any existing aboriginal or treaty rights of the
members of the Sechelt Indian Band, or any other aboriginal peoples of
Canada, under s. 35 of the Constitution Act 1982.
This section might have great significance if provincial and Sechelt interests diverge .
The fiduciary obligation, it will be remembered, arises out of aboriginal title
and the surrender obligation . Essential to its existence is the discretion that the
Crown has over the potential uses of surrendered reserve land .
The first comment that must be made is that the federal government might
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be held to a fiduciary standard in relation to the transfer of the reserve to the Band
under the Act . If there is a fiduciary obligation owed under s . 91(24) of the
Constitution Act. 1867, that duty would govern the transfer of the land to the Band .
We have to assume that there have been no breaches of the duty during the transfer
process. If there have been, it would remain open to the Band or its members to
sue the government for breach of its duty .
I am assuming also that it is possible for the government and the Sechelt
Band to agree termination of the fiduciary duty, if it is a s . 35 obligation, without the
necessity of a constitutional amendment . It is the position of the Band that the
fiduciary obligation vis a vis the land has now been terminated ."
The Act contains a similar provision to s . 88 of the Indian Act. Section 38
states :
Laws of general application of British Columbia apply to and in respect of
members of the Band except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent
with the terms of any treaty, this or any other Act of Parliament, the
constitution of the Band or a law of the Band .
It is worth noting that, in as much as it is not inconsistent with the Sechelt Act, the
Indian Act still applies to Sechelt lands . Therefore, the law relating to s . 88 remains
in some force .
The legislative powers of the Band under s . 14(3) include the power to adopt
any law of the province of British Columbia as its own law where authorized to by
the Act and the Constitution. Section 15 permits the Council to exercise powers
granted by the B.C. legislature . Sections 17 through 20 allow the Band to establish
itself, as the Sechelt Indian Government District Council. (hereafter SIGDC) The
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Act allows the SIGDC, once established, to exercise certain powers over Sechelt
lands including powers over zoning, the operation of businesses, local taxation and
other matters."' The federal government transferred those powers from the Band
Council to the SIGDC 14th April 1988. 138 Powers over the disposition of land cannot
be transferred to the SIGDC and must remain with the Band .
By the Sechelt Indian Government Enabling Act, 140 the British Columbia
government recognized the SIGDC as the governing body of the District . It provides
in s.3 :
Where in exercise of its powers of self-government conferred by the Sechelt
Indian Band Self-Government Act (Canada) the District Council enacts laws
or by-laws that a municipality has under an act of the province, those laws or
by-laws shall, for the purposes of this act, be deemed to have been enacted
under the authority of that act of the province .
The B.C. government in 1988, through a regulatory power granted in this Act,
allowed the SIGDC funding for municipal programs and suspended the taxation of
non-Indian held Sechelt lands . The SIGDC, in return, agreed to provide municipal
services similar to those provided elsewhere by the province ."'
A prime purpose of the Sechelt Act was to permit the Band to bring its land
under the B.C. lands legislation. This was required to raise funding for a large
marina development the Band had arranged for waterfront land on the reserve . The
investors wanted the security of fee simple and registration, preferably under the
provincial lands registration system .
If the application of B .C. laws to the Sechelt lands were to threaten the
viability of the Band in future years in a way unanticipated today, could the Band
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raise the fiduciary obligation of the Crown to correct the situation? Could the Band
raise the obligation so as to require the Crown to end the operation of B .C. law on
the reserve? If they could do that, could they go further and require the Crown to
pass legislation to prevent the land from being lost to the Band?
It is assumed that the federal government could amend or revoke the
legislation if it were not violating aboriginal rights in so doing. But if the federal
government refused to act, would it be possible for the Band to force the
government to act? Clearly if legislation were violating an aboriginal right, s . 52
could be invoked to have the legislation declared of no force and effect. Section 3
of the Sechelt Act would permit that. But if it were the land right which were
threatened, it would not be that simple . Then it would be Crown protection of land,
the very duty which the Act was intended to oust, that the Band would be invoking .
Since the Band has fee simple and control of the surrender process, it would appear
that no fiduciary obligation would exist in the federal government .
However, the Act includes this provision :
For greater certainty, Sechelt lands are lands reserved for the Indians within
the meaning of Class 24 of section 91 of the Constitution Act . 1867 .
142
This might suggest that the federal government has retained some aspects of its
fiduciary obligations to the Band. There is no purpose speculating under what
circumstances the federal duty might be retained, but, unlikely as it would appear,
it must be admitted that a possibility exists that the federal government still retains
some obligation vis a vis Sechelt Indian lands .
A second question arises . If positive legislative or administrative action were
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necessary to prevent further damage as a result of the operation of the Sechelt Act
and provincial legislation, would it be possible to call on the fiduciary obligation and
the wardship to force the government into action?
It too seems unlikely . However, there are some indicators to the contrary .
The federal government has retained some control over the Band's affairs . The
Band is still within s . 91(24) of the Constitution. Furthermore, they have retained
power over the transfer to the SIGDC and the transfer back to the Band of any
governmental powers." They have also retained control over the approval of
amendments to the Band Constitution .'" Finally, unless declared otherwise, the
Indian Act continues to apply to the Sechelt Band and its members ." In addition,
the Act permits the Minister with the approval of the Governor in Council to enter
into funding agreements with the Band . All this suggests that certain aspects of the
wardship role of the Crown remains active between the Crown and the Sechelt Band .
Therefore, it remains possible that the Band might in future, if its status as an Indian
community were threatened by the continued operation of the Act, be able to raise
an obligation in the federal government to act to protect the Band . Ultimately, it
would appear that certain aspects of the trust obligation remain .
d Conclusion
The theory suggested here is proposed as a minimal standard for the
constitutional review of aboriginal and treaty rights. It is seen as a transitional
theory applicable for s . 35 rights until such time as those rights receive express
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entrenchment. It is clear that a process of negotiation is the better route for
delineating the rights entrenched within s . 35. Nevertheless, it is important, should
the courts find themselves having to deal with litigation before the s . 35 negotiation
process is completed, that they deal with the section so as to require the Canadian
governments to take aboriginal and treaty rights seriously . The standard proposed
here should result in the protection of a broad range of rights . It could also result
in a flood of litigation . That should not be seen as a problem. If the courts do not
demonstrate that they are prepared to give a broad reading to Part II of the
Constitution Act . 1982, there will be no incentive for the governments of Canada to
negotiate in good faith. A positive and principled statement supporting a just
interpretation of existing aboriginal rights may be a necessary prerequisite to the
negotiation of fair resolution of the problems precipitated by the colonisation of
North America.
The aboriginal peoples of Canada stand at a crucial stage in their history .
They have either reached the beginning of decolonization or are at the closing stage
of colonization. The Inuit alone seem to have escaped litigation of their aboriginal
rights. The Bear Island case is presently being appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada." It deals with treaty rights . The crucial Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en case,
presently at trial in British Columbia will, in all probability, take the issue of
aboriginal rights, including the right to self-government to the Supreme Court of
Canada." Finally, the Metis are also at the Supreme Court arguing that they too
have e isting rights as a community ."' It appears that it will be the courts who will
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decide whether colonization or decolonization lies in the immediate future of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada. It is to be hoped that they will take a creative and
just approach to the interpretation of the aboriginal and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples .
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